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In this thesis, I use two strategies of inquiry to further our understanding of indirect 
short-selling constraints. First, I interview a series of experienced market 
practitioners to identify their attitudes towards indirect constraints. I find little 
support for D’Avolio’s (2002) suggestions that short-selling is inhibited by 
managers’ fear of tracking error and by the cultura p essures of a society that can 
vilify short-sellers. However, I am able to introduce a new, social, indirect constraint 
to the literature – the perception that short-selling is a form of ‘trading’ as distinct 
from ‘investment’, and the consequent lack of acceptance amongst stakeholders that 
this engenders. This constraint reveals a divide betwe n the attitudes of the academic 
community and parts of the institutional practitioner community on the subject of 
short-selling. However, interviewees argue that this indirect constraint is diminishing 
over time. This raises the prospect of markets in practice converging in behaviour 
towards the markets assumed in classical asset pricing models, and has implications 
for market efficiency. My second strategy of inquiry s to use a large, new stock 
lending database to explore three risk-related indirect constraints to short-selling. I 
examine ‘crowded exits’, a general class of liquidity problem, and find that these are 
associated with statistically and economically signif cant losses for short-sellers. I 
also examine ‘manipulative short squeezes’, a liquidity problem arising from 
predatory trading. Consistent with theory and the literature on the subject, I find that 
these are rare for larger, more liquid stocks. However, when they do occur, these 
events generate statistically significant losses for short-sellers. Finally, I build upon 
the work of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) and investigate the response of 
short-sellers to losses. I find that short-sellers close their positions in response to 
accounting losses and not simply in response to rising hare prices. This is consistent 
with short-sellers’ use of risk management tools that are designed to crystallize small 
losses. These serve to limit the risk of potentially unlimited losses and to reduce short 
positions at times of heightened synchronization risk. Stocks subject to short-
covering in this manner do not subsequently under-perform the market. My findings 
demonstrate that a sophisticated group of traders, st ongly associated with price 







1.1 Research Objectives of the Thesis 
 
Short-selling is a key component of arbitrage, a process that in neo-classical finance 
involves traders exploiting asset pricing anomalies and in so doing, helping to keep 
markets efficient. However, the literature makes a number of assumptions about 
short-selling and arbitrage. Implicit in Fama’s (1965) description of securities 
markets, for example, is the existence of a myriad of arbitrageurs, each taking small 
positions to exploit mispricing opportunities. Asset pricing models such as the 
Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing (Ross, 1976) assume no restrictions on 
short sales, including full use of the short sale proceeds. There are, though, important 
differences between markets in theory and markets in practice. For example, short-
sellers in practice must find securities to borrow and effectively pay fees to borrow 
those securities. Furthermore, short-sellers face collateralisation and margin 
requirements. Short-selling is thus made difficult (in the finance literature, it is said 
to be ‘constrained’). Such constraints serve to limit the frequency and/or scope of 
arbitrage, and so could have repercussions for asset pricing and market efficiency. 
Short-sale constraints and their impact on rational asset pricing has been a fertile area 
of research over many years. One key strand of the literature seeks to demonstrate 
that securities can become over-priced in the presence of short-sale constraints. 
Miller (1977) shows that securities can become over-valued and remain over-valued 
for some time in markets with short-selling constraints and heterogeneous 
expectations amongst investors. Duffie et al. (2002) show that in the face of short-
selling constraints, a stock price can initially be higher than the greatest valuation of 
any investor, because the price should include the benefits obtained from being able 
to lend the stock in future. Furthermore, the authors show that a stock price under 
short-sale constraints can even be higher than that under a regime where no short-




Theory thus suggests that the presence of short-sale constraints can influence asset 
pricing. Accordingly, any asset pricing model that assumes unconstrained short-
selling is making use of an assumption that can, in and of itself, affect asset pricing. 
The role and importance of assumptions in the models of finance theory has been a 
controversial subject for some time. MacKenzie (2006) describes the debate that 
arose over the use of simplifying assumptions during the development of modern 
finance theory and cites Friedman’s (1953) arguments on this subject. Friedman 
effectively provides a defence for the use of unrealistic assumptions so as to better 
understand the consequences of a change in circumstances: “The test of a theory was 
not whether its assumptions were descriptively ‘realistic’, for they never are, 
but…whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate 
predictions.” These comments were later echoed by Sharpe (1964) in his defence of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. However, Sharpe uss the considerably weakened 
word “acceptable”, rather than “accurate”, when refe ring to the predictions yielded 
by a model. This line of argument, however, is not universally accepted. In 
particular, both Mandelbrot (2004) and Taleb (2007) argue against the common 
assumption of a Gaussian distribution of returns for equities in asset pricing models. 
According to Taleb: “…these Gaussianizations do not have realistic assumptions and 
do not produce realistic results.” Furthermore: “Almost everything in social life is 
produced by rare but consequential shocks and jumps; all the while almost 
everything studied about social life focuses on the “normal”, particularly with “bell 
curve” methods of inference…” Taleb’s arguments have relevance to those studying 
short-selling constraints - specifically, short-sellers are subject to uncommon, but 
consequential, events that would not be experienced by traditional, unleveraged long-
only investors. Examples of such events include ‘crowded exits’ and ‘manipulative 
short squeezes’. These topics are addressed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
 
D’Avolio (2002) studies a sample of US stock lending data and observes that short-
selling is ‘relatively uncommon’ – short interest i typically only 1.5% of market 
value, while only 7% of loan supply (by value) is borrowed. The author introduces 
the ‘short sale reluctance puzzle’ and attributes it to short-sale constraints. He 
suggests three types of constraint: borrowing costs, cultural barriers and a fear of 
3 
 
tracking error, and argues that further research needs to be conducted into the 
barriers to short-selling. It should be noted, though, that short-selling activity has 
generally been increasing in developed equity markets over recent years. Dechow et 
al. (2001) observe a trend of increasing short-selling in the USA over the period 
1973-1993. Boehmer et al. (2008) find that 1 in 8 trades in their US stock sample is a 
short-sale, and suggest that short selling is ‘relatively common’ - in contradistinction 
to D’Avolio’s assertion that it is ‘uncommon’.  Further, growth in the number of 
hedge funds and in their assets under management1 suggests an increasing appetite 
for short-selling. Nevertheless, globally, short-selling remains a limited activity (see 
Bris et al., 2007) and is certainly not the broadly and frequently practised activity 
assumed in Fama’s 1965 discussion of security markets. 
 
Nagel (2005) shows that short-sale constraints helpexplain cross-sectional returns. 
He argues that there are two types of constraint on sh rt-selling: ‘direct’ constraints – 
associated with costs of borrowing and access to stock loans - and ‘indirect’ 
constraints – associated with institutional and cultura  barriers. He further argues that 
stocks owned by major stock lenders are less likely to be subject to direct short-
selling constraints. Using institutional ownership as a proxy for direct short-sale 
constraints, he finds that these help explain a number of cross-sectional return 
anomalies, but do not fully account for the cross-sectional return differences. He calls 
for further research into indirect short-sale constrain s. The literature thus provides 
evidence that direct short-selling constraints can influence cross-sectional returns, 
but also identifies weaknesses in our understanding of indirect short-selling 
constraints. D’Avolio’s ‘short-sale reluctance puzzle’ and Nagel’s call for further 
research into indirect short-sale constraints together inspire the research conducted 
for this thesis.  
 
I interview a series of practitioners to explore thbarriers that exist to short-selling. 
The interviewees include a variety of experienced financial market practitioners, only 
some of whom are involved in short-selling. These interviews are designed to 
improve our understanding of indirect short-sale constraints, to query their relevance 
                                                
1 Industry data is available at www.ifsl.org.uk - International Financial Services London, for example. 
4 
 
in light of the Boehmer et al. (2008) study that suggests that short-selling on the New 
York Stock Exchange has become common, and to identify changing attitudes 
amongst stock market participants. Although I address research questions posed in 
the finance literature, this part of the thesis argu bly belongs in the “Social Studies of 
Finance” field. Social Studies of Finance is the application to financial markets of 
social science disciplines, including sociology and thropology. 
 
The finance literature highlights a number of indirect short-sale constraints, including 
short time horizons (De Long et al., 1990), agency relationships between short-
sellers and owners of capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and a lack of co-ordination 
amongst short-sellers (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002). Interviewees refer to each of 
these indirect short-sale constraints, and to a number of well-understood direct 
constraints such as legal restrictions and the costs associated with borrowing stock to 
facilitate short-selling. However, interviewees reject the two suggestions put forward 
by D’Avolio (2002) – namely, fear of tracking error and the cultural pressures of a 
society that can vilify short-sellers. This allows me to reject the hypothesis that the 
fear of tracking error and vilification are universal constraints to short-selling. 
Furthermore, interviewees make suggestions that allow me to introduce a new, 
social, indirect constraint to the literature – thenotion that short-selling is associated 
with speculation or trading, as opposed to ‘investing’. Whereas ‘investing’ is 
perceived as a long-term social ‘good’ that receives acceptance amongst stakeholders 
such as clients, trustees and investment consultants, short-selling is perceived to be 
speculative or trading–oriented and so does not meet with the same level of 
acceptance. This ‘lack of acceptance’ is an indirect constraint that limits the capital 
allocated to short-selling. It also reveals a divide between the academic community 
and parts of the institutional practitioner community on the subject of short-selling. 
However, interviewees suggest that this indirect constraint has been diminishing over 
time. This raises the possibility of convergence betwe n practice and theory and has 
potentially positive implications for market efficiency.   
 
Interviewees also highlight a number of risks and practices specific to short-selling, 
including ‘crowded exits’, ‘manipulative short squeez s’ and the potential for 
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theoretically unlimited losses. I investigate these ph nomena further, and make use 
of a large, new commercial stock lending database to undertake econometric 
analysis, with the aim of better understanding the nature and impact of these three 
risk-related indirect short-selling constraints. The database comprises publicly 
available stock lending data for the London Stock Exchange (the world’s second 
largest equity market by market capitalization throughout this study). My data runs 
for 45 months, from the inception of the dataset on September 1st 2003 through until 
May 31st 2007. The institutional framework on disclo ure and transparency with 
respect to short-selling differs by country. In particular, there are important 
differences in disclosure between the UK and USA. Whereas monthly short-sale 
information is publicly available in the USA, aggreate daily stock lending data for 
the largest companies is provided in the UK. Stock lending data can be obfuscating 
compared to short-selling data, as one might borrow stock for more reasons than 
simply facilitating a short-sale. However, the availability of daily data provides for a 
greater degree of granularity than does monthly data. Given the short-term nature of 
much short-selling activity (see, for example, Boehm r et al., 2008 and Cohen et al., 
2007), this enhanced granularity allows for a much ri er analysis of the activities of 
short-sellers and of the risks that they face. 
 
Short squeezes are described in a series of studies into hort-selling constraints (see, 
for example, Dechow et al., 2001, D’Avolio, 2002, Geczy et al., 2002) but are not 
examined in detail in any of these studies, perhaps because of the practical 
difficulties in identifying them. Dechow et al. (2001) describe a short squeeze as a 
situation where a stock loan is recalled and the stock borrower is unable to find an 
alternative lender. The stock lender must then purchase shares in the open market to 
repay the stock loan and close the position. Given this definition, a short squeeze 
could occur naturally where a stock lender recalls his stock to settle a sale and the 
short-seller is unable to replace his stock loan due to limited supply. However, short 
squeezes can also be associated with manipulation and market abuse: the stock 
lender buys additional shares in the company to ‘pum ’ the share price and 
simultaneously recalls stock on loan. If the short-seller is unable to locate new stock 
to borrow, he must cover his position by buying stock in the open market. The 
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market impact of his stock purchases places further upwards pressure on the stock 
price. The manipulator completes the process by ‘dumping’ his shares at a profit. 
Note, though, that the affirmative identification of a manipulative short squeeze 
requires knowledge of the motivation for an actor’s behaviour. As a manipulative 
short squeeze would be considered market abuse by a regulator, it is likely to be 
covert in nature. Consequently, a manipulative short squeeze will generally be 
unobservable to the researcher. Nevertheless, Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) 
argue that: “short squeezes are not just a theoretical concept or a Wall Street myth, 
but rather a market reality.” My research strategy is to study patterns in market 
behaviour that are consistent with a manipulative short squeeze, whilst being aware 
of the possibility that each apparent manipulative short squeeze could simply reflect 
noise. I define a pattern of market behaviour that one would expect to find around the 
time of a manipulative short squeeze. I study the dataset for patterns consistent with 
manipulative short squeezes and find that they are infr quent in nature. Theory 
suggests that manipulative short squeezes are most likely to occur in smaller, less 
liquid stocks. Consistent with theory, I find few apparent manipulative short 
squeezes in larger stocks. It also follows from theory that to attract a short-seller to a 
less liquid stock, the mispricing would need to be gr ater, so as to compensate the 
short-seller for the risk of becoming the victim of a manipulative short squeeze. This 
risk/ liquidity problem could contribute to the cross-sectional return differences 
observed by Nagel. 
 
I also define and study ‘crowded exits’ – liquidity problems that arise in stocks 
where short-sellers hold large positions relative to normal trading volume, and when 
a catalyst prompts short-sellers to cover their positions rapidly and simultaneously. 
Catalysts include, but are not limited to, public news releases by companies. The 
temporary excess of demand for stock relative to normal trading volume leads to 
upward pressure on the stock price.  I measure the abnormal returns around these 
periods and observe that ‘crowded exits’ are associated with statistically and 
economically significant positive abnormal returns (i.e. losses to short-sellers). 




Limits to arbitrage can explain a variety of market anomalies found in the literature. 
The easing of short-sale constraints leads to reduced limits to arbitrage and 
consequently should have an impact on price discovery, pricing efficiency and 
market liquidity. As an illustration, Danielsen & Sorescu (2001) find that option 
introductions, as examples of diminishing short-sale constraints, lead to price falls. 
As short-selling becomes more common, market practice converges towards a key 
assumption in finance theory: namely, that short-selling is ‘plentiful’ and widely 
practised. This could have important effects on a number of the market ‘anomalies’ 
identified in the empirical finance literature. In a environment of diminishing short-
sale constraints, existing trading strategies that exploit the inability of some actors to 
short-sell should not be relied upon to continue generating positive abnormal returns. 
 
The more widespread use of short-selling could be regarded as an example of what 
MacKenzie (2006) describes as ‘Barnesian performativity’. Economists might 
assume the broad and frequent use of short-selling in asset pricing models. As market 
participants begin to regard this assumption as a natural state of affairs, they engage 
and make greater use of short-selling. Ultimately, markets become more like the 
efficient markets envisaged by the economists’ models. However, not all changes in 
stock market behaviour related to the growth in short-selling need be as benign as the 
gradual erosion of market anomalies. MacKenzie (2006) also describes ‘counter-
performativity’, where the practical use of some aspect of theory makes economic 
processes less like their depiction in economics. In my investigation of crowded 
exits, I explore a possible example of ‘counter-performativity’ in markets. Starting 
from the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) theory that short-sellers are, on average, 
well-informed, and noting that a series of empirical studies (e.g. Ackert and 
Athanassakos, 2005, and Boehmer et al., 2008) show that heavily shorted stocks 
perform poorly, there is an incentive for rational market actors to use short-sale/stock 
loan data to form trading strategies. In particular, an otherwise uninformed trader 
could simply short stock in a company that is observed to be heavily shorted. This is 
effectively a form of ‘imitation’ – short-sellers copy the trades of earlier short-sellers. 
As this technique becomes more common, the prices of heavily shorted stocks will 
begin to reflect more ‘imitation’ and less ‘information’. It could also lead to 
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increased short positions relative to the normal liquidity offered by a stock. This 
approach bears the seeds of its own destruction and should eventually break down. 
As a result of widespread and repeated imitation, popular short positions become 
very crowded relative to the stock’s normal liquidity. A liquidity problem could arise 
if short-sellers attempt to cover their positions simultaneously. When such crowded 
exits occur, stock returns would be driven not by changes in the fair value of the 
company, but by the herd-like behaviour of traders covering their short positions. 
Markets would (temporarily) exhibit behaviour that is inconsistent with market 
efficiency. Given the importance of the path of stock returns to investors employing 
leverage (who are liable to margin calls or subject to loan covenants) or to 
investment agents using open-ended fund structures (who are subject to the risk of 
redemption by clients), even temporary market imbalances can have important 
practical implications. This process of imitation, crowded exits and path dependency 
problems arguably constitutes an example of counter-performativity in securities 
markets.  
 
I conclude by considering the risk of potentially unlimited losses to short-sellers. I 
follow the line of enquiry of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) and test for 
systematic behaviour by short-sellers in response to negative returns. I extend their 
analysis and study the behaviour of short-sellers as share prices rise above the 
estimated average costs basis for short positions. I find that short-sellers cover their 
positions in response to accounting losses. Accordingly, short-sellers do not suffer 
from loss realization aversion, a well-documented bias found amongst many other 
types of investor. Short-sellers’ behaviour is consistent with the use of stop losses as 
a risk control mechanism, a technique described by a series of interviewees. Stop 
losses are designed to prevent large losses by ‘stopping out’ (i.e. closing) positions 
once they produce a small loss. Short-sellers form a subset of the investment 
community that is generally considered to be ‘sophisticated’ or ‘well-informed’ (see 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987 and Boehmer et al., 2008) and it is noteworthy that 
they do not in aggregate suffer from loss realization aversion. My findings contribute 
to the discussion initiated by Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) on why short-




A better understanding of indirect short-selling constraints and of changes to these 
constraints should be of interest to financial regulators and academics alike. It is also 
highly relevant to those market practitioners, including analysts, active investment 
managers and traders who compete incessantly in stock markets to identify 
opportunities for out-performance. Accordingly, this research into indirect short-
selling constraints has a potentially wide audience. 
 
 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Section 2 describes the institutional framework governing short-selling and stock 
lending. I provide definitions for short-selling and stock lending, and discuss 
motivations for these practices. I explain the process of borrowing stock, and 
describe the risks associated with lending stock and short-selling. I also discuss 
regulatory and disclosure regimes with respect to short-selling and stock lending. 
 
Section 3 is the literature review. I describe the various theoretical perspectives on 
short-selling constraints and the main hypotheses po ited. I also describe the 
empirical evidence in support of these hypotheses. I review the literature on indirect 
short-sale constraints and identify gaps in the literature.  
 
Section 4 investigates indirect short sale constraints. I use the results from a series of 
interviews with experienced investment professionals to identify the key direct and 
indirect short-selling constraints that they experience. I compare these results to 
those constraints discussed in the literature. I explore the nature of the cultural and 
institutional constraints on short selling, and seek to understand why short-selling has 
been generally increasing over the past thirty years, by referring to the changing 
nature of these constraints. 
 
Section 5 describes the data that I use for my quantitative studies. I use a new dataset 
of daily stock lending data for 45 months of London Stock Exchange activity. I 
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merge this dataset with data on stock returns and other stock characteristics from 
Datastream to produce my final dataset. I discuss the s rengths and limitations of this 
dataset and make adjustments to minimize the obfuscating impact of dividend tax 
arbitrage on the stock lending data. 
 
Section 6 deals with the first of my quantitative studies into indirect short-sale 
constraints. I define and investigate ‘crowded exits’. I study the abnormal returns of 
stocks involved in crowded exits, and describe how crowded exits can constitute a 
form of ‘counter-performativity’ in markets. I also suggest how short-sellers should 
incorporate an understanding of ‘crowded exit risk’ into the portfolio risk 
management process. 
 
In Section 7, I explore the frequency and nature of ‘manipulative short squeezes’. I 
test theories on the types of stocks most likely to be subject to manipulative short 
squeezes and study the abnormal returns of stocks around apparent short squeezes, to 
understand more fully the risks facing short-sellers. 
 
In Section 8, I build on research by Gamboa-Cavazos nd Savor (2007) and analyse 
the response of short-sellers to accounting losses. I then relate my findings to the 
literature on loss realization aversion.  
 
Section 9 concludes. I summarise the main findings, discuss their implications and 




















Short-selling is a financial market practice that allows an investor to act on his/ her 
belief that a security is over-priced in some manner, or that it is expected to under-
perform. This perceived over-pricing or expected under-performance can be in 
absolute terms (i.e. the security is trading above its perceived fair value or is 
expected to fall in price), or can be relative to the price of some other security. 
 
It may be defined as the sale of securities that the seller does not own, or that the 
seller owns but chooses not to deliver. The short-seller borrows securities in order to 
fulfil delivery obligations to the purchaser. At some later time, the short-seller 
purchases the same security, effectively closing out his/ her position. 
 
 
2.1.2 Motivation for Short-Selling 
 
Traditionally, short-selling has been perceived as a speculative activity. McDonald 
and Baron (1973) cite a New York Stock Exchange survey from 1947 suggesting that 
approximately two thirds of short trades are speculative in motive. The remainder is 
likely to comprise hedging, ‘risk arbitrage’ or tax related trades (such as ‘selling 
against the box’ i.e. short-selling against existing long positions). McDonald and 
Baron suggest that the proportion of hedging and arbitr ge trades is likely to have 
increased since this report was published. More recnt studies suggest a dramatic 
change in motivations. According to Brent et al. (1990), a short-sale is rarely a 
straight-forward speculative bet on a decline in the value of a security. Instead, short 
positions are generally entered as part of a broade trading strategy, designed to 
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benefit from perceived pricing anomalies between two or more securities. These 
trading strategies, often referred to as ‘arbitrage’ or ‘risk arbitrage’ strategies, involve 
the simultaneous positioning of the trader in one or m re long positions and one or 
more short positions. The price of each security will be related in some manner. The 
positions are subsequently reversed or unwound, with any profit being earned by the 
relative price movements of the positions, and any transactions costs associated with 
the trades. A number of examples of such strategies are hown below: 
 
Convertible Bond Arbitrage 
 
In practical terms, convertible bond arbitrage generally entails the purchase of 
convertible bonds and the hedging out of equity risk by short-selling the underlying 
stock. Other risks involved in purchasing convertible onds (such as credit risk, 
interest rate risk or volatility risk) may also be h dged out by the risk arbitrageur. At 
a later time, either the positions will be unwound; or the convertible bond will be 
converted into equity and this will provide the stock to cover the short position. In 
both cases, the risk arbitrageur aims to benefit from elative price movements in the 
two securities (less transaction costs) during the holding period. Agarwal et al. 
(2004) study the risks and return characteristics of convertible bond arbitrage and 
argue that it is associated with three “primitive trading strategies”: positive carry, 




When a company is offering shares in itself in a bid to acquire another company, a 
typical merger arbitrage strategy is to sell short shares in the bidding company, and 
to buy shares in the target company. If the bid is successfully completed, the target 
company shares are exchanged for shares in the bidding company, and these are used 
to cover the short position. The profit from this position is the uplift in value of the 
target company shares as the bid moves to completion, less all relevant transaction 
costs. The risks include the possibility of non-completion of the bid. The distribution 
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This entails either buying or selling short the shares in constituent companies of an 
equity index (e.g. FTSE 100 index) and taking an offsetting position in the index 
future, to benefit from an arbitrage opportunity. The positions are unwound after 




This is generally undertaken when the share price relation between two companies is 
inconsistent with its historical relationship, or exp cted to change in future. It entails 
buying shares in one company, believed to be undervalued relative to the other, and 
selling short shares in the second company. The two companies may have similar 
characteristics, providing a natural hedge against market movements. The positions 
are later unwound, and any profit would be based on relative share price changes less 
transaction costs (see for example, Vidyamurthy, 2004). 
 
Capital Structure Arbitrage 
 
This strategy involves exploiting perceived mispricing between the different classes 
of capital within a firm’s capital structure. In particular, some combination of long 
and short positions are taken in the bonds, credit default swaps and equity of the 
same company. Yu (2006) argues that capital structure arbitrage “is full of risk, and 
can lead to large losses with alarming frequency.” 
 
 
In addition to profit-seeking strategies such as those above, the literature identifies a 




Improving the Risk-Adjusted Return of a Portfolio 
 
Adding a lowly correlated asset or portfolio to an existing portfolio can lead to 
improved risk-adjusted returns (see Elton et al., 1976). One type of portfolio that can 
have a low correlation of returns with traditional asset classes such as equities and 
bonds is a hedge fund. These, according to Ackermann et al. (1999), can be 
characterised by a number of features, including “largely unregulated organisational 
structures, flexible investment strategies [including short-selling], relatively 
sophisticated investors, substantial managerial investment, and strong managerial 
incentives.” The authors study hedge fund returns in the eight years ending in 1995 
and show that adding such funds to an existing portfolio of assets can enhance risk-




Alexander (1993) argues that, as most stocks have a positive covariance with one 
another, “short-selling creates a set of negative covariances” and can thus be used to 
reduce risk when constructing a portfolio.  He suggests that in the context of total 
portfolio risk, short–selling might not be as risky as it seems when merely looking at 
the variance of a short position. The ability to undertake short-selling also allows the 
investor a further means of protecting the value of a portfolio against an anticipated 
market fall. Brent et al. (1990) find evidence supporting a hedging motivation f r 




Bey and Johnson (2006) show that emerging market equity investments can be 
‘spanned’ (i.e. their behaviour can be replicated) using traded U.S. securities, 
provided investors can undertake short-selling and margin trading. U.S. investors 
wishing to invest in emerging market equities, but unable to do so for, say, regulatory 
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reasons, can thus achieve similar results in the domestic market, so long as short-
selling and margin trading is permitted. 
 
Improving the ‘Informational Efficiency’ of a Portfolio 
 
Short-selling allows for more ‘informationally efficient’ portfolios to be created (see 
Clarke et al., 2002, 2004). In a traditional long-only portfolio, securities deemed to 
be over-priced can, at the lower limit, be zero-weighted in a portfolio. By lifting the 
restriction on short-selling, over-priced securities can be short-sold and information 
gained from investment analysis, including negative opinions on stocks, can be more 
fully utilised. This is particularly helpful when a negative opinion is obtained on a 
smaller company, as merely holding a zero weighting in a smaller company will have 
little benchmark-relative impact on performance. This insight has led to the 
development of so-called ‘short extension portfolios’ in recent years – portfolios that 
permit some degree of short-selling, but that re-invest the proceeds of short-selling so 
as to have a net 100% long position in stocks (see, for example, Jacobs and Levy, 
2007, and Clarke t al., 2008). 
 
 
2.1.3 Constraints and Risks associated with Short-Selling 
 
 
A number of constraints are identified with short-selling. These include ‘direct 
constraints’, such as legal and regulatory restrictions on short-selling (see Almazan, 
2004) or costs associated with the borrowing of stock so as to facilitate the settlement 
of a short-sale. There also exist a series of ‘indirect constraints’, including cultural 
and institutional constraints (see, for example, D’Avolio, 2002; Jones and Lamont, 
2002; and Nagel, 2005). The literature also describes a series of risks that act as 






A typical risk arbitrage strategy, such as pairs trading, might involve a short position 
in an apparently over-valued security and a long-position of equal size in a similar, 
but apparently under-valued security. This partially hedged arbitrage position is 
risky, because the fundamental value of the combined position might change 
adversely due to the emergence of new information about the fundamentals of each 
company. Furthermore, the valuation models used by the arbitrageur might be faulty.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that such risk arbitr ge is concentrated in 
markets where the value of securities can be ascertain d with some confidence. For 
example, for high quality bonds, where future cash flows are almost known with 
certainty, arbitrageurs can identify deviations in price from fundamental value, and 
fundamental risk is low. In foreign exchange markets, where central banks may 
intervene in an attempt to maintain non-market exchange rates, arbitrageurs can 
again identify potential mispricing. In equity markets, though, the absolute and 
relative values of shares are more difficult to estima e, and hence arbitrage 
opportunities are harder to identify. This suggests a rationale for why short-selling is 
so rare in equity markets: the fundamental risk associated with arbitrage between 
different equities is often high enough to deter th arbitrageur from taking a position. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also suggest that risk-averse arbitrageurs might avoid 
extremely volatile markets, if expected ‘alpha’ does not increase in proportion to 
volatility. This would be the case where fundamental risk was the cause of much of 
the volatility, and they cite the example of an industry that is perceived to be under-
priced as one bearing high fundamental risk. 
 
Noise Trader Risk 
 
Noise trader risk, described by Black (1986) and De long et al. (1990), concerns the 
risk that prices can move further away from fundamental value, due to the correlated 
actions of ‘uninformed’ investors. If the arbitrageur can hold on to the security 
position long enough, a reversion to fair value will ensue and noise trader risk merely 
presents opportunities to take additional arbitrage positions. But in practice, the 
investor might be unable to hold the position long enough to profit from reversion. 
Reasons for this might include an inability to meet margin calls for collateral on the 
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short position (due to limited capital) if noise traders move prices further away from 
perceived fair value; or redemption by clients disaffected with short-term fund 
performance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) name this latter problem ‘performance 
based arbitrage’. Contractual restrictions on the withdrawal of funds by investors 
(known as ‘lock-in periods’) are attempts by risk arbitrageurs to mitigate this 
problem. Closed-end funds, such as investment trusts, naturally mitigate 
‘performance based arbitrage’ by their ‘closed-ended’ nature. For investment 
managers, this serves to reduce the risk of withdrawal of funds following poor 
returns. It might at the same time protect fund investors (in aggregate) from 




Synchronization risk, as identified by Abreu and Brunermeier (2002) is concerned 
with uncertainty about the market timing decisions f other rational arbitrageurs, and 
thus the timing of the price correction. They show that rational arbitrageurs do not 
act immediately on knowledge of stock over-valuation, but instead wait for other 
rational arbitrageurs to learn about the over-valuation. Acting immediately might 
lead to losses, if enough other rational arbitrageurs do not know of the over-valuation 
and fail to act at the same time. Chanos (2003) states “It is very costly and full of risk 
for the short seller to execute and maintain a position, waiting for the rest of the 
market to realise the stock is overvalued.” Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that 
risk arbitrageurs might tend to avoid positions where the long-term ratio of alpha to 
volatility is high but the short-term ratio is low, perhaps due to the slow resolution of 
uncertainty, noise trader risk and the lack of a catalyst for convergence. However, 
Hardie and MacKenzie (2007) observe that, in practice, arbitrageurs can enter 
immediately into seemingly attractive positions and then proceed to advise their 
known contacts, such as brokers and peers, of the attractiveness of that position. For 
example, in their observational study of a hedge fund, the following situation arose: 
 
“The trader asked his assistant to construct a spreadsheet of recent prices of the two 
bonds, which supported the view that it was indeed an anomaly and thus a trading 
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opportunity. Having first made the necessary purchases and short sales to take 
advantage of it, the trader then phoned a contact in an investment bank to direct his 
attention to the anomaly – ‘There is at least half a point in that trade, and there is zero 
market risk’ – and sent him the spreadsheet.”  
 
The purpose of this activity is to encourage dissemination of the idea and to alert 
other arbitrageurs to the opportunity. This has twoeffects: first, it lowers the risk of 
greater divergence of the position from fair value, so limiting margin calls and the 
risk of ‘performance-based arbitrage’. Secondly, it m ght bring the trades of other 




Short-sellers borrow securities to settle short positions. For a security borrowed ‘on 
call’ rather than for a fixed term, the short-seller risks having the borrowed security 
recalled by the lender. If the short-seller is unable to replace the borrowed stock, he 
must buy the stock in the market to cover his position. In the case of a simple short-
sale, if the stock is re-purchased at a higher price than the original short-sale price, a 
loss results. Where the recall occurs within a riskarbitrage position, losses can arise 
depending on the relative movements of the components of the strategy prior to 
position closure. When a large trader is an immediat , forced buyer of an illiquid 
security, there could be considerable market impact. Additionally, if other traders 
were aware that a forced buyer was about to enter the market, they could choose to 
trade in a predatory manner, ahead of the forced purchase (see Brunnermeier and 
Pederson, 2005). This can affect liquidity and stock returns, and is explored further 
in Section 6.  
 
D’Avolio highlights that when a ‘special’ (a security that is expensive to borrow) is 
recalled, short-sellers on average are unable to renew a similar loan for a mean of 23 
days (median of 9 days).  
 




A positive return is expected for owning a risky asset. Consequently, a short-seller 
should expect a negative return from a short position in a risky asset. No income is 
received from stocks that are sold short – in fact, dividends must be manufactured for 
the stock lender. Short-sale profits are limited to 100% of the proceeds on the date of 
sale. Losses are theoretically unlimited however, as share prices are not ‘capped’. In 
practice, though, the limited capital of the short-seller places a constraint on losses - 
at the point at which the short-seller runs out of capital and is unable to meet 
variation margin, his/ her short-position will be covered by the broker and the short-
seller’s loss will be ‘locked-in.’ Viewed in isolation, a negative expected return is 
likely to be unattractive to many market participants. 
   
Short-selling is understood to be practised by hedge fund managers and risk 
arbitrageurs as a routine part of their strategies. However, Ackermann et al. (1999) 
state that a “standard deviation of return measure of total risk may not fully capture 
the complex risk taking from hedge funds’ dynamic, highly leveraged strategies.” 
The distribution of returns from a hedge fund is believ d by the authors to exhibit 
‘fat tails’ relative to a Normal or log-normal distribution. Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) state that: “Risk arbitrage is appropriate only for those investors that are 
willing to incur negative returns in severely depreciating markets and limited positive 
returns in flat and appreciating markets.” In other words, the distribution of returns in 
risk arbitrage is skewed or asymmetrical. Such distributions could prove unattractive 
to some market participants.  
 
 
In summary, there exists a variety of direct and indirect constraints on short-selling. 
Several of these indirect constraints are related to risk. Whereas some of these risks, 
including fundamental risk and noise trader risk, are lso associated with ‘long-only’ 
investing, others, such as recall risk, are unique to short-selling.  
 
 







Securities lending is the market practice whereby securities are transferred 
temporarily from one party (the lender) to another (the borrower) for a fee. The 
borrower must return the securities to the lender either at the end of an agreed term, 
or on demand. In law, the transaction is an absolute transfer of title (or sale) against 
an undertaking to return equivalent securities. Most securities loans are 
‘collateralised’ either with cash or other securities. The process is facilitated by agent 
intermediaries, such as custodian banks and investment anagers, and by principal 
intermediaries, such as prime brokers and broker dealers - these latter often being 
divisions of investment banks.  
 
 
2.2.2 The Stock Lending Process 
 
A typical stock lending transaction starts with a tr der, who intends to short-sell, 
requesting from his broker a ‘locate’ on a given quantity of a stock. In the USA for 
example, Regulation SHO (2004) requires that short-sellers ‘locate’ stock to borrow 
prior to selling the stock. Formal securities lending exchanges do not currently exist, 
although Jones and Lamont (2002) describe a formal market that existed on the New 
York Stock Exchange from 1926 to 1933.  Brokers may locate stock from their own 
inventory, from an institutional investor with whom they have either a relationship or 
a stock lending agreement, or via the use of an intermediary such as a custodian or 
investment bank. Electronic platforms such as EquiLend and SecFinex allow firms to 
share information on stock available for lending and to negotiate stock loans, thus 
facilitating the process of locating or lending stock. Some stock lending agents enter 
into agreements known as ‘exclusives’ with investment managers, whereby they 
obtain access to all stocks in a portfolio over some defined term, for the purpose of 




The difficulty of locating stocks depends on a series of factors. Duffie et al. (2002) 
suggest that the difficulty depends on company size (market capitalisation), the 
proportion of a company’s shares available for trading (free-float), whether or not the 
stock is included in a major index, the degree of cncentration of ownership, 
liquidity of the stock, and ‘special’ factors, such as whether or not the stock is or has 
recently experienced an IPO, merger, acquisition or spin-off. Other influential factors 
are likely to include the proximity of a dividend record date or a cut-off date for 
voting at an AGM or EGM (see Section 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for a description of the 
motivation for borrowing and lending securities). 
 
Stock borrowing generally takes place on a quicker cycle (typically same day) than 
stock settlement (typically T+3 settlement). Collater l is transferred from the stock 
borrower to the lender, to protect against the effects of default. If in the form of cash, 
collateral of 102% of the market value of the loaned stock is typical. If securities 
such as Treasury bills or other stock are used, collateral is likely to be higher because 
of the greater risk to the lender in terms of the ne d to liquidate the securities in the 
case of default (see Section 2.1.3 on risks). Cash collateral earns a ‘rebate’: the 
lender, who receives the collateral, effectively pays interest to the stock borrower 
who provided the cash collateral. The rebate rate incorporates an effective stock 
lending fee, and so is lower than the rate of interest that the cash might otherwise 
have earned. In the case of hard to borrow stocks (‘specials’) the rebate rate can be 
zero or even negative. The effective securities lending fee is negotiated between the 
parties involved, and is determined by supply and demand for the securities to be 
lent, collateral flexibility (the borrower might be willing to pay a higher fee if the 
lender is willing to be flexible on the type of collateral accepted), the term associated 
with the transaction, the marginal tax rates of the respective parties and the size of 
any forthcoming dividends.  According to Faulkner (2006), typical fees to borrow 
FTSE 100 stocks are 6-200 basis points per annum. For FTSE250 mid-capitalisation 
stocks, fees are generally somewhat higher, at 10-400 b.p. per annum. D’Avolio 
(2002) finds that the value-weighted mean fees for ‘general collateral’ US stocks (i.e. 
stocks that are not ‘specials’) is 17b.p. per annum. Under Regulation T, US retail 
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clients must post 50% of the market value of the stock in additional collateral. 
Furthermore, they typically do not receive interest on their collateral.  
 
Stock loans are normally made on a ‘call’ basis: that is, they are open-ended in 
nature, renewed daily and with collateral adjusted according to daily market moves 
in the underlying stock. For call loans, stocks may at any time be ‘recalled’ (i.e. 
return of the stock may be demanded by the lender). A small proportion of loans are 
‘term loans’, where recall is not permitted without penalty during the term of the 
loan. Common reasons for recalling include a desire to sell the underlying stock, or 
the desire to vote on a corporate issue. In fact, voting of proxies is considered best 
practice for institutional voters, and Myners (2005) argues that for contentious 
resolutions, “the lender should automatically recall the related stock, unless there are 
good economic reasons for not doing so.” When a stock is recalled and the original 
borrower is unable to locate new stock to replace the recalled stock, he becomes a 
forced buyer of the stock, due to his need to close out the position. This situation is 
referred to as a ‘short squeeze.’ 
 
During a stock loan, the lender is ‘made whole’ by the borrower in all respects 
possible. For example, dividends are manufactured by the borrower and paid to the 
lender. Additionally, during a rights issue, rights are manufactured by the borrower 
for the benefit of the lender. However, voting rights are transferred to the borrower, 
as by law the transaction is an absolute transfer of title and the lender no longer 
legally owns the stock, Raajimakers (2005) argues that institutional investors “must 
as far as possible prevent their shares being used by others to influence voting 
relationships” and that regulators will need to take dditional measures, including an 
explicit ban on the borrowing of shares with the aim of voting on them, in order to 
make clear that the practice is not permitted. 
 
Potential borrowers can reserve or pre-borrow via a process known as ‘icing’ or 
putting securities ‘on hold’. ‘Icing’ applies for one business day but can be rolled 
over. No fee is paid to the lender and if a new pros ective borrower emerges, the 
original borrower is typically given thirty minutes to commit to the loan. 
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Alternatively, one can ‘pay to hold’, whereby the prospective borrower pays the 
lender a fee to secure the future stock loan and a contract is formed. ‘Icing’, ‘paying 
to hold’ or borrowing more stock than required fulfils the locate requirement for 




2.2.3 Motivation for Borrowing Securities 
 
There are several motivations for borrowing securities (see, for example, Moore and 
Rich, 2002). As described in Section 2.1.2, a common reason for borrowing 
securities is to settle an outright sale of securities, known as ‘short covering’. Short 
covering would be required, for example, after a short sale - the sale of a security that 
the seller does not own. Furthermore, a broker may borrow securities to cover a short 
position after failed settlement. A market maker or exchange specialist might borrow 
securities to fill a customer buy order or to mainti  price stability.  
 
Securities lending can also be related to a derivative contract, such as a swap, a 
‘contract for differences’ (‘CFD’) or a spread bet. Derivatives can be used to 
speculate on price movements in securities without the need to purchase or short-sell 
those securities. In the UK, derivatives have some tax advantages over transactions 
in the underlying security: swaps and CFDs are not subject to stamp duty; spread 
bets are subject to neither stamp duty nor capital gains tax. Where an investor or 
speculator enters a derivative contract, the counterparty to the contract may choose to 
hedge his/ her exposure to the underlying security. Where an investor or speculator 
believes that a stock will perform poorly, he might ini iate a ‘bear’ CFD or spread 
bet. The counterparty to this transaction could hedge his position if desired by 
borrowing and then short-selling the underlying stock. In the UK, purchases of stock 
by market makers are free from stamp duty (normally set at 0.5% of the value of all 
purchases in listed UK equities). This provides fortax-efficiency in derivative 




Where a voting decision is pending on some corporate decision (e.g. a restructuring 
or acceptance of a take-over bid), securities may be borrowed and voted, providing 
an inexpensive mans of influencing the vote. Borrowing stock to influence a vote is 
legally permitted, but generally considered to be unacceptable practice amongst 
practitioners. Christoffersen et al. (2007) find evidence that stock lending markets 
host markets for the trading of votes. 
 
 
2.2.4 Motivation for Lending Securities 
 
A primary motivation for stock lending is that lenders typically receive fees from the 
borrowers. The mechanism for this is discussed in Section 2.2.2.  
 
A further motivation for lending securities is to obtain cash collateral for financing 
purposes. Transactions other than cash-collateralisd securities lending, such as 
repurchase agreements and buy/sell back agreements, ca  also be used to obtain cash 
in exchange for lent securities. 
 
Index funds make natural lenders of stock: they generally have large scale and long 
duration holdings in stocks. Their aim is to track an index; the performance of 
specific stocks within that index is of lesser importance. Actively managed pension 
funds, endowments and other institutional investors are also potential stock lenders, 
although each of these parties might be concerned with the impact on their 
investment returns if the securities lent are short-s ld. 
 
Intermediaries, aware of demand to borrow stock, are able to provide ‘guaranteed 
fee’ deals to institutional investors. This provides a marketing-led, fee-seeking 
incentive for stock lending, and was mentioned by several of my interviewees as a 
common practice. Institutions holding stock are offered guaranteed fees or ‘out-
performance certificates’ for some defined term, in exchange for lending their stock. 
The intermediary uses the borrowed stock to arrange swaps with other institutions 
that wish to gain short exposure to these same stocks. The swaps could include a 
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‘break fee’ if the institution obtaining a short position wishes to terminate the 
contract early, thus allowing the intermediary to offer the guaranteed term fee to the 
lender. 
 
The temporary transfer of ownership may also inspire securities lending. For 
example: where the holder of securities is subject to withholding tax on interest or 
dividends, but some other body would be free of withholding tax, the latter could 
borrow securities, receive the interest or dividend free of withholding tax and share 
some of the benefits with the lender, via a fee or larger manufactured dividend. As 
another example, where a company offers shareholders a choice of receiving a 
dividend as cash or as further shares in the company,  shareholder may be 
constrained from acquiring more shares. For example, the shareholder might be a full 
replication index fund unable to take an over-weighted position in a company, or 
may have reached its maximum holding size in the dividend paying company. The 
stock dividend might be more attractive than the cash dividend, due to movements in 
market price of the company’s shares, subsequent to the declaration of the dividend. 
In these circumstances, it may be beneficial to lend the shares to an unconstrained 
investor, who will accept the dividend in the form of shares and then sell these shares 
in the market, sharing some of the benefits with the lender. Such practices are 
typically known as ‘dividend arbitrage’ and are not uncommon. Quoted in Bollen 
(2005), Paul Wilson, Head of Securities Lending and I vestment Products at 
JPMorgan Investor Services EMEA, commented: “On averag , our estimates suggest 
that dividend arbitrage accounts for about 10 percent of overall volume and 35 




2.2.5 Risks associated with Securities Lending 
 
There are two main risks associated with securities lending: risk of default by the 




As described in Section 2.2.2 above, when a lender receives cash collateral, he must 
pay a rebate rate to the provider of that collateral. This rate incorporates a market 
return on invested cash, less a stock lending fee. If the lender aims to further enhance 
returns on the transaction, the lender may re-invest the cash collateral into securities 
with a greater credit risk or longer duration than the likely term of the loan. Losses 
may occur if the credit quality of the securities deteriorates, or if interest rates rise. 
According to Faulkner (2006), a number of large securities lending losses have been 
associated with the unsuccessful reinvestment of cash ollateral.  
 
If the stock borrower defaults (i.e. is unable to deliver stock following recall by the 
lender) cash collateral is used to ‘buy-in’ the borrower. The borrower must 
compensate the lender for any additional costs associated with a buy-in. If collateral 
had been offered in the form of securities, the lender can sell the collateral in the 
market to raise funds to replace the lent securities. However, losses can occur if the 
sale proceeds are lower then the value of the lent s curities. Risk of loss increases if 
the securities used as collateral were originally over-valued, do not move in line with 
the loaned securities, or suffer from poor liquidity. 
  
Further risks include fraud, risk of error and system failure – risks that can be 
observed in any financial transaction. Also, securities loans are sometimes settled as 
‘free of payment’ transactions, whereby collateral is taken separately and possibly at 
a different time. There is thus the possibility of ‘daylight exposure risk’ – when 
securities have been delivered but not yet covered by collateral. Sackville et al. 
(2005) outline a framework for quantifying the risks in securities lending, so that the 
securities lender can compare the anticipated returns from securities lending to the 
risks involved.    
 
  
2.3 The Regulatory and Disclosure Environment 
 
Robotti (2005) explores short-selling and arbitrage in a regulatory context. Some 
classes of investor, involved in collecting money from the public in certain countries, 
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are legally prevented from short-selling securities. Such laws are designed to protect 
(unsophisticated) investors from unlimited losses. However, increasingly available 
alternatives, such as single stock futures, spread b tting and contracts for differences, 
allow smaller (or ‘retail’) investors to short-sell securities. At the same time, 
regulators might be interested in achieving and maintaining efficiency in markets. 
Fama’s (1965) description of arbitrage regards short-selling as an essential 
mechanism for correcting over-pricing in securities and hence short-selling can assist 
in making markets more efficient. Thus, regulators face a dilemma: permitting short-
selling might help make markets more efficient, in the sense that there exists a 
mechanism for driving prices towards fair value, but it could also result in unlimited 
losses for some investors (effectively, bankruptcy sets in at some point due to limited 
capital). If confined to sophisticated investors, large losses and bankruptcy might be 
tolerable. However, amongst retail investors, especially those invested via collective 
investment funds, this might become politically unacceptable. Robotti argues: “The 
puzzle for regulators lies in this tension between the need to protect investors and the 
need to promote efficiency, which regulators find equally constraining.” The author 
argues that the efficiency argument has had an important influence on the way 
regulators allow short-selling to operate in a market. 
 
Chanos (2003) describes short-selling as being a “he vily regulated strategy with 
significant legal and economic constraints.” At a mini um, short-sales are subject to 
the same anti-manipulation rules as long-only investing. In the main, these rules were 
developed following a series of high profile stock manipulation cases in the USA in 
the 1930s. A number of these incidents involved short-selling, and this cast suspicion 
over the practice. Case law in stock manipulation (e.g. Harris V United States 1931, 
United States v. Brown 1934) developed rapidly during this period, and following a 
backlash from politicians, a series of securities laws including the National Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed. Sections 9 and 10 
of the 1934 Act specifically deal with the manipulation of security prices. Some of 
these laws are contentious. For example, Berle (1938) argues that the stabilisation of 
stock prices after an Initial Public Offering could be perceived either as stock price 
manipulation, or as a technique for the protection of investors during the distribution 
28 
 
phase of the IPO. The author argues that “the intent should govern” when 
determining whether or not a particular course of action constitutes stock price 
manipulation and this is reflected in current industry standards. For example, the 
CFA Institute’s (2005) ‘Standards of Practice Handbook: Standard II, Integrity of 
Capital Markets (B), Market Manipulation’ argues that “market manipulation 
damages the interests of all investors by disrupting he smooth functioning of 
financial markets and damaging investor confidence” but states that “the intent of the 
action is critical to determining whether it is a violation of this standard.” 
  
There also exists anti-manipulation regulation specific to short-selling. The 
introduction of Regulation SHO in the United States of America in 2004 provides 
one such example. Primarily, it requires a ‘locate’ requirement. That is, short sellers 
must first find securities to borrow and make an arrangement to borrow them in 
future, ahead of entering a short position in that security. Finnerty (2005), however, 
explains where loopholes to Regulation SHO exist, such that ‘naked’ short selling 
might continue to be practiced2. In particular, the use of certain alternative markets to 
the cash market allows for naked short selling. There r mains the suspicion that 
short-selling can be used as a tool for the manipulation of stock prices. Rhee (2003) 
expresses this notion when he states that “securities traded in the OTC [over the 
counter] markets including NASDAQ Small Cap, OTCBB, and OTC Pink Sheets are 
not subject to short sale restrictions, even though most of these securities are illiquid 
and vulnerable to price manipulations related to short-selling.” 
 
A further noteworthy piece of legislation relating to short selling is the so-called 
‘uptick rule’, currently practiced in Japan and until 2007 practiced in the USA on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ markets. This requires all short-sale  to be disclosed as short-
sales, and for all short-sales to be made only at or ab ve the last transaction price 
(referred to as zero plus tick if the same price as the last transaction, or plus tick if at 
a higher price than the last transaction). Exchange traded funds are generally 
exempted from this rule, so as to facilitate their use in hedging. Such a rule could be 
                                                
2 A ‘naked’ short-sale arises when the seller does not own the shares and has no plans to borrow stock 
by the settlement date. See Culp and Heaton (2007) for a fuller description of naked short-selling. 
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interpreted as an attempt to prevent short-selling from driving down the price of a 
security, and to provide re-assurance to market participants concerned at this risk. 
 
Regulation on short selling and securities lending varies across different countries. 
At one extreme, China currently prohibits both practices, but short-selling is 
becoming effectively possible as alternative instruments such as options and index 
futures become available (see Clunie and Ying, 2008). In September 2008, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission announced that it plans to liberalize rules to allow 
limited short-selling of stocks. Following an anti-deflation package announced by the 
Japanese government in February 2002, the Japanese Financial Services Agency 
introduced an “up-tick rule” from March 2002. Although similar to US rules, these 
changes caused some controversy amongst practitioners at the time of 
announcement. In the United Kingdom, there is no “up-tick rule.” The Financial 
Services Authority has stated that it regards short-selling as a legitimate investment 
activity that promotes market efficiency. It generally regards regulatory constraints 
as unnecessary in light of existing market and regulatory arrangements. Bris et al. 
(2007) show that stock prices in countries with short-sale constraints in place are less 
efficient that those where short-selling is permitted. Nevertheless, during 2008, 
extraordinary changes were made to short-selling rules by many national financial 
regulators. These changes were ostensibly in response to events in the banking 
industry that had led to the so-called ‘credit crunh’ that began in 2007 and 
continued into 2009. In June 2008, the Financial Servic s Authority of the United 
Kingdom (FSA) introduced greater disclosure rules on short-selling during rights 
issues, addressing fears over manipulation by short-sellers. In July 2008 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan becam  the first of a series of 
regulators to suspend short-selling. In September 2008, the FSA suspended short-
selling of shares belonging to a list of financial companies, arguing that this was 
required to maintain confidence in the markets. Other countries soon followed suit, 
including the USA. Regulators in other countries went further: in Australia, for 
example, all new short-sales were suspended. At the time of writing (January 2009), 




Robotti (2005) analyses responses to the SEC’s consultation process ahead of 
implementation of regulation SHO 2004, and shows that different institutions are 
affected by short selling regulation in different manners. For example, broker/ 
dealers favoured less regulation, perhaps due to the fact that they derived income 
from the process of short-selling and wished to seeit unconstrained. Stock 
exchanges, representing indirectly the corporate sector, favoured no change in 
regulation. Smaller capitalization companies favoured tighter regulation, perhaps 
fearing that short-selling could drive down their share prices and raise their cost of 
capital. Some smaller capitalization companies, andtheir shareholders, criticised 
short-sale abuses and alleged share price manipulation. Robotti (2005) argues that 
any initiative on short selling can affect the balance between the interests of long-
shareholders (investors) and hedge funds/ market makers.  The author concludes;” 
The efficiency justification of short selling produces a divide [between corporate and 
financial interests, and also between long and short holders of capital].” Furthermore: 
“Contrary to the dominant view on short selling, no financial practice is positive or 
negative in absolute terms but only in relative terms. There are always social 
conflicts surrounding market practices.” 
 
In the USA, the Investment Companies Act of 1940 allows mutual funds to short-sell 
only if this is incorporated into the fund prospectus. Most hedge funds are exempt 
from the 1940 Act, by virtue of being domiciled offshore, or by being limited 
partnerships with fewer than 100 investors. Ackermann nd Ravenscraft (1998) show 
that regulatory differences between mutual funds and hedge funds lead to large 
differences in their uses of short-selling, as well as uses of leverage, concentration, 
derivatives, illiquid securities and lock-up periods. Such differences appear to hinder 
mutual fund performance relative to hedge fund performance. According to Almazan 
et al. (2004), only about 30% of US mutual funds are allowed to sell short, and only 






Disclosure of information on short selling also presents a dilemma to regulators. 
Publishing information on outstanding short positions improves transparency in 
markets, and should assist in making market more efficient, in the sense that 
information is readily available, disseminated widely and can be imputed into 
security prices. However, by disclosing such information, the risks associated with 
short selling can increase. One risk associated with short selling is that of a ‘short 
squeeze’ (see Section 2.1.3 above). If detailed information about short positions was 
made public, predatory traders could seek to exploit it. By aggressively purchasing 
stock in companies known to be shorted by traders with limited capital, it might be 
possible to impose losses on the short-seller and induce closure of the position. If this 
is accompanied by a loan recall, and the stock loancannot be readily replaced, the 
borrower becomes a forced buyer of the stock and could suffer losses. Fear of a 
manipulative short squeeze might deter short-selling amongst traders, and thus curtail 
the process of risk arbitrage. If short-sellers stop driving prices towards fair value, 
the market becomes less efficient. This is a particularly difficult dilemma to resolve 
and regulators generally arrive at a compromise. For example, in the USA, aggregate 
short positions are disclosed to the market once a month for major stocks. In the UK, 
the aggregate number of securities on loan for the largest companies is disclosed 
daily, three days in arrears, to the market. These di closures provide a degree of 
transparency, but by delaying publication and using ag regated data, investors are 




In the USA, profits from a short sale are taxed at the short-term capital gains rate, 
regardless of the length of time for which the short position was open. By contrast, 
lower capital gains tax rates apply to those long-positions that are held for longer 
durations. Short-selling is thus disadvantaged relativ  to long-only investing, for 
taxable investors.  
 
Recall that a securities lending transaction is, in law, an absolute transfer of title, 
suggesting that it should be a taxable event. Such tax treatment, though, could render 
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securities lending unattractive and provide a barrier to a process that is believed to 
improve market efficiency. Accordingly, most countries do not regard securities 
lending as a taxable event. For example, in the UK,appropriately documented 
securities lending transactions are not subject to two taxes that a typical sale and 
purchase would face: Stamp Duty Reserve Tax (currently payable by the stock 
purchaser at the rate of 0.5% of the value of the transaction) and Capital Gains Tax 
(payable by the seller when the proceeds of the sal exceed the costs basis of the 









Lamont and Thaler (2003), Geczy et al. (2002), and Ofek et al. (2004) all note that 
there are alternative means of obtaining short-exposure to an equity, other than short-
selling. A series of derivative instruments exist that can be used to construct 
positions economically equivalent to short sales. These include: 
 
Single Stock Options 
 
Single stock put options give investors the ability to gain from falling share prices, 
and can thus provide an alternative to short-selling. According to Sorescu (2000) and 
Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), single stock put options are associated with 
potentially lower transaction costs than short-selling stock. The introduction of such 
derivatives reduces the constraints on short-selling and is associated with price drops 
in the underlying securities. 
 




Markets for futures contracts on single equity stocks were first offered to U.S. 
investors in 2002. Single stock futures can provide an alternative to trading in the 
shares of a company on the stock exchange. Selling a single stock future is 
equivalent to taking a short position in a company. Margin for single stock futures is 
set at 20 percent of the contract’s value, well above the 5 percent margin typical for 
other futures contracts. Johnson (2005) surmises that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, co-regulator of the single stock futures market along with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, wanted to ensure that stock futures did not 
have a “margin advantage” (i.e. lower margin levels) than exchange traded stock 
options. In turn, the 20 percent margin on Chicago Board Options Exchange stock 
options might have been set - according to Johnson - out of fear that “lower option 
margins could draw investors away from the regular stock market.” Johnson is thus 
suggesting that margin levels have been set by regulators in such a way as to balance 
the attractiveness of the three markets. This in tur suggests an understanding by 
regulators that investors can treat each market as an alternative for the others.   
 
In addition to discussing the regulatory environment surrounding US stock futures, 
Johnson examines whether or not the market has been successful since launch. The 
market had, by 2005, disappointed some observers. Figures from the Futures 
Industry Association suggest that stock futures accounted for less than one percent of 
industry volume in 2004. Johnson argues that the US regulatory environment for 
stock futures is “unnecessarily harsh” but admits that: “even in the institutional 
world, where the regulatory hurdles and costs are esily avoided, business in stock 
futures has failed to bloom.” He considers the reasons for the lack of interest in the 
US stock futures market: “Does it have anything to do with the bias shown by 
investors for the long side of the market, a proclivity to view hedging as a drag on 
potential investment profits, a preference for the limited-liability features of stock 
options, or other considerations that are endemic to securities markets but do not 






Raab and Schwager (1993) state that the degree of market incompleteness is 
“expressed by the difference between the number of states of nature and the number 
of linearly independent states.” They take a market with a set of assets and assume a 
short-selling restriction on those assets. They then introduce a new asset, which is a 
positively weighted sum of the original assets, andssume no short selling restriction 
for this new asset. They show that this new asset i a substitute for short positions in 
the original assets. As a practical example, by taking a short position in a stock index 
future, and long positions in each of the stocks covered by the index future except for 
one, a short-position in a single stock is effectively created. Thus, when a stock index 
future exists, it is possible to synthetically short-sell any stock contained in the index 
to which the index future relates.  
 
Contracts for Differences 
 
A contract for differences (CFD) is a cash-settled agreement or contract between two 
parties. It allows a trader to speculate on price movements in securities without the 
need to purchase or sell-short those securities. A typical CFD requires the 
counterparty to pay the CFD position taker the difference between a security’s 
current price and its price on initiation of the CFD. CFDs are marked to market daily, 
with initial margin and variation margin. They are open-ended (i.e. there is no pre-
defined maturity of the contract) and the position is generally closed at the discretion 
of the position taker. Where an investor or speculator enters a contract for difference 
or places a spread bet, the counterparty may choose t  h dge his/ her exposure to the 




Swaps, agreements between two parties to exchange cash flows at future dates 
according to some defined formula, can be functionally equivalent to the 
establishment of short (or long) positions in securities. Such swaps are known as 
‘total return swaps.’ Investment banks or prime broke s that offer swaps to investors/ 
traders who have a negative opinion on the outlook f r a security “usually take a 
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risk-neutral position by hedging the client’s position with the underlying asset”, 
according to a 2007 investment bank report3. 
 
 
2.4.2 Tax Treatment of Alternatives 
 
“The tax treatment of derivatives is more critical to their success than in most 
technologies” argues MacKenzie (2007). He cites the example of UK tax law treating 
options, up until September 1980, as ‘wasting assets’, such that capital gains could 
be incurred on loss-making as well as on profitable trades. This initially curtailed the 
appeal of the London Traded Options Market. Additionally, “a large part of the 
appeal of financial spread betting is that in the U.K. customers’ winnings are free 
from tax.” 
 
Gordon (2005) argues that, for US investors, the time horizon of a trade or 
investment will influence the choice of whether to trade in the underlying security, or 
to trade via derivatives. This is because of differing capital gains treatment over 
different time horizons for different types of security or contract. Another influence 
will be the issuer of the contract. The author states: “If an investor makes a short-
sale, no matter how long the holding period until a gain is realized, it will always be 
taxed as a short-term gain [and thus subject to the highest possible marginal tax rate]. 
When the investor owns a listed put [option] from an exchange, the capital gains will 
be taxed at [a] blended rate of 23 percent. But if the investor had bought a put from a 
dealer, then any short-term gains would have been taxed at 15 percent, the only 
difference being the issuer of the contract.” 
 
One can thus conclude that the choice of instrument for expressing a negative 
opinion on a security will depend on several factors, including cost of access to 
different markets, scale of trade, perceived pricing anomalies across markets, tax 
effects, time horizon for the trade and the issuer of the contract. For any given level 
                                                




of risk, rational tax-paying traders will choose the instrument with the greatest net-






































The financial literature has traditionally depicted short-sellers as ‘well informed’ 
market participants who have the ability to identify overvalued stocks, and who act 
on this knowledge. This depiction arises, for example, in Fama’s (1965) description 
of securities markets and in the Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing (Ross, 
1976), where arbitrageurs are able to identify mispricing of securities and act on this 
knowledge for profit. A growing number of studies, including most recently Ackert 
and Athanassakos, 2005, and Boehmer et al., 2008, provide empirical support for the 
notion that short-sellers are, in aggregate, well-informed. However, short-selling 
costs and constraints can make it difficult for short-sellers to exploit over-pricing in 
assets. A picture thus emerges in the literature of well informed market participants 
who exploit (and thus correct) pricing anomalies in markets, but who are limited in 
their activities by a number of direct and indirect constraints. A series of researchers 
(D’Avolio, 2002, Ofek et al., 2004, and Nagel, 2005) argue that our understanding of 
indirect constraints is incomplete, thus highlighting gaps in the literature.  
 
Despite the generally benign depiction of short-sellers in the literature, a number of 
recent theoretical and empirical papers, including Cai (2003), Brunnermeier and 
Pederson (2005), Attari et al. (2005) and Coval and Stafford (2007) reveal that sort-
sellers can also act in a manner that not only fails to promote market efficiency, but 
instead actively seeks to drive asset prices away from fair value. These papers 
provide illumination on a ‘darker’ side of short-selling, and create a richer picture of 
how short-sellers act in practice, and of how asset prices can be set.     
 
 




Asset pricing models such as the Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing (Ross, 
1976) assume that there are no restrictions on short- ales, including full use of the 
short-sale proceeds. However, in practice, short-seller  must find securities to 
borrow, effectively pay securities lending fees and face collateralisation and margin 
requirements (see Section 2.1.3). In the finance literature, practical and/ or cultural 
barriers to short-selling are referred to as ‘short-sale constraints’ and the impact of 
these constraints on the rational pricing of assets has been a fertile area of research 
over recent years. A further key assumption in some ass t pricing models, such as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964), is that investors have ‘homothetic 
expectations’. That is, all investors have identical estimates of the expected return 
and probability distribution of returns from all securities. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
point out that uncertainty over future cash flows and the appropriate discount rate for 
an asset can make it extremely difficult to ascertain its fair value. As a result of this 
difficulty, investors in practice are generally understood to have ‘heterogeneous 
expectations’. Lintner (1969) creates a model with heterogeneous expectations, but 
with unrestricted short-selling, and obtains results similar to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. This might suggest that relaxation of the homothetic expectations assumption 
has little impact on asset pricing. However, in a canonical paper on short-selling 
constraints, Miller (1977) considers heterogeneous investor expectations in 
conjunction with short-sale constraints. He argues that with short-sales constraints 
and divergence of opinion amongst investors, the price of a security is set by the 
beliefs of the most optimistic investors, not by those of the average investor. He 
observes that the entire issue of shares in any company is held by a limited number 
of investors relative to the total universe of investors. It will be those investors with 
the most optimistic estimates of returns that own the securities. In his model, 
overpricing develops because pessimists are preventd from short-selling overpriced 
stocks. Miller concludes that “the presence of a substantial number of well informed 
investors will prevent there from being substantially undervalued securities, but 
[given short-selling constraints] there may be securities whose price has been bid up 





A series of subsequent articles consider Miller’s hypothesis. Harrison and Kreps 
(1978) state that if the markets for stocks were perfect, the amount of stock available 
to be held long would not be fixed, but would “increase as members of less 
optimistic classes sold the stock short”. However, with short sale constraints, the 
price of a stock can rise above even the valuation of the most optimistic investors, 
based on their expectations for future payoffs. They conclude that: “Equilibrium will 
be reached only when investors take positions sufficiently disparate that their 
aversion to risk gives them identical marginal beliefs".  Jarrow (1980) argues that 
under “homogeneity of beliefs” for the covariance matrix of future prices, short-sale 
constraints will only increase prices of risky asset . He points out that according to 
Miller (1977), market-wide short-sale constraints would lead to pervasive 
overpricing of the entire market. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) explicitly dismiss 
the possibility of price bias as a result of short-sale constraints, observing that 
“rational expectations formation…removes any upward bias to prices.” The 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) model examines the effect of short-sale constraints 
within a rational expectations framework. Their model incorporates three types of 
market participant: perfectly informed traders, uninformed traders and a competitive 
market-maker. Not all traders face the same short-selling costs: some face none, 
some face short-sale prohibitions and others face short- ale restrictions or costs (e.g. 
stock borrowing costs). The authors argue that imposing a cost on short-selling 
makes it less attractive, and so leads to fewer shot- ales. Furthermore, as those 
willing to bear the cost are most likely to be those anticipating the greatest benefit 
from short-selling, the imposition of costs on short-selling will increase the 
proportion of informed traders relative to uninformed traders within the pool of 
short-sellers. Conditional on some traders experiencing costs to short-selling, their 
model predicts that the announcement of an unexpected increase in short-interest in a 
security is bad news, as the announcement reveals a greater than expected proportion 
of short-sales amongst all sell orders placed in the market. An empirical implication 
is that short-interest announcements produce a price-adjustment where they contain 
information that is not yet public knowledge. This in turn suggests a possible test for 
information efficiency across markets, by comparing abnormal returns after short-
interest announcements. Note though that this is not a simple research exercise in 
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practice, because of differing disclosure rules across markets (see Section 2.3). 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that short-sale constraints are likely to reduce 
informational efficiency. Short-sale constraints imply asymmetry in the speed of 
price adjustments to negative versus positive information, and skewness in the 
distribution of returns. Periods of no trading are bad news, as they may reflect 
informed traders holding bad news but facing short-sale constraints. 
 
Morris (1996) considers short-sale constraints and argues that the price of a stock can 
be higher than the valuation of all investors due to the opportunity to speculate that 
arises when shorting is prohibited. Securities lending fees are studied in static models 
by Duffie (1996), Krishnamurthy (2002) and by D’Avolio (2002). However, Duffie 
et al. (2002) create a dynamic model of equity prices, stock lending fees and short-
interest. Trading is motivated by differences of opinion between agents. The authors 
claim that strong lender bargaining power, or a large discrepancy between the beliefs 
of optimists and pessimists, can produce share prics above even the most optimistic 
shareholders’ valuation. This is due to the opportunity to earn fees from lending the 
stock in future. This suggests that a stock price, when limited shorting is permitted, is 
initially higher than the price with no shorting permitted. This provides a rebuttal 
against the common perception that easier access to hort-selling results in lower 
security prices. The authors further argue that this can explain the ‘negative stub 
value’ effect associated with spin-offs (i.e. a negative implied market value for the 
portion of a parent company not spun off, even thoug  equity is associated with 
limited liability). This effect has been identified by Lamont and Thaler (2003), who 
study the case of 3Com/ Palm, and by Ofek and Richardson (2003). In the Duffie t 
al. (2002) model, as lending fees decrease, so too does the valuation associated with 
the marginal investor and this leads to a decline in stock price. The model thus 
predicts a relationship between expected returns and lending fees. This is consistent 
with Jones and Lamont (2002), who, for their sample of NYSE stocks from 1926 to 
1933, find that stocks with high lending fees delivr inferior average returns. Duffie 
et al. argue: “Since the lending fees reflect the expectation of future shorting 
demand, our model suggests that price declines can be more directly related to 
expected changes in the short interest over time.” The Duffie et al. (2002) model also 
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shows that price declines associated with falling lending-fee effects are likely to be 
greater for companies with a smaller free-float (i.e. a smaller proportion of a 
company’s shares being tradable in public markets) or with larger differences of 
opinion between investors (as revealed by a proxy such as higher turnover). This is 
consistent with poor average returns following an Initial Public Offering, when 
investor opinions are likely to differ greatly (due to low levels of knowledge about 
the new company) and when free float is likely to be lower (due to lock-ins of stock 
held by directors and officers).  
 
Whereas Miller (1977) asserts that, under short-sale constraints, higher prices will be 
seen in securities with greater divergence of opinin about the future returns from the 
security, Jiang (2005) develops a model that shows that both under-valuation and 
over-valuation are possible in a market with divergence of investor opinions. Hong, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) claim that “a speculative bubble arises because 
investors, with heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and facing short-sales 
constraints, anticipate the option to resell the stock to buyers with even higher 
valuations.” Bai et al. (2006) argue that if short-sale constraints eliminate some 
informed investors, market prices become less informative about their information. 
However, “less informative prices need not bias the expectations of less informed 
investors since they are fully aware of the possible negative information held by the 
constrained investors.” Under such a rational expectations framework, short–sale 
constraints increase the perceived risk for uninformed investors, who require lower 
security prices in compensation. The authors also argue that short-sale constraints 
reduce hedging activity and that this has the effect of increasing asset prices. Thus, 
there are [at least] two effects from short-sale constraints, and these drive asset prices 
in opposite directions. Bai et al. (2006) conclude that “when the information effect is 
significant, short-sale constraints can actually cause prices to decrease and to be 
more volatile.” Although there remains much debate on the impact on asset prices 
from short-selling constraints, Asquith et al. (2005) argue “that it is now widely 
accepted that if short-selling is costly and there ar  heterogeneous investor beliefs, a 










There is a growing body of empirical literature on short-selling and asset pricing. To 
date, empirical research has tended to be concentrat d in the US stock markets, but 
as only monthly information on short interest has been publicly available in the USA 
prior to 2005, this has limited the scope of research into the topic4. A number of 
well-regarded empirical studies make use of private US databases, or else consider 
other markets where greater disclosure on short-selling or stock lending makes them 
well-suited for empirical study. Below, I classify the empirical literature into five 
distinct strands: 1) the extent of short-selling and stock lending; 2) the behaviour of 
short-sellers; 3) the relationship between short selling (or the release of information 
about short-selling) and stock returns; 4) the costs f short-selling; and 5) the impact 
of short-sale constraints on asset pricing and market efficiency. 
 
 
3.3.2 The Extent of Short Selling 
 
Asquith and Meulbroek (1996) and Dechow et al. (2001) examine the extent of short 
selling in stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock 
Exchange during the period 1976-1993. Dechow et al. (2001) use as their short 
interest variable the percentage of outstanding share  shorted in each company. From 
their sample of over 34,000 firm-years, they show that 36.6% of firm-year 
observations show no short positions. Approximately 46% of observations show 
small short positions (greater than zero but less than 0.5% of outstanding shares). 
Less than 2% of observations have over 5% of outstanding shares shorted. They 
observe a pattern of long-term growth in short selling (from less than 0.2% of 
outstanding shares being shorted in 1976 to approximately 1.4% in 1993) and 
                                                
4 Regulation SHO (2004) required transaction level short-sale data on US stocks to become publicly 
available from January 2005. 
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suggest that this might be due to deregulation of the capital markets and the growth 
of the hedge fund industry. 
 
D’Avolio (2002) studies stock loan data from 2000 to 2001 and shows that at the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the supply of securities to lend appears 
plentiful, and yet only a fraction of the shares available are borrowed at any time. He 
states that market short interest is typically only 1.5% of market value. In a prepared 
statement to the US Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable of Hedge 
Funds on May 15th, 2003, James Chanos, President of Kynikos  Associates,  US 
firm specialising in short selling and managing over $1 billion of assets, argues that 
“In almost any environment, professional short-sellers are a small percentage of 
those actively engaged in the markets.” He argues that whereas strong equity market 
performance in the 1990s made conditions difficult for short-sellers, by 2003 “a 
number of new participants have emerged and, with them, heightened public, 
corporate and regulatory scrutiny of the practice of short selling has ensued, as it 
does during almost every prolonged market downturn.” A gel et al. (2003) study 3 
months of short trades reported to NASDAQ through its ACT trade-reporting system 
(from 13/9/00 to 12/12/00). They find that 2.36% of trades are short trades, with the 
median being less than the mean, suggesting that short ales tend to be concentrated 
in certain companies on a subset of days. Based on the percentage of shares shorted, 
they find that 2.88% of shares traded were shorted. The median (1.10%) was much 
lower, again suggesting a concentration of shorting activity in certain companies. 
According to Almazan et al. (2004), approximately 30% of US mutual funds are 
allowed by prospectus to sell short - and only about 3% actually do sell short. 
Asquith et al. (2005) state that shares sold short, as a percentage of shares 
outstanding, more than doubled in the twenty years prior to their study. However, the 
general uptrend in short interest was interrupted during the bull market of the 1990s 
before reaching a new peak in the bear market of 2002. Short interest ratios are 
skewed, with only a small number of stocks having high ratios.  
 
In a study of US daily short-sale data from 2000 to 2004, Boehmer et al. (2008) find 
that aggregate short-interest is 2.0% in 2004, but tha 12.86% of trading volume 
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involves a system short-seller (i.e. a short-seller other than a market maker or floor 
broker). These statistics indicate that, on average, th  holding period for short 
positions is less than that for long positions. Diether et al. (2008) use regulatory tick-
by-tick short sale data for a cross section of 3800 stocks from both the NASDAQ and 
NYSE markets for 2005. They find that short selling s more prevalent in the USA 
than revealed in earlier studies, with 24% of NYSE and 31% of NASDAQ trading 
volume by shares represented by short-sales. 
  
Bris et al. (2007) examine short-selling in 47 countries around the world. They find 
that short selling is prohibited in 12 of these 47 countries and that it is only practised 
in 28 of the 35 countries in which it is allowed. Laws, regulation, frictions and costs 
vary by country. Au et al. (2007) examine UK stock lending data from September 
2003 to September 2006 and observe that “the typical firm in the UK sample has 
very little short interest.” The mean percentage of outstanding shares on loan is 
around 3%; the median is around 2%. The 95th percentile by percentage of 
outstanding shares on loan is around 11% in mid-2006. MacKenzie and Henry 
(2008) examine a subset of 95 stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that 
have continuous stock lending activity during the period 2005-2007 and find that the 
average weekly short sales volume was around 5% of total traded volume across the 
sample period and that it ranged from approximately 2-7%. 
 
Taken together, these studies suggest that short-selling activity in the USA has been 
generally increasing over the past thirty years. Although aggregate short-interest 
remains small, the proportion of trading that is due to short-selling has risen to as 
high as one-third. When viewed in conjunction with low levels of short-interest, the 
large number of short-sales indicates brief mean holding periods for short-sellers. 
The growth of short-selling over time suggests thatshort-sale constraints in one form 
or another have been reducing. Outside the USA, there ave been fewer studies into 
short-selling, but those studies that have been conducted reveal a picture of generally 




It is important to note that during 2008 there were xtraordinary changes to short-
selling regulations in almost all major stock markets. Several, including the USA and 
UK, placed temporary prohibitions on new short sale for a defined list of financial 
companies. Australia temporarily prohibited new short sales of any stock. These 
prohibitions represented a regulatory response to the severe problems experienced in 
the global banking industry, credit markets and stock markets during 2007 and 2008, 




3.3.3 The Behaviour of Short-Sellers 
 
Dechow et al. (2001) investigate the trading strategies of short-sellers. The authors 
identify a strong relation between the trading strategies of short-sellers and ratios of 
fundamentals to market prices. They show that short-sellers target equities that have 
low fundamental-to-price ratios, and then unwind their positions as these ratios revert 
to the mean. They also show that short-sellers refine their trading strategies in three 
ways: by avoiding equities where short-selling is expensive; by using information 
other than fundamental-to-price ratios that has predictive ability with respect to 
future returns; and by avoiding equities with low fundamental-to-price ratios where 
the low ratios are due to temporarily low fundamentals (as opposed to temporarily 
high prices). Their evidence suggests that “short sellers are sophisticated investors 
who play an important role in keeping the price of st cks in line with fundamentals.” 
The authors also conduct telephone interviews with nine global short-selling hedge 
fund companies, and determine that these short-seller  are selling equities that they 
perceive to be ‘over-priced’ in some manner. They note, though, that these short-
sellers might inadvertently be loading up on the ‘book to market’ risk factor 
hypothesised by Fama and French (1992). Some practising short-sellers have 
publicly described their decision-making processes and this can provide clues to the 
behaviour of short-sellers. For example, Chanos (2003) states that Kynikos 
Associates, a short-selling firm of which he is Presid nt, conducts financial analysis 
on companies and identifies for short-selling those that have “(1) materially 
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overstated earnings; (2) an unsustainable or operationally flawed business plan; 
and/or (3) [are] engaged in outright fraud.” 
 
Angel et al. (2003) find that short-selling is more common in actively traded 
companies and in shares with higher price volatility. They argue that liquidity 
considerations are important to short-sellers, in the sense that they do not wish to 
have to cover positions is stocks with poor trading liquidity, where their market 
impact could be high. 
 
Sloan (1996) documents the accrual-related mispricing effect in equity markets, 
consistent with investors focusing on corporate earnings data and ignoring cash flow 
and accrual components of earnings.  Cash flow earnings are found to be more 
persistent than accrual earnings and the author describ  a trading strategy to exploit 
this finding. The strategy involves buying shares in companies that fall into the 
bottom decile by accruals, and short-selling those in the top decile by accruals. This 
strategy generates significant positive abnormal returns before transaction costs. 
Richardson (2000) investigates the relationship betwe n high earnings accruals at the 
company level and short-interest at the stock level and “[does] not find systematic 
evidence that short-sellers trade on the basis of inf rmation contained in accruals.” 
Collins et al. (2003) show that non-persistent accruals are concentrat d in stocks with 
low institutional ownership. Kraft et al. (2006) demonstrate that the abnormal returns 
described by Sloan (1996) depend on a small number of observations from within 
each decile. Mashruwala et al. (2006) consider the distribution of the accrual 
anomaly, and find that it is concentrated in smaller or hard-to-short companies. Such 
stocks would generally be characterised by poorer tading liquidity, higher 
transaction costs, poorer loan availability and higher stock lending fees. With poorer 
trading liquidity, the risk associated with a stock loan recall would be elevated. This 
acts as a limit to arbitrage and, along with higher transaction and shorting costs, 
could help explain why the accruals anomaly has perist d, despite being known for 
many years. Palmon et al. (2008) examine a subset of US-listed stocks from 1971-
2003 and identify an interaction between the accrual anomaly and company size that 
yields returns in excess of the adjustment for size in Sloan (1996). Their results 
47 
 
suggest a “modified accrual trading strategy that gives more weight to small 
companies in its long positions and to large companies in its short positions.” They 
argue that this will produce better results in practice, as short-selling large-cap stocks 
is likely to be less constrained and less costly than short-selling small-cap stocks. 
 
Christophe et al. (2004) investigate short-selling around the time of earnings 
announcements and find that short-interest increases head of negative earnings 
surprises. 
 
Short sellers might be expected to take advantage of any ‘day of the week’ effect in 
choosing when to initiate or close out a short position. Furthermore, a day of the 
week effect could suggest a profitable arbitrage strategy, if transaction costs did not 
exceed possible gains. Gibbons and Hess (1981), Abraham and Ikenberry (1994), 
and Dubois and Louvet (1996) suggest that returns on certain days of the week are 
greater than returns on other days. However, Connoly (1989, 1991) and Chang, 
Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) question the statistic l robustness of such findings. 
Chen and Singal (2003) argue that speculative short-sellers may be the cause of the 
Monday effect, as they initiate short-sales that are later closed before the next 
weekend. Angel et al. (2003) assess the frequency of short-selling by weekday for 
their sample. Little day-to-day variation is shown for the percentage of short trades 
and percentage of shorted shares.  
 
Chen et al. (2008) examine mutual funds that use short sales of US domestic stocks 
as an investment strategy. They find that managers tend to establish short positions in 
the larger and more liquid stocks, perhaps to minimize the possibility of short 
squeezes. They also find that the shorted stocks have low book to market ratios, 
higher total accruals, and higher prior sales growth. The shorted stocks earn 
significant negative abnormal returns, suggesting that he fund managers are able to 





Asquith et al. (2005) consider differing motivations for short-selling. They 
differentiate between situations where short-sellers identify over-valued securities 
(‘valuation shorts’) and those where a short-seller id ntifies a convertible bond that is 
cheap compared to the equity of the same firm (‘arbitr ge shorts’). The authors state 
that, arbitrage short-sellers do not profit to the same extent as valuation-based short-
sellers, at least for high short-interest stocks in their sample study. Such results do 
not, however, take account of the use of leverage in a trade – it is possible that 
arbitrage trades are less risky and so can support greater leverage than valuation 
trades. Diether et al. (2008) agree that “short sellers are not all alike.” Some traders 
speculate on prices reverting to fundamentals, whereas others hedge long positions or 
options in the same stock, and yet others conduct convertible or index arbitrage. The 
authors also find evidence that some short-sellers act as voluntary liquidity providers, 
trading when a temporary buy order imbalance arises in markets. Furthermore, some 
short-sellers provide additional risk-bearing capacity in periods of elevated 
uncertainty. For their sample period (i.e. 2005) the authors find that short-selling 
activity is higher for larger stocks, growth stocks, high price stocks, stocks with high 
institutional ownership, and those with actively traded put options. Note, though, that 
this is a short sample period. 
 
As described in Section 2.3, there has been suspicion amongst investors in the USA 
since at least the Great Crash of 1929 that short-seller  destabilize markets and cause 
falls in the level of the stock market. Foster (1932) states: ‘There is every reason to 
believe that short-selling has been a substantial cause – not the chief cause, by any 
means, but a substantial cause – of the depth and duration of the present business 
depression.” However, in the same article, the author cites Emery, who argues that 
the short-seller “keeps prices down by his short sales, and then keeps them strong by 
his covering purchases.” For a number of years, there as thus been a debate as to 
whether short-selling provides a stabilising or destabilising influence on the market. 
This debate is far from concluded. For example, the UK’s financial regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority, described short-selling in a 2002 discussion paper as a 
“legitimate investment activity which plays an important role in supporting efficient 
markets. It accelerates price corrections in overvalued securities, it supports 
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derivatives trading and hedging activities and facilit tes liquidity and trading 
opportunities”5. And yet in September 2008, The Financial Services Authority 
announced a four month prohibition on the initiation of new short positions in a 
defined list of UK-listed financial companies, amidst a stock market ‘panic’. Several 
other countries around the world followed with similar, and in some cases harsher, 
constraints on short-selling. The empirical literatu e sheds some light on this ongoing 
debate. For example, Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) find that short-selling 
increases after stock prices rises; and short position  are reduced after stock price 
falls. Albert et al. (1997) use data on NASDAQ stocks between 1987 and 1991 and 
conclude that short-sellers do not destabilize the market, but add liquidity by short-
selling stocks that have risen strongly in price during the preceding 30 days. Angel et 
al. (2003) find that short-sellers generally target firms exhibiting greater than average 
price performance. For large short-sale positions, the authors find negative market-
adjusted returns in the following three days. This supports the notion that short-
sellers help to stabilize a market, but the study is conducted over an extremely brief 
sample period (specifically, three months during a ‘bear market’). Diether et al. 
(2008) show that “past returns remain a significant predictor of future short-selling 
even after controlling for the contemporaneous returns, buy-order imbalances, 
volatility and spreads, and after controlling for the autocorrelation in short-selling 
activity and volume.” They conclude that “short-sellers are not the villains they are 
made out to be by the media and issuers. Instead, traders do seem to target stocks 
where prices are out of line with fundamental value.” 
 
A different perspective is provided by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). They study 
the behaviour of hedge funds around a time of rapid scent in technology stocks 
(1998-March 2000) and their subsequent sharp decline (March 2000 – March 2003). 
An investor who had a negative relative opinion on a technology stock might have 
attempted to short-sell that stock, to benefit from predicted future under-performance 
against an index. Instead, the authors find that hedge funds were, in aggregate, ‘over-
weighted’ in technology stocks during 1999 and early 2000. If short-selling was too 
difficult or too costly, a hedge fund would simply hold a zero position in the security, 
                                                
5 Financial Services Authority Short Selling Review, 2002. Discussion Paper 17. Available from: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/ Policy/DP/2002/discussion_17.shtml [Accessed 3/3/08]. 
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or at the very least some under-weighted position relative to the benchmark weight of 
the security, but would certainly not have held an over-weighted position. Perhaps 
this can be explained by high short-selling costs; however, Geczy et al. (2002) find 
little support for the notion that short-selling constraints made it difficult for 
arbitrageurs to short “DotComs” during the late 1990s or in 2000: “Short exposure to 
DotComs was not costly or difficult; a portfolio constructed from easy-to-borrow 
stocks tracks an internet index closely over [the] sample period, and the wholesale 
specialness cost of a portfolio with harder-to-borrow stocks, which tracks even more 
closely, is only 1.15% for the year.” In light of this evidence, Brunnermeier and 
Nagel argue that hedge funds were ‘riding the technology bubble’, rather than short-
selling apparently over-valued stocks. This casts doubt on the notion that short-
sellers are continuously engaged in short-selling over-priced securities.  
 
This empirical finding can be related to a theoretical model introduced by De Long et
al. (1990). The model comprises four time periods, two assets (cash and stock) and 
three types of traders (positive feedback traders, utility maximizing informed rational 
speculators and fundamental-versus-price-comparator ‘passive investors’). Positive 
feedback traders are investors who buy securities aft r their price has risen, and sell 
after prices fall. They are associated with price momentum trading or trend 
following, stop-loss orders (selling a risky asset after a price drop below some pre-
defined level), dynamic hedging (selling a risky asset  after a price fall, and vice 
versa), and the liquidation of positions by investor  unable to meet margin calls. 
Rational speculators, on learning some news about a security, not only trade in 
response to the news, but also trade additionally in anticipation of positive feedback 
traders’ response to the rational speculator’s trading. Price moves in response to 
news are exaggerated as informed rational speculators drive prices away from 
fundamental value, in anticipation of the actions of p sitive feedback traders. The 
pattern of stock prices observed with the model is consistent with empirical evidence 
of positive serial correlation of returns over periods of weeks or months, followed by 
mean reversion over several years (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993, 
2001). The authors argue that in the presence of positive feedback traders, it might be 
rational for investors to “jump on the bandwagon and not buck the trend” when 
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prices are trending. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2004): even though technology stock prices had risen to the extent that 
they appeared to be over-priced, it might have been rational to avoid short-selling 
these stocks in the presence of a body of positive feedback traders. This pattern of 
behaviour stands in contradistinction to the traditional depiction of short-sellers as 
traders who help to stabilize asset prices, by exploiting differences in asset prices 
away from fundamentals. Section 3.3.6 considers further examples from the literature 




3.3.4 The Relationship between Short-Selling (or the Release of Information 
about Short-Selling) and Stock Returns 
 
A substantial body of literature examines the relationship between announcements of 
short-interest (i.e. the proportion of shares outstanding that are shorted) and 
subsequent stock returns. Early research focuses on the relationship between 
aggregate short-interest in the stock market, and the return of a stock market index. 
For example, Seneca (1967) and Kerrigan (1974) show t at high aggregate short 
interest is associated with lower S&P 500 index returns. Bowlin and Rozeff (1987) 
study the behaviour of NYSE ‘specialists’ and find that the short-interest ratio 
amongst specialists is inversely related to subsequent returns from NYSE stocks. 
 
A number of papers study the empirical implications arising from the theory of 
Dimaond and Verrecchia (1987). In particular, these xamine stock returns after 
increases in short interest or after the announcement of an increase in short interest. 
Vu and Carter (1987) examine daily abnormal returns for stocks with large increases 
in short interest. They find a significant positive abnormal return prior to the 
announcement day, but find no significant abnormal return on the announcement 
day. Senchack and Starks (1993) investigate the market reaction to monthly short-
sale announcements from both the New York and the American Stock Exchanges. 
They examine the wealth effects of short-interest announcements, and the relation 
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between wealth effects and the degree of unexpected increases in short-interest. 
Using monthly common-stock short-interest figures published monthly in the Wall 
Street Journal from 1980 to 1986, they identify companies showing ‘unusually large’ 
increases in short interest - defined by the authors as increases in short interest of at 
least 100% over the previous month. They use an evet-study methodology, forming 
portfolios of each month’s sample of stocks, to examine the abnormal returns 
associated with unusually large short-interest annou cements. The event period 
extended from 15 days before the short interest annou cement to 15 days afterwards. 
They find “weak support for the hypothesis that themarket reaction to an unusual 
increase in unexpected short interest is negative.” The authors refine their analysis by 
determining the expected change in short-interest using OLS regression with market 
capitalisation, beta, dividend yield and the existence or non-existence of options on 
the company’s equity as explanatory variables. They find evidence that some 
significant negative price reaction occurs in an extended period around the 
announcement of a substantial increase in short-interes . Dividing the sample into 
optioned and non-optioned equities, they find that non-optioned equities closely 
follow the results for the full sample, but to a stronger degree. Optioned equities 
display a negative but insignificant reaction around the announcement date. In a 
cross-sectional analysis, they find that the greate  change in unexpected short 
interest, the more negative the market’s reaction to the short-interest announcement. 
For firms with traded options, the reaction is less negative. Thus, conditioned on the 
forecast model of short sales used, they find empirical support for the theoretical 
implication of the Diamond-Verrecchia model. The authors comment that their 
analysis, and any empirical analysis on short selling, s complicated by the “many 
reasons to sell short that are unrelated to information.” Furthermore, negative 
abnormal returns after the announcement day “may simply reflect the release of 
unfavourable news subsequent to the release of short inte est.” Aitken et al. (1998) 
analyse information provided by the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), covering 
intra-day information on short positions in listed ASX equities. Short trades were 
reported to the market soon after execution. Using details of all limit and market 
orders placed, and trades executed on the ASX’s automated trading system, they 
investigate the market reaction to short sales. They study short periods of time (up to 
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45 minutes) after short sales, and also the 30 trades that immediately follow the 
short-sale. Abnormal returns are calculated by comparing short-sales to matched 
non-short sale trades. They find a significantly negative abnormal return in calendar 
time following short-sales, for both limit orders and market orders, consistent with 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987). 
 
A related strand of the empirical literature has been to determine the relationship 
between levels of short-interest and subsequent stock returns. These tests often start 
with the notion that short-selling is costly and constrained, leading many uninformed 
traders to avoid short-selling. This leads to he hypothesis that there should be a 
higher proportion of well-informed traders amongst short-sellers (i.e. that short-
sellers in aggregate are well informed). McDonald an Baron (1973) find that “the 
estimated average return on short positions was superior to that in an untimed short-
selling strategy with less than one-half of the sample stocks. Their results are 
supportive of the efficient markets hypothesis, and suggest that short sellers in 
aggregate do not possess “superior information or insight.” Similarly, Figlewski 
(1981), Brent et al. (1990), Figlewski and Webb (1993) and Woolridge and 
Dickinson (1994) do not find evidence of a strong relation between short-interest and 
abnormal returns. However, by focusing on firms with large short-interest only, 
Asquith and Muelbroek (1996) argue that the power of such tests can be improved. 
They find a strong and consistent relation between short-interest and excess returns. 
Shares with high levels of short interest (defined in their paper as greater than 2.5% 
of shares outstanding) perform significantly worse than comparable shares without 
high levels of short interest. This finding inspired a series of research papers, 
including Dechow et al. (2001), Angel et al. (2003), Desai et al. (2002), Gopalan 
(2003), Ackert and Athanassakos (2005) and Diether et al. (2008) each of which 
produced results consistent with the notion that short-sellers are ‘well informed’, by 
revealing a negative relationship between high levels of short interest in a stock and 
subsequent abnormal returns. 
 
Boehmer et al. (2008) build on this work and investigate short-sellers by ‘type’. They 
show that institutional non-program trades are the ‘most informed’ of all types. The 
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authors also pose an important question: “What is the source of this information?” At 
the time of writing, this question remains unanswered in the finance literature. If it is 
‘inside information’ (material, specific non-public nformation), the use of which is 
prohibited by regulators, then it will prove very difficult to identify this in any formal 
study. However, clues to possible sources of information can be found in other parts 
of the literature. Ofek et al. (2004) suggest that cross market anomalies can exist, 
either due to market segmentation or frictions in trading across markets. This 
suggests that any anomalous pricing could arise in ither the underlying equity 
market, the alternative market being considered, or some combination of the two. If 
the market segmentation theory holds, and if at least some of the cross market pricing 
anomaly is due to mis-pricing in the equity market, then this suggests that 
observation of cross market arbitrage opportunities could be the source of some of 
equity short-sellers’ ‘information’. A further source of information could be 
knowledge of the predictable behaviour of other market participants, such as full 
replication index funds or those facing asset fire sales. For example, Chen et al. 
(2006) estimate that up to $2.1 billion per annum is lost from funds that track the 
S&P 500 and Russell 2000 indices, due to predatory trading (including the short-
selling of stocks ahead of demotion from an index) by those who anticipate the 
predictable actions of full replication index funds.   
 
Jones and Lamont (2002) criticise the use of short interest as a proxy for shorting 
demand. They note that the quantity of shorting represents the intersection of supply 
and demand. A stock with an infinitely high borrowing cost might have high demand 
for shorting, but would still show zero short interest. Accordingly, “short interest can 
be negatively correlated with shorting demand, overpricing and shorting costs.” 
Asquith et al., (2005) investigate the intersection of supply and demand for short-
selling. They use proxies for the supply of stock to borrow and for the demand for 
short-selling, so as to identify situations in which short-selling constraints are 
binding. They posit that the short interest ratio is a proxy for short sale demand 
(despite the Jones and Lamont critique of this measur ) and that institutional 
ownership is a proxy for lendable supply. They furthe  assume that “short-sale 
constraints are most binding when there is strong demand and limited supply.” The 
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authors define short-sale constrained stocks as “those in the highest percentile of 
short interest ratios that are also ranked in the lowest third of stocks by institutional 
ownership.” Portfolios of stocks meeting these criteria underperform by 2.15% per 
month during 1988-2002 on an equal-weighted basis and by a statistically 
insignificant 0.39% per month on a value-weighted basis. Typically 21 stocks per 
month are classified as short-sale constrained under this methodology, out of a 
universe of 5,500 stocks. The authors find that the underperformance of stocks with 
high levels of short interest is “fairly brief”. This suggests that frequent portfolio 
rebalancing would be required to capture the negative abnormal returns from such 
stocks,  
 
Cohen et al. (2007) use a four year panel dataset, comprising stock loan prices and 
quantities from a large institutional investor, to examine whether it is shorting 
demand or stock loan supply that drives the relationship between shorting indicators 
and stock returns. They identify weaknesses in the extant literature, in that most 
studies construct proxies for shorting demand or for stock loan supply (e.g. 
institutional ownership or breadth of ownership), or use equilibrium prices (i.e. stock 
loan fees) or equilibrium quantities (i.e. short interest) to identify a relationship with 
stock returns. The authors attempt to “disentangle” supply and demand shifts in the 
stock lending market, rather than taking an intersection of the two. They do this by, 
for example, identifying situations where the price of a stock loan increases at the 
same time as the quantity lent increases. In these ca s, there must have been at least 
a demand shift outwards. The authors then explore the effect of these demand shifts 
on future stock returns. They find that shorting demand plays a key role in 
influencing stock returns - more so than supply shift , high stock loan fees or high 
levels of short interest. A weakness in the literature on the effect of short sale 
constraints on stock prices, according to the authors, is that few papers address the 
endogeneity of common shorting indicators. To identify if shorting indicators are 
simply correlated with changes in public information flows, or if they have 
explanatory power abstracting from public information, they isolate firms and times 
of scarce public information. The authors find that their results “are unlikely to be 
driven by public information flow” as the impact of shorting demand on stock returns 
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is concentrated during times when sell-side analyst earnings revisions are absent. 
Furthermore, it is shown that increased shorting demand is not merely a proxy for 
future public information releases. Taken together, this suggests that short-selling “is 
an economically important mechanism for information revelation in prices.” The 
authors argue that investors forming trading rules from these findings would have 
earned statistically and economically significant retu ns, even after taking account of 
stock loan fees, trading commissions and market impact estimates. 
 
MacKenzie and Henry (2008) examine the relationship between stock returns and 
trading volume on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They find that the information 
content of trading volume is strongest for trades initiated by short-sellers. Further, 
they follow the procedure of Cohen et al. (2007) to “consider whether information 
about changes in conditions in the market for borrowing stock may provide superior 
information about the future returns than short volume alone.” They find that shifts 
in the demand curve in the stock lending market are most informative, although 
shifts in supply are also important. Whereas Cohen et al. (2007) find that shifts in the 
demand curve provide information that persists for one month; MacKenzie and 
Henry (2008) find their information shorter lived. The authors argue that their 
findings provide further evidence that short-selling “is a major channel for the 
transmission of information about prices.” 
 
In summary, the empirical literature generally finds a negative relationship between 
unexpected increases in short-selling and abnormal eturns at the individual stock 
level, consistent with the Diamond-Verrecchia model. Empirical studies also find 
that high levels of short-interest are associated with poor returns at the individual 
stock level. Furthermore, there is evidence of a negative relationship between 
increasing demand from short-sellers and abnormal returns at the individual stock 
level. The empirical literature thus yields results that are consistent with the notion 
that short-sellers are, in aggregate, well-informed.  
 
 




The setting of fair prices in a market is determined through the interactions of 
arbitrageurs and noise traders (see for example, Gemmill and Thomas, 2002). 
However, securities prices can vary from fair value, as expected under full 
information, due to a number of frictions, including transaction costs (see, for 
example Madhaven, 2002). For an arbitrageur, transaction costs include securities 
lending fees and other costs associated with short-selling. Knowledge of securities 
lending fees is thus an important consideration for those seeking to study asset 
pricing. 
 
Jones and Lamont (2002) study the centralized stock loan market (known as the ‘loan 
crowd’) that existed on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange from 1926-1933. 
The authors state that most large-capitalization stck  in the loan crowd “can be 
shorted fairly inexpensively, but sometimes even large-cap stocks become expensive 
to short. Small stocks tend to be more expensive to short, but only during the first 
half of the sample.” Most stocks are lent slightly below the call-money rate (i.e. the 
rebate rate reflects a modest stock lending fee). A “large mass of stocks” exhibits a 
rebate rate of zero, and some stock loans attract a neg tive rebate rate. The average 
stock borrowing cost is 0.35% per month. The authors show that as stocks ‘enter the 
loan crowd’, they generally have high valuations and low subsequent returns. The 
cost of borrowing stock in the loan crowd is negatively related to the abnormal 
returns achieved on those stocks. Size-adjusted returns are 1-2% lower for stocks that 
enter the loan crowd for the first time, and despite the high costs of borrowing and 
shorting these securities, it is profitable to short them. 
 
D’Avolio (2002) examines US stock lending from a large, institutional lending 
intermediary and finds that 91% of stocks lent out cost less than 1% per annum to 
borrow. The value-weighted mean fee for such ‘general collateral’ stocks is 17 basis 
points per annum. For the remaining 9% of stocks (known as ‘specials’), the mean 
fee is 4.3% per annum. The greatest fee observed in his sample is 79% per annum. 




The finance literature identifies a number of ‘zero-cost’ long-short factor portfolios 
that earn positive returns, including the book-to market strategy from DeBondt and 
Thaler (1987) and Fama and French (1993), and the pric momentum strategy from 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001). In practice, however, there are a number of 
constraints on obtaining the returns documented in the literature. These include 
transaction costs, liquidity problems and short-sale constraints such as access to (and 
costs associated with) stock loans. D’Avolio (2002) and Geczy et al. (2002) each 
show that constraints on short-selling are not uncomm n, and proceed to examine if 
these constraints fully explain the apparent anomalies discussed above. D’Avolio 
(2002) examines stock lending fees and shows that ‘growth’ and ‘low-momentum’ 
stocks are relatively more likely to be ‘special’, leading to practical difficulties and 
costs in creating the long/ short factor portfolios f und in the finance literature. 
Geczy et al. (2002) obtain a database comprising all US equity loans for one year 
(November 1998 to October 1999) for a large, but unide tified, lender. Data is daily 
and includes loan size, pricing and end date. This allows the authors “to replicate 
short-selling strategies subject to actual stock-by-stock short-selling constraints on 
the correct days.” The authors replicate each strategy at three levels of access to 
equity loans. The first level mimics the availability of loans to retail investors, where 
there is no access to ‘specials’. The second level mimics the access available to a 
large institution, where access to ‘specials’ is avail ble at the market rate. Finally, to 
compare to a number of other academic papers, they assume that borrowing and 
short selling is free from costs and constraints. They examine if investors can 
actually realize the returns of documented long-short factor portfolios found in the 
literature. The authors find that the expected-return difference between unconstrained 
factor portfolios found in the literature and portflios that investors could actually 
hold is significantly smaller than the unconstrained factor portfolios’ documented 
profitability, but still greater than zero. They argue that if short-selling problems 
explain the availability of factor portfolio returns to unskilled managers, then these 
short selling problems are not borrowing costs, but perhaps prohibitions on short-
selling or liquidity constraints. They argue that “specialness is a stock-specific, rather 
than categorical, consideration.” In other words, although borrowing problems and 
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costs can compromise stock-specific trades, there is not significant evidence to 
suggest that categorical (i.e. factor) portfolios are severely compromised.     
 
Geczy et al. find that “short exposure to IPOs is generally feasible for those with 
good access to equity loans, even in the first days of trading.” Loans of shares within 
one month of an IPO are all ‘special’ with wholesal borrowing costs of 
approximately 3% per annum, falling to 1.5% per annum after 25 trading days. These 
are not large enough to offset the approximately 5% per annum underperformance of 
IPOs highlighted by Loughran and Ritter (1995). The authors also find that for stocks 
that have been public for 6-12 months, borrowing costs are small enough to reject the 
hypothesis that none of the profits arising from the underperformance of these shares 
is available. In support of Miller’s (1977) notion of investors having divergent 
opinions, Geczy et al. find that there is a higher cost to shorting ‘hotter’ IPO 
offerings. Weaker IPOs, subject to price support or stabilization as discussed in 
Aggarwal (2000) and Ellis et al. (2000) are also more expensive to short, providing 
indirect evidence that short-sellers target IPOs they believe to be inflated. Geczy et
al. find that it is significantly profitable to short securities ahead of the expiration of 
a ‘lock-up’ that prohibits major pre-IPO shareholders from selling. In summary, 
Geczy et al. find that “the documented underperformance by IPOs cannot be 
attributed to equity-loan frictions alone.” Ofek and Richardson (2003) find that stock 
lending fees are negatively correlated with the period of time that the firm has been 
listed on a public market. They also find that short interest is positively correlated 
with firm age.  
 
Ali and Trombley (2006) examine observable stock characteristics as proxies for 
stock loan fees. These characteristics are firm size, trading volume, cash flow, IPO 
status and book to market ratio. They combine these measures into an aggregate 
measure and find that this measure is positively correlated with higher short interest 
and short sale constraints. It is negatively correlated with subsequent six month 
returns. Their results suggest that “short sale constraints constitute a coherent 




In a study of the returns available from merger arbitrage, Mitchell and Pulvino 
(2001) analyse the returns from merger arbitrage assuming that the risk-free rate is 
paid on short proceeds. They state that: “results from unreported analyses indicate 
that annual returns are reduced by approximately two percent if interest is not paid 
on short proceeds” thus providing some estimate of the impact on returns from 
borrowing shares at ‘special’ securities lending fee rates, where the ‘special’ rate 
might be such that no interest is paid on the collateral for borrowing stock. Geczy et 
al. (2002) incorporate information about the cost and avail bility of borrowing shares 
in the acquiring company in a take-over. They find, for their dataset, that the 
incidence of loans of shares in the acquiring company in a take-over is generally low. 
Profits resulting from a merger arbitrage strategy are “greatly reduced – though still 
large” in their sample period for a strategy in which borrowing is only permitted 
when their data provider lends. In addition, their data shows that demand for 
borrowing shares involved in mergers is highest on he merger announcement days. 
This supports Jensen and Ruback (1983) who find that merger announcement days 
are the most profitable for merger arbitrage strategies. 
 
In summary, short-sale constraints in the form of st ck loan unavailability and stock 
lending fees mitigate the returns available from zero-cost long-short factor portfolios 
and other strategies designed to exploit apparent stock market anomalies. Whereas 
stock lending fees for most stocks (known as ‘general collateral’) are very low, a 
limited number of stocks (known as ‘specials’) can only be borrowed at higher fee 
rates. However, ‘specialness’ or difficulty in borrwing a stock does not fully explain 




3.3.6 The Impact of Short-Sale Constraints on Asset Pricing and Market 
Efficiency 
 
A number of papers test Miller’s theoretical prediction that stocks subject to large 
divergences of investor opinion could, under short-sale constraints, become over-
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valued. Identifying divergences in the opinions of all investors is not possible, and so 
proxies have been developed for divergence of opinin. Miller (1977) suggests stock 
turnover as such a proxy, but later work has tended to use differences amongst sell-
side analyst forecasts instead. Diether et al. (2002) and Gopalan (2003) use the 
dispersion in sell-side analyst’s forecasts as a proxy for divergence of opinion and 
show that this measure is associated with equity over-valuation, consistent with 
Miller’s (1977) prediction. Doukas et al. (2006), however, criticise the use of this 
dispersion measure and use instead a ‘diversity’ measur  that attempts to adjust 
analyst dispersion for uncertainty, leaving ‘divergnce of opinion’. The authors find 
the opposite effect from Diether t al. (2002). There are, however, potential problems 
associated with using sell-side analyst forecasts, including biases due to conflicts of 
interest within integrated investment banks (see, for example, Dugar and Nathan, 
1995, and Hong and Kubik, 2003) and herding behaviour. Doukas et al. (2004) 
attempt to correct for these potential biases, but do not collect buy-side analyst data, 
which is not subject to the same conflicts of interest. Furthermore, Doukas et al. 
(2006) use a proxy for short-selling costs, based on size and institutional ownership, 
rather than collect stock lending fee data. Using US data from 1983 to 2001, Doukas 
et al. (2004) argue that divergence of opinion is priced at a discount, consistent with 
Merton’s (1987) argument that divergence of opinion represents risk, and in 
contradistinction to Miller’s (1977) prediction. 
 
Reed (2007) obtains stock lending fees from a large US stock lending institution for 
the year from November 1998 to October 1999 and examines stock returns around 
quarterly earnings announcements. He separates his ample into ‘specials’ (stock 
with fees greater than general collateral by a defined margin) and non-specials, and 
describes specials as stocks where short-selling is con trained. He finds that specials 
are slow to incorporate private information. Furthemore, they experience a stronger 
reaction to information announcements and exhibit more left-skewness. These results 
are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) hypothesis. Constrained 
stocks also produce a slow reaction to publicly released earnings information, 
offering a partial explanation for the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. 
Reed concludes that short-sale constraints in the form of specialness cause a 
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reduction in the informational efficiency of a market, increase the magnitude of 
returns on the announcement of information and increase the probability of large 
negative returns.  
 
By comparing the behavior of stock markets with different degrees of constraints, 
our understanding of the impact of short-sale constraints on asset pricing and market 
efficiency is improved. Daouk and Charoenrook (2005) survey the regulation and 
feasibility of short sales and put option trading across a number of stock markets and 
employ this data to analyse the effects of short-sale constraints. They assert that in 
countries where short selling is possible, volatility is lower and liquidity is higher. 
They also argue that in countries where short selling is permitted, markets have 
“lower cost of capital and the stock market price increases when short-sale 
restrictions are lifted. The authors argue that: “These findings appear to support the 
argument that short-sale constraints reduce market quality”. Chang et al. (2006) find 
that short-sale constraints tend to cause over-valuation, and that this effect is more 
pronounced in stocks with greater dispersion of investor opinions. Bris, et al. (2007) 
find empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that short-sale constraints are 
associated with security mispricing. They analyze a sample of countries where short-
selling is permitted, using time-series and cross-sectional difference techniques, and 
compare with countries where short-selling is not allowed or is not practiced. They 
construct two measures of price efficiency that quantify the asymmetric response of 
individual stock returns to negative or positive information. They find that prices 
reflect information faster in countries where short-sales are allowed. This evidence is 
consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security level in the 
absence of short-selling constraints. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) use a dataset 
covering 26 countries from 2004 to 2006 to investigate the effect of short-sale 
constrains on price efficiency. They find that short-sale constraints, as measured by 
limited lending supply and high borrowing fees, are ssociated with poorer price 
efficiency. Specifically, stocks subject to greater short-sale constraints respond more 
slowly to market wide shocks. Limited lending supply is associated with greater 
skewness in the distribution of stock returns, but is not associated with fewer extreme 
negative returns. The authors argue that this latter observation “mitigates regulatory 
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concern that removing short-sale constraints increases the frequency of crashes at the 
stock level.” Wu (2008) analyzes daily shorting flow data from 2005 to 2006 for a 
large sample of New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks. She finds that stocks with 
greater shorting activity are “more efficiently priced, in the sense that their 
transaction prices follow more closely to a random walk.” Furthermore, faster 
incorporation of information is observed in stocks with greater shorting activity, 
suggesting that short-sellers contribute to price dscovery. 
 
The empirical evidence above provides support for the notion that short-selling 
constraints reduce pricing efficiency. Accordingly, short-sellers are often depicted in 
the literature as market participants who promote market efficiency and assist in 
driving securities towards fair value. However, a deeper investigation of the literature 
reveals that such a depiction is too simplistic. Attari et al. (2005) and Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2005) outline theoretical models for ‘predatory trading’ - behaviour 
that exploits knowledge of the positions, strategies and capital of one or more other 
traders. Predatory traders drive prices away from fair value, drain liquidity from the 
market and impose losses on weakened market particints. Predators benefit from 
the market impact of forced transactions by weakened traders, who capitulate under 
the weight of losses. Empirical evidence for predatory trading is provided by Cai 
(2003), who examines the trades of prime brokers and finds evidence that a prime 
broker ‘front runs’ the trades of the Long Term Capit l Management hedge fund 
immediately prior to its collapse in 1998; and by Coval and Stafford (2007) who 
examine mutual fund asset fire sales. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) provide 
examples of situations that could be exploited by predatory traders: “Hedge funds 
with (nearing) margin calls may need to liquidate, and this could be known to certain 
counterparties such as the bank financing the trade; similarly, traders who use 
portfolio insurance, stop loss orders, or other risk management strategies can be 
known to liquidate in response to price drops.” The authors also highlight the risk of 
a short squeeze, one of the key risks associated with short selling. 
 
Bentson and Wood (2006) build on the work of Harris and Shultz (1998) and discuss 
trading strategies associated with the small order ex cution service (SOES) on 
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NASDAQ. From June 1998, NASDAQ market makers were obliged to instantly 
honour trades placed through SOES at quoted prices for up to 1000 shares, with up to 
five repetitions. Investors and traders used this right to pursue a variety of trading 
strategies, one of which involved a form of predatory rading. According to Bentson 
and Wood (2006), “SOES day traders…[attempt] to identify the onset of buy/ sell 
programs by institutional investors, stepping in front of these programs by absorbing 
the available liquidity, and then resupplying the liquidity at short-term profit.” This 
predatory trading technique profits from the desire or need of institutions to trade 
large positions in securities that have limited liquidity. Predators attempt to predict 
their actions, then remove liquidity by ‘front runni g’ the anticipated trades with buy 
or short-sell orders. Later, and at more advantageous prices, they resupply liquidity 
to the market. 
 
Shkilko et al. (2008) examine all trades and quotes on NASDAQ from May 2005 to 
May 2006 to study “a relatively unexplored class of short-sellers; the class that, 
instead of enhancing market efficiency, occasionally manipulates prices.” They show 
that short-sellers substantially increase their activity following significant negative 
order imbalances created by non-short trades, contributing to price overshooting. 
Thus, intra-day liquidity crises are exacerbated by short-sellers. Their results provide 
empirical support for the predictions of Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s theoretical 
model of predatory trading.  
 
Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) investigate short-selling activity around seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) and state that there has been suspicion that short-sellers 
target stocks prior to SEOs, so as to produce artificial discounts in the price of new 
shares. The authors find that short interest between th  date of announcement of an 
SEO and the offer date is approximately three times the level prior to the 
announcement. Short interest returns to normal levels after the offer date. In 1988, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 10b-21 as an anti-
manipulation measure. The rule prohibits the use of shares purchased at the offer 
price to cover short positions established after the filing of an SEO registration 
statement. Post 1988, the level of pre-offer short interest has fallen. Where the rule 
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appears to be binding, issuing firms suffer smaller discounts. However, Safieddine 
and Wilhelm find evidence of regulatory arbitrage where issuing firms have listed 
options – short-sellers develop synthetic short positions using options, and Rule 10b-
21 fails to constrain this activity. This study provides evidence of short-sellers 
temporarily driving stock prices away from fair value for their own gain, at the 
expense of shareholders in firms undertaking SEOs. Henry and Koski (2007) 
examine a sample of SEOs between 2005 and 2006 and find that: “Around issue 
dates, higher levels of pre-issue short-selling are significantly related to larger 
discounts, consistent with manipulative trading.”  
 
To summarise this section, there is only limited empirical support for Miller’s notion 
that differences in opinion in the face of short-sale constraints can lead to over-
pricing. Arguably, this could be due to the difficulties in measuring differences of 
opinions between investors, and disagreement over the best proxies to use. Short-
selling constraints at the country level are associated with higher volatility, poorer 
liquidity and less efficient price discovery at the individual stock level. This suggests 
that short-sellers play an important role in market efficiency, and that short-sale 
constraints act as a limit to arbitrage. There is, however, theoretical and empirical 
evidence that short-sellers/ arbitrageurs do not always behave in a manner consistent 
with driving asset prices to fair value. It could be argued that short-sellers usually 
improve market efficiency, but that, occasionally, they do the very opposite and drive 
asset prices away from fair value.   
 
 





The literature describes a number of indirect short sale constraints that make short-
selling difficult and thus serve as limits to arbitage. A limited number of theoretical 





3.4.2 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Black (1986) argues that securities prices reflect both the information upon which 
information-traders trade, but also the noise upon which noise-traders trade. Noise 
can create the opportunity for profitable trading, but simultaneously makes it difficult 
to trade profitably. Even without short-sale constraints, the existence of noise trading 
means that shares may not always be rationally priced. However, noise trading also 
makes arbitrage risky. Information can give a trade an edge, but not a guaranteed 
profit. Consequently, informed traders will not take large enough (i.e. risky enough) 
positions to eliminate the noise and thus noise trading acts as limit to arbitrage. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) investigate the process of arbitrage. They describe a 
“textbook description of arbitrage” as a strategy that requires no capital, entails no 
risk and generates guaranteed and immediate profits. Such arbitrage would play a 
critical role in financial markets, as it would bring prices towards fundamental values 
and thus keep markets efficient. However, they argue that “the textbook description 
does not describe realistic arbitrage trades and, moreover, the discrepancies become 
particularly important when arbitrageurs manage other people’s money.” Even 
apparently simple examples of arbitrage, such as tht between two similar bond 
futures contracts traded on different exchanges, can take on the characteristics of risk 
arbitrage, when considered fully. Risk arbitrage bears risk of loss and requires capital 
– an important distinction from the textbook definition of arbitrage. The authors thus 
argue that the model of arbitrage assumed in asset pricing models such as the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964), the Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing 
(Ross, 1976), and in Fama’s (1965) analysis of effici nt markets, is not consistent 
with how arbitrage is practised in financial markets. Instead of vast numbers of small 
arbitrageurs, arbitrage is in practice conducted by relatively few specialised 
professionals, who generally use outsiders’ money to take large positions. An agency 
relationship exists between the specialised arbitrageurs and their clients. These latter 
often have limited knowledge of arbitrage. As a result of this, and the requirement 
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for capital associated with risk arbitrage, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) introduce the 
notion of ‘performance based arbitrage’, whereby funds under management are 
related to the past performance of the arbitrageur. With the existence of noise traders, 
arbitrage positions can widen, thus leading to poor performance for the arbitrageur. 
For an arbitrage position, expected returns are high exactly when past returns are 
low; however, poor performance can lead to clients withdrawing assets from the 
arbitrageur. Consequently, arbitrageurs can be forced to close positions that offer 
high expected returns, exacerbating deviations from fundamental value. This model 
suggests that arbitrage is even more constrained than s own in previous models such 
as De Long et al. (1990). Devices such as ‘lock-in periods’, whereby investors suffer 
contractual restrictions on withdrawing funds, are attempts by arbitrageurs to 
mitigate the problems associated with performance based arbitrage. However, 
potential clients might fear being locked in to a poorly performing arbitrage fund. 
This suggests that only those managers with successful track records of performance 
might be able to persuade clients to accept lengthier lock-in periods.  
 
Abreu and Brunermeier (2002) identify a further limit to arbitrage arising from noise 
and co-ordination problems between arbitrageurs. They develop a model whereby 
rational arbitrageurs do not act immediately on knowledge of stock over-valuation, 
but instead wait for other rational arbitrageurs to learn about the over-valuation. 
Acting immediately might lead to losses, if other rational arbitrageurs do not know of 
the over-valuation and so fail to act at the same ti . Acting in isolation makes an 




3.4.3 Empirical Studies into Indirect Short-Selling Constraints 
 
Jones and Lamont (2002) show that stock borrowing costs alone do not explain the 
under-performance of ‘loan crowd entrants’. They argue that unwillingness to short 
(or some other unobserved indirect short-sale constrai ts) must be partially 
responsible for the low returns on stocks that enter th  loan crowd. The authors 
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suggest five possible indirect short-sale constraints: i stitutional constraints, cultural 
biases (such as social stigma), the cost and time of s arching for stock to borrow, the 
risk of being unable to meet calls for additional collateral, and finally, recall risk.  In 
an empirical study of stock loan data, D’Avolio (200 ) finds that stock loan recalls 
are rare on average, but that recall risk increases with trading volume and low 
availability of stock loans. 
 
Ofek et al. (2004) find substantial evidence of limits to arbitrage across a universe of 
US stocks. A significant proportion of these stocks face high stock lending fees (a 
direct short-sale constraint) which has an impact on c nducting arbitrage between 
equity and options markets. Limits to arbitrage canlead to violations of the put-call 
parity relationship - a ‘no-arbitrage’ relationship that one expects to hold in options 
markets. They show that these violations are “asymmetric in the direction of short 
sales restrictions” and thus “consistent with the tory of limited arbitrage”. They 
argue, however, that these violations cannot be fully accounted for by shorting costs 
or transaction costs. Thus, if short-selling constrain s explain these violations, it is 
indirect and not direct constraints that matter. Assuming that stock lending fees relate 
directly to the difficulty of shorting, they find a general relation between violations 
of no-arbitrage in the options market and short sale constraints. They also create a 
framework that allows one to interpret the differenc  between a stock’s value on the 
equity market and its option-implied value as a mis-pr cing in the equity market.  
 
Nagel (2005) argues that “A central element of any mispricing story has to be an 
explanation as to why these abnormal returns are not arbitraged away.” He 
investigates the extent to which short-sale constraints play a role in limiting 
arbitrage, by arguing that the supply of stocks to borrow is likely to be sparser in 
companies with low institutional ownership. Accordingly, short-sale costs should be 
higher and short-sale constraints more binding in such stocks. Using institutional 
ownership as a proxy for short-sale constraints, he finds that short-sale constraints 
help explain cross-sectional return anomalies such as “the underperformance of 
stocks with high market-to-book ratio, analysts forecast dispersion, turnover or 
volatility.” These results hold even after accounting for the company size effect. 
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However, direct short-selling constraints fail to account for all the cross-sectional 
return differences, and he calls for further research into indirect short-sale 
constraints. 
 
Au et al. (2007) argue that positive abnormal performance amongst value-weighted 
portfolios of stocks exhibiting the greatest degree of stock borrowing may be caused 
by short squeezes. However, the authors do not adjust for the obfuscating effect of 
dividend tax arbitrage and so their results should be treated with caution. 
 
Cavazos and Savor (2007) study a short selling dataset of NASDAQ stocks for the 
period June 1998 to August 2001. They investigate the determinants of short interest 
changes, and find that short sellers are likely to cover their short positions after stock 
prices rise, and increase their short positions after stock prices fall. By establishing a 
separate portfolio for arbitrage-motivated short selling trades, they further suggest 
that while this relationship is strong for short positi ns based on a perception of over-
valuation, it does not hold for trades motivated by arbitrage, because these investors 
are largely insensitive to stock price movements. Their result suggest that short 
sellers cannot, or are not willing to, maintain short positions in the face of adverse 
stock price moves, and so are unable to drive stock pri es towards fair value. This 




3.5 Gaps in the Literature 
 
D’Avolio (2002), Ofek et al. (2004) and Nagel (2005) each argue that further 
research is required into the nature of indirect constraints on short-selling. Although 
we have theoretical models that describe ‘synchronisation risk’ and ‘performance 
based arbitrage’, the literature on other indirect short-sale constraints is limited at 
best. A number of indirect constraints are named and described in the literature, but 
little else is known of their nature and the extent to which they limit arbitrage. There 
is thus a need for a comprehensive survey of short-sale constraints, and for these 
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constraints to be placed fully into context. Such a study would improve our 
understanding of limits to arbitrage, of the short-sale reluctance puzzle, and of why 
short-selling has become more common over the past thirty years. 
 
In describing ‘performance based arbitrage’, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) demonstrate 
that arbitrageurs and short-sellers can face path-dependency problems. Academics 
and market historians are well aware of rare events that have had important 
consequences for some investors, their agents, and regulators. These include the 
stock market crash of October 1987 (see, for example, Gennotte and Leland, 1990), 
the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in the autumn of 1998 (see 
MacKenzie, 2003) and the quantitative fund crisis of August 2007 (see Khandani and 
Lo, 2007). Accordingly, to gain a fuller understanding of indirect short-sale 
constraints, it is important to consider events that are unlikely to transpire, but that 
can have important consequences for short-sellers if they do transpire. One widely 
recognized problem faced by short-sellers is the risk of falling victim to a ‘short 
squeeze’, described by Dechow et al. (2001) as a situation where a stock loan is 
recalled and the stock borrower is unable to find a alternative lender. The stock 
borrower must then purchase shares in the open market to repay the stock loan and 
close the position. This risk is also described by Duffie et al. (2002) and Geczy et al. 
(2002), but no further work is undertaken. D’Avolio (2002) examines the frequency 
of stock loan recalls and the ease with which a recll d stock loan is reinstated, thus 
providing clues about the potential frequency of short squeezes. Nevertheless, we 
currently have limited knowledge of the frequency of short squeezes, the types of 
stocks most likely to be subject to a short squeeze, and the abnormal returns 
associated with these events. Knowledge of these would assist in understanding the 
importance of this short-sale constraint. The more sp cific case of a ‘manipulative 
short squeeze’, where a short squeeze is engineered for profit by a stock lender, has 
yet to be examined in the literature. Such work would provide a link between the 
literature on manipulation and the literature on stock lending and short-selling. 
 
Short squeezes can be related to a more general class of liquidity problem that I refer 
to as ‘crowded exits’. A ‘crowded exit’ is a liquidity problem that arises where short-
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sellers hold large positions in a stock relative to normal trading volume, and when a 
catalyst prompts short-sellers to cover their positi ns rapidly and simultaneously. 
Catalysts include, but are not limited to, public news releases by companies, stock 
loan recalls and the use of stop loss mechanisms. The temporary excess of demand 
for stock relative to normal trading volume leads to upward pressure on the stock 
price. Crowded exits in the broadest sense have yet to be described in the literature, 
but are widely feared by risk-conscious short-sellers and can deter short-selling. 
There is a need to describe and define crowded exits, to measure their frequency, the 
type of stock affected and the abnormal returns associated with the phenomenon. 
 
The literature documents that short-sellers, unlike long-only investors, face 
potentially unlimited losses, but does not describe how short-sellers manage this risk. 
There is a need to understand the extent to which tis risk can act as a short-sale 
constraint, and how short-sellers manage the risk. Furthermore, the impact on asset 




3.6 Summary and Main Research Questions 
 
There remains much debate in the literature about the impact of short-sale constraints 
on asset prices. Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) state th t “regardless of whether short-
sale constraints have positive or negative impact on prices....these constraints reduce 
the informational efficiency of prices i.e. [prices] do not reflect all available 
information.” 
 
The empirical literature generally finds a negative relationship between unexpected 
increases in short-selling and abnormal returns at the individual stock level, 
consistent with the Diamond-Verrechia model. Studies also find a relationship 
between high levels of short-selling and abnormal returns at the individual stock 
level. Furthermore, there is evidence of a negative relationship between increasing 
demand from short-sellers and abnormal returns at the individual stock level. The 
72 
 
empirical literature thus yields results that are consistent with the notion that short-
sellers are, in aggregate, well-informed. However, knowledge of such studies 
presents uninformed traders with a potentially profitable strategy, namely to short-
sell companies observed to have high or rising levels of short-interest. Where such 
‘imitation’ becomes more common, the prices of heavily shorted stocks will begin to 
reflect more ‘imitation’ and less ‘information’. Itcould also lead to increased short 
positions relative to the normal liquidity offered by a stock. Consequently, liquidity 
problems could arise if short-sellers attempt to cover their positions simultaneously. 
MacKenzie (2004) shows that large scale imitation of trading strategies can lead to 
unexpected consequences in markets, including liquidity crises. Short-selling and 
imitation by uninformed traders has yet to be fully investigated in the finance 
literature, and is the subject of analysis and discus ion in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
 
Short-selling constraints at the country level are ssociated with higher volatility, 
poorer liquidity and less efficient price discovery at the individual stock level. This 
has led to the widely-held view amongst academics and financial regulators that 
short-selling generally assists in improving market efficiency. Nevertheless, there is 
a growing body of theory and empirical evidence to suggest that short-sellers can 
also act in a manner that not only fails to promote market efficiency, but instead 
actively seeks to drive asset prices away from fair value. 
 
D’Avolio’s (2002) short-sale reluctance puzzle has yet to be resolved. Thomas 
(2006) examines short-sale constraints and argues that “we still do not know why so 
little short selling takes place.” Duarte et al. (2006) argue that liquidity events, 
including short squeezes, margin calls and stock specialness could be important 
constraints on short-selling. D’Avolio suggests that: “To fully understand the 
observed [short-sale] reluctance, researchers must explore less explicit measures of 
short-seller costs and risks – ones that extend beyond the loan market.” Some insight 
to the puzzle is provided by the earlier work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002), but a more comprehensiv  investigation of the 
puzzle is likely to require a qualitative approach. Such an investigation would 
address two key research questions: “Why is short-selling not more common?” and 
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“Why has short-selling been generally increasing over the past thirty years?” These 
research questions are addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
A common problem for short-sellers that has yet to be addressed in the literature is 
that of a ‘crowded exit’. In Chapter 6, I describe crowded exits and address the 
following research questions: “how frequent are crowded exits?”; “what are the 
abnormal returns experienced by short-sellers around crowded exits?” and “what 
types of stocks experience crowded exits?” Given the answers to these questions, I 
discuss the extent to which crowded exits pose a risk to short-sellers and thus deter 
short-selling. 
 
In Chapter 7, I define the pattern of market behaviour that one would expect to find 
around the time of a manipulative short squeeze, and then examine patterns in market 
behaviour that are consistent with this definition. In this way, I address the following 
research questions: “what are the abnormal returns associated with apparent 
manipulative short squeezes?”; “how frequent are apparent manipulative short 
squeezes?” and “what type of stocks are associated wi h apparent manipulative short 
squeezes?” I also address a further research question: “should short-sellers fear 
manipulative short squeezes?” 
 
In Chapter 8, I build on the work of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) and pose the 
following research question: “how do short-sellers re pond to accounting losses?” I 
answer this question by estimating the average cost basis of short-sales made in each 
stock. I then examine the behaviour of short-sellers on each occasion that a stock 
price rises above the average cost basis of short-sellers. The findings from this study 
also help to address a related research question: “do short-sellers suffer from loss 
realization aversion?” 
 
I use a mixed methods approach to address the above research questions. In Chapter 
4, I use semi-structured interviews to investigate th  short-sale reluctance puzzle. I 
then build and describe in Chapter 5 a new database of tock lending data. I use this 
data in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to investigate crowded exits, manipulative short squeezes 
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and short covering after losses. Following from these studies, I anticipate a better 
understanding of a number of constraints on short-selling, including an 
understanding of the frequency of these events, the nature of stocks affected and the 
abnormal returns experienced by short-sellers. Together, this thesis aims to undertake 
the type of work proposed by D’Avolio (2002), Ofek t al. (2004) and Nagel (2005): 
to investigate indirect constraints on short-selling i  greater depth. In so doing, I aim 
to fill gaps in the literature related to indirect short-sale constraints and so improve 
































An aspect of short-selling that has puzzled academics is: “Why is short selling not 
more common?” D’Avolio (2002) calls this the “short sale reluctance puzzle” and 
illustrates it by showing that at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the supply of 
securities to lend appears plentiful, and yet only a fraction of the shares available are 
borrowed at any time. A low level of borrowing implies a low level of short-selling. 
Asquith and Moelbroek (1996) and Dechow et al. (2001) examine stocks listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange during the period 
1976-1993 and find that most firms have less than 0.5% of outstanding shares 
shorted. Angel et al. (2003) find that less than 3% of shares traded on the NASDAQ 
market during late 2000 - a period of pronounced falls in share prices - were shorted. 
Jones and Lamont (2002) study a centralized stock loan market on the NYSE (known 
as the ‘loan crowd’) from 1926-1933 and argue that “it must be that unwillingness to 
short (or some unobserved shorting cost) is partially responsible for the low returns 
on stocks entering the loan crowd for the first time”, suggesting that the reluctance to 
sell stock short is not simply a recent phenomenon. 
 
Although D’Avolio asks why short-selling should be so ‘uncommon’, there is as yet 
no definitive view as to exactly how much short-selling should be expected in a 
market. Recall that Fama (1965) assumes that stock mar ets comprise large numbers 
of arbitrageurs - market participants able to hold both long and short positions - 
whereas Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, in practice, there exist a smaller 
number of arbitrageurs, generally acting as agents for investors. Neither of these 
models provides a clear guide as to the proportion of trades that should be short-
sales, or to the extent of ‘short-interest’ expected in equity markets. Furthermore, 
Dechow et al. (2001) observe that the percentage of outstanding shares shorted has 
grown from less than 0.2% in 1976 to approximately 1.4% in 1993. The authors 
suggest that this might be due to deregulation of the capital markets and growth in 
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hedge funds. D’Avolio (2002) studies 18 months of data from 2000 to 2001 and 
argues that the low level of stock borrowing observed is a puzzle. Nevertheless, 
continued long-term growth in short-selling might lead to it becoming more 
common, and Boehmer et al. (2008), using data from January 2000 to April 2004, 
are the first authors to suggest that short-selling in the USA is ‘common’. Each of 
these studies should be considered within a theoretical framework that provides no 
firm guide as to the extent of short-selling that should be expected in an equity 
market. 
 
Understanding why short-selling of stocks is uncommon, but also why it is becoming 
more prevalent, is of importance to those seeking to understand how markets work 
and why market participants behave the way they do. It is also important to those 
(such as regulators) seeking to ensure that markets operate fairly and efficiently. 
Bulmer (1982) argues that social scientists have a role in considering policy research, 
and it is possible that findings from this research could assist regulators in 
developing policy and regulations with respect to sh rt-selling6. 
  
The topic of this research is attitudes to (and barriers to) the short-selling of stocks. It 
has been suggested by Blaikie (2000) that there are thr e main reasons for 
undertaking research: personal, academic and social reasons. The motives for this 
study are to address a current puzzle in the literature (an ‘academic’ reason); and to 
contribute to decision making with respect to financi l regulation and the 
development of investment processes by fund managers (‘social’ reasons). This 
section aims to investigate the short-sale reluctance puzzle by examining the 
constraints on short-selling that are experienced by practitioners. I intend to test if 
ideas presented in the finance literature as possible explanations of the puzzle are 
indeed credible, and to uncover other possible causes not yet addressed in the 
literature.  
                                                
6 In fact, whilst planning the design for this research, a colleague and I were hired by the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority to consult on proposed new rules allowing hedge funds to list 






4.2 Barriers to Short Selling 
 
The literature identifies a number of barriers to short-selling. These include 
‘fundamental risk’, ‘noise trader risk’, ‘recall risk’ and ‘synchronization risk’ (see 
Section 2.1.3). D’Avolio (2002) highlights that the v ry securities the short-sellers 
want to borrow are often those that are difficult and expensive to borrow, suggesting 
practical and cost barriers to selling-short. He also hypothesises that a fear of 
tracking error (deviation in results from a benchmark) might constrain managers to 
follow a narrowly defined process, and thus limit short-selling by investors. Duarte et
al. (2006) suggest that liquidity events, including short squeezes and margin calls, 
could play an important role in constraining shorts-selling. By showing that the cost 
of buying options as insurance against liquidity events exceeds the abnormal profits 
that short-sellers appear to earn, they argue that liquidity problems might explain the 
short-sale reluctance puzzle.  
 
Geczy et al. (2002) note that a derivatives transaction can be functionally equivalent 
to a short-sale. Thus, a trader does not need to short- ell, to express a negative 
opinion on a stock. However, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find that 79% of equity 
mutual funds make no use of derivatives, indicating that they are not taking 
‘synthetic’ short-positions via derivatives. Furthermore, I find from discussions with 
prime brokers that the counterparties to synthetic short sales generally hedge their 
own positions, ultimately by short-selling the underlying stock. Thus, the availability 
of derivatives for expressing negative opinions on securities is unlikely to explain the 
uncommonness of short-selling.  
 
Nagel (2005) argues that there are two types of short-sale constraints: direct 
constraints, including costs and difficulties in borrowing stock, and indirect 
constraints, including institutional and cultural reasons that lead to a “general lack of 
short-selling in the stock market”. He argues that both direct and indirect constraints 




Short-selling can also be constrained by regulation. At the time of writing, the 
mainland Chinese stock exchanges prohibit short-selling; some countries limit its use 
in certain situations, or restrict its use to certain classes of investor. Jones and 
Lamont (2002) state that “governments often restrict short-selling [through 
regulation and moral suasion] in an attempt to maintain high security prices.” They 
continue: “Short selling restrictions historically follow major price declines as short 
sellers are blamed.” They attribute an unwillingness to lend to “fears of legal 
persecution in a hysterical political environment.”  
 
Hardie and MacKenzie (2007) document the agencement hat makes up a London-
based hedge fund: “the arrangement [in the broadest s nse] of people, technical 
systems, and so on that constitutes it.” One of their key observations is that the hedge 
fund, comprising no more than five people and an intern, was able to research, trade 
and monitor long and short positions in global (especially emerging market) bonds, 
bond derivatives and currencies. They argue that the fund’s capacity to enact trades 
depended on people and technical systems not physicall  present in its trading room 
– in particular, ‘prime brokers’ and a fund administration firm that is based in 
Dublin. They thus observe ‘distributed cognition’ (see Hutchins, 1995). The growth 
in hedge funds has coincided with growth in prime brokerage and in fund 
administration that is capable of processing and accounting for short-sales amongst 
other things. This growth in turn has the potential to reduce the costs and 
complexities involved in short-selling, and so to facilitate additional short-selling.   
 
Although there are various barriers to short-selling, our understanding of which 
barriers are most influential is only partial at best. D’Avolio (2002) argues that to 
solve the puzzle, researchers must explore less explicit measures of short-seller costs 
and risks, extending beyond the loan market.  He suggests studying some of the 
constraints listed above, but does not research these imself, instead leaving it to 
others to undertake such work. It is this research that I undertake for this thesis. This 
chapter is qualitative in nature. It explores the nature of barriers to short-selling and 
how some investors overcome these barriers while oth rs do not. This research is 
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inter-disciplinary in nature, building on an understanding of both the financial 
economics and economic sociology literature. More sp cifically, this work falls into 
the Social Studies in Finance literature. 
 
 





A review of the literature and preliminary discussions with practitioners showed that 
there is unlikely to be a single, definitive ‘truth’ behind the short-sale reluctance 
puzzle. Discussions revealed a different set of opini ns and perspectives from each 
individual, often related to firm culture or to a manager’s beliefs, rather than to 
clearly definable barriers. The multi-faceted, complex and sometimes contradictory 
views emerging from my preliminary discussions suggested that inductively 
developing a pattern of meaning, and identifying themes in practitioners’ views, was 
an appropriate epistemology. This is akin to the social constructivist perspective, as 
espoused by Berger and Luckmann (1967), Crotty (1998) and Lincoln and Guba 
(2000). By relying on the participants’ views of why short-selling is rare, and on why 
they themselves do or do not practice short-selling, I was able to form a socially 
constructed theory of why short-selling is uncommon. An implicit ontological 
assumption is that reality is constructed by its social actors (Blaikie, 2000). 
 
An alternative perspective is to relate this study to advocacy or participatory 
knowledge claims (see Neuman, 2000, or Fay, 1987). Under these knowledge claims, 
research should contain an agenda for reform or change. Typically, the theoretical 
perspectives such as feminist perspectives or racialized discourses are integrated with 
the philosophical assumptions that build a picture of the issues being examined. One 
would not ordinarily claim that investment managers are a marginalized or 
disadvantaged group, and so it would appear unusual to set this work within an 
advocacy approach. But one can hypothesise that some f r  of cultural constraint is 
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preventing these individuals and groups from achieving their full potential. After 
consideration, I decided to reject advocacy claims for this research, but note that an 
advocacy approach need not be inadmissible.  
 
R.K. Merton (1972) discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses arising from 
‘Insider’ and ‘Outsider’ status in social research. Whereas the Insider (a member of a 
specified group or occupant of a specified social statu ) might have privileged access 
to particular kinds of knowledge, the Outsider is able to bring needed perspective to 
our understanding of a social problem. Merton argues that individuals have a ‘status 
set’ as opposed to a single status. Consequently, idividuals “typically confront one 
another simultaneously as Insiders and Outsiders.” In this research, I might have 
been considered an Insider by virtue of my work experience in the investment field, 
and the fact that I was known to some of the participants. However, as an academic 
researcher, I might also have been perceived as an Outsider. I believe that my work 
experience allowed me to understand and respond to what I heard during the research 
process, but that my status as a researcher allowed me access to information that 
might not otherwise be available to those with fullInsider status. I am aware that my 
background might have influenced my interpretation of what I heard and could have 
influenced the behaviour of the participants. However, each participant is well-
informed, able and willing to state his/ her own opinion. Mason (1996) refers to the 
need for “active reflexivity”, or “critical self-scrutiny” in social research. I believe 
that my stance with respect to the research process and participants was that of the 
empathetic observer, seeking objectivity but also being able to consider myself in the 
interviewee’s position, so as to better understand heir actions. 
 
 
4.3.2 Strategy of Inquiry and Research Method 
 
My research addressed the processes of interaction amongst a community of 
investors and supporting actors who are linked via social networks. It focused on the 
specific contexts of the managers’ work, so as to understand the cultural and 
historical settings of the managers. With respect to a socially constructed 
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epistemology, Cresswell (2003) states: “Often, these subjective meanings are 
negotiated socially and historically…they are not simply imprinted on individuals 
but are formed through interaction with others.” As I was attempting to understand 
better how a series of individuals, committees and firms make choices, grounded 
theory appeared to be an appropriate research strategy. I aimed to identify a general 
theory of actions and interactions, grounded in the explanations provided by the 
research participants. This strategy allowed me to collect data from a greater number 
of sources in a given time than would have been possible with a case study approach. 
It was also less intrusive and thus more practical o implement than an ethnographic 
strategy.  
 
Given this strategy of inquiry, I selected semi-struc ured interviews as the most 
appropriate research method. I also considered surveys, but noted that surveys can 
suffer from low response rates. Furthermore, Becker (1996) argues that a survey 
generally limits the type of information that one receives. I also believed that they 
could have restricted the depth of understanding arising on more complex issues. As 
new explanations for the short-sale reluctance puzzle could have emerged from this 
research, I used a data collection procedure that allowed for the capture of such 
information. Having formed a personal network of investment managers, I believed 
that I had a ‘competitive advantage’ in a research process that involves gaining 
access to senior investment professionals. I also believed that my personality was 
suited to conducting in-depth interviews with practitioners, and to understanding the 
subtleties within the answers that I received. 
 
Another possible approach was to have used focus groups - these might offer insights 
into people’s shared understanding of the research question (Gibbs, 1997) and the 
degree of consensus on the topic (Morgan & Kreuger, 1993). However, it would 
likely have been difficult to assemble a number of busy investment managers from 
different firms at one time, and there would have be n a loss of anonymity for each 




Whereas I initially intended to study the phenomenon fr m a global perspective, I 
realize that this would yield only a very small sample from a disparate pool of 
managers. Working in a variety of countries would also have made it more difficult 
to gain access for interviews. Instead, I chose to focus on investment managers based 
in Scotland. Collectively, the Scottish investment community comprised 24 firms 
managing £100 million or more in assets as of December 31st 2004. Fourteen of these 
firms had their headquarters in Scotland; the remainder were branches of foreign 
firms. In total these firms managed £560 billion of assets (source: Financial Times 
29/5/05), making Scotland the twelfth largest centr for fund management 
worldwide. The Scottish financial community has prided itself on its innovation over 
many years, including the development of investment trusts and early adoption of 
global investment strategies. Given its scale and track-record of innovation, one 
might expect Scottish investment managers to be active practitioners in the field of 
short-selling. However, Scottish hedge funds assets under management are estimated 
by the author to have only reached £1.5 billion by 2005 - less than 1% of total asset 
under management in the country, and approximately one one-thousandth of 
worldwide hedge fund assets under management (source: Financial Times 29/5/05). 
Furthermore, several prominent Scottish asset managers have publicly declared their 
hostility to hedge funds. Thus, as an innovative country and centre for fund 
management that has not taken up short-selling in scale, Scotland makes a 
particularly interesting location for study into the short sale reluctance puzzle. 
 
 
4.3.3 Data Collection Procedures 
 
Cresswell (2003) argues that, when employing a socially constructed epistemology, 
interview questions should be open-ended and the resea cher should listen carefully 
to what people say or do in their work. Only after r ceiving responses to my initial, 
open-ended questions did I then enquire about attitudes to the specific constraints 




I interviewed 31 individuals in total from 23 firms. Within each firm, I identified the 
individual whom I believed had the best knowledge of the subject area, and who had 
influence in setting policy within the firm. This tended to be the chief investment 
officer, senior investment manager, head of asset allocation or director of risk. All of 
my interviewees had over 10 years of industry experience. I identified three Scottish 
firms that had introduced short-selling funds in recent years, and I included managers 
of these funds amongst my interviewees. I also interviewed one firm that was 
‘incubating’ its first hedge fund. Understanding why these four firms made the 
decision to introduce short-selling portfolios, and learning about the barriers to 
growth that they were facing, was likely to shed light on short selling constraints. I 
also identified two managers who had launched hedge funds but closed them soon 
afterwards – interviewing these managers provided valuable information. In some 
cases, I interviewed more than one participant within a firm so as to obtain additional 
information or a different perspective on a constrain .  
 
There are potential cultural difficulties in running both hedge funds and long-only 
funds within the same organization, and it is possible that new firms, with generally 
simpler institutional structures, might be more like y to practice short-selling. I 
identified a recently established firm, where experienced and knowledgeable 
managers had created a new investment processes, and interviewed a founding 
partner at the firm. 
 
I supplemented the Scottish investment manager interv ews with selected interviews 
in other markets where this could have provided fresh insights. For example, I 
interviewed securities lending agents and a prime broker, to gain a different 
perspective on the key issues. Such individuals provide services that facilitate short-
selling. Consequently, they are familiar with any trade processing or ‘mechanical’ 
constraints experienced by prospective short-seller. Their firms tend to be based in 
London and New York. I had contacts in a number of these firms, and so was able to 
gain access for interviews. Some of the risks associated with short-selling might 
make the practice unsuitable for certain types of institutional investors. I included a 
pension fund trustee and two consultants to institutional investors in my interviews, 
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to obtain their opinions on this matter. If end-consumer demand for short-selling was 
found to be diminished for some reason, this could shed light on the short-selling 
reluctance puzzle.  
 
Where I did not have an existing contact at any one f my targeted firms, I used a 
‘snowball technique’ (i.e. identifying respondents who refer the researcher to other 
respondents) to obtain access. Atkinson and Flint (2001) argue that, although 
‘snowball sampling’ violates some of the principles of sampling (presenting 
representativeness problems, for instance), it can provide a means of accessing hard-
to-reach groups, such as disadvantaged individuals or social elites.  
 
Through my interviews, I collected primary data in a semi-natural setting: I offered 
participants the choice of their own office, my office or an external location in which 
to hold interviews. 
 
 
4.3.4 Data Analysis Procedures 
 
I coded each interview in terms of firm characteristics and explanations offered to the 
short-sale reluctance puzzle, so as to identify themes that emerge from the 
interviews. Factors that might have influenced attitudes to short-selling include: the 
age and type of firm, and the education of directors and managers of each firm. In 
particular, I wished to compare between distinct types of investment company: 
insurance companies with a large share of captive business (who might be expected 
to be more risk averse in nature), and independent investment managers who 
compete globally for business (and would thus tend to be more entrepreneurial in 
nature). My sample of interviewees is drawn from both types of firms, so as to 
provide insights into differences in attitude and actions between the two. 
 
A strength of this research is that it is involved in-depth discussion with participants 
from almost all of the largest firms within one financial centre. There are, however, 
some potential weaknesses. For example, Robotti (2005) studies a change to short-
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selling regulation in the USA, and highlights that whilst the USA has introduced 
additional short-selling legislation (e.g. Reg. SHO, 2004) in recent years, others (e.g. 
Hong Kong) have been liberalizing. This raises dependability issues for my research 
– direct constraints are subject to change and my research must take account of this. I 
addressed this by involving firms that had been developing new processes, and 
asking about the catalysts for their process changes; by asking all participants about 
their expected future attitudes to short-selling; and by directly asking about 
regulatory constraints, if the interviewees did not address this issue themselves. 
 
A further key issue concerns the ‘generalizability’ of results from this research. 
Although the Scottish industry competes globally for clients, invests globally and 
makes use of research produced by organizations from around the world, it 
nevertheless has a distinct culture, and this is likely to be a limitation of the research. 
However, this research can assist in revealing what is not ‘generalizable’. For 
example, the (US) literature suggests that short-seller  might fear cultural pressure 
against their activities, but my interviews revealed a clear rejection of this notion. 
Although it might be considered unpatriotic in the USA to short-sell (see, for 
example, Diether et al., 2008) it was clear from my interviews that this cannot be 
generalized to every other country.   
 
To test the robustness of my findings, I compared what I heard in interviews to what 
firms were doing, and what they had already said in the public domain. Additionally, 
in some cases I interviewed two people within the same organization, and compared 
their comments on the firm’s attitude to short-selling. 
 
 
4.3.5 Ethical Issues 
 
The participants in this research were knowledgeable, senior managers, who were 
readily able to give informed consent. I had established a level of credibility amongst 
many of the interview participants, such that they ad confidence that I would treat 
information received with discretion. Grinyer (2002) states that “Anonymity for 
86 
 
respondents/ participants is assumed to be an integral feature of ethical research”, but 
highlights special circumstances where anonymity might not be preferred.  The 
British Sociological Association’s (1992) Code of Ethical Practice states that 
“Research participants should understand how far they will be afforded anonymity 
and confidentiality and should be able to reject the use of data gathering devices…” I 
explained in advance the nature of my research, offered anonymity to all 
interviewees and asked if I may record the interview. I did not offer any payments or 
incentives to interviewees – Thompson (1996) argues that payments are unlikely to 
be desirable when dealing with socially powerful peo l . I received written consent, 
in the form of an e-mail response, to conduct interviews from the majority of 
participants and received verbal consent from the remainder. I offered to show 
interview transcripts to each participant. For two of the firms targeted for interviews, 
I had provided consultancy services in the past. However, these consultancies were 
in areas unrelated to this research, and so I believe that no conflicts of interest arose. 
Gorard (2002) asks researchers to consider ethics in social science research from the 
perspective of those not involved. Although highly relevant in some situations, I saw 
few ethical implications from this work for non-participants. 
 
 
4.3.6 Preliminary Work 
 
Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) argue that pilot studies can uncover potential 
problems with research design and can serve as tool increase the likelihood of 
success in a research study. They advocate greater r porting of improvements made 
to the research process as a result of pilot studies. With a limited universe of 
interviewees from whom to draw in Scotland, I chose not to undertake a pilot study. 
However, I undertook preliminary, unrecorded discusions with three individuals 
who were chosen as being people with whom I had establi hed goodwill from 
previous engagements, and who were willing to participate in preliminary 
discussions as well as later, formal interviews.  I sought to learn if the interview 
candidates had a sound knowledge of the research topic, and if they felt able to 
discuss the issues, subject to anonymity. I learned that the subjects had a good 
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knowledge and understanding of the research topic, and that they were willing to 
answer questions. However, questions on the subject of ‘predatory trading’ (i.e. 
actions designed to harm other short-sellers) were met with coyness. I attributed this 
to the emotiveness of the phrase in question, and use  this finding to re-word my 
proposed interview questions. One question: “Do you ever practise predatory trading 
against other short-sellers?” was altered to become two, less emotive, questions: 
“Are you aware of the presence of short-sellers in tocks that you hold?” and “Does 
this knowledge influence the way in which you behave?” The success of the initial 
discussions with prospective participants suggested that planning a ‘fall back option’ 





I obtained an interview with at least one senior individual from almost all of the 
largest investment management firms in Scotland, an from many of the smaller 
firms. I also interviewed a number of individuals working for firms that interact with 
or provide support to investment management firms, including investment 
consultants, risk consultants, fund trustees and securities lending agents. These latter 
interviews provided a robustness check on the claims made by the investment 
managers, and also provided a different perspective on client-related issues. 
 
In each case, I requested an interview by sending a letter or an e-mail to my targeted 
interviewee. The letter stated that I was researching attitudes to (and barriers to) 
short-selling. The vast majority of individuals agreed to be interviewed. A small 
number of targeted interviewees argued that they did not practice short-selling and 
therefore could not help with my research; when I explained in more detail why I had 
targeted them (namely, that I wished to speak to non-short-sellers as well as short-
sellers, to better understand the barriers to short-selling), most agreed to be 
interviewed. I attribute this willingness to be interviewed to the fact that I was known 
to many of them in advance, and also to the University of Edinburgh’s reputation for 
research amongst many of the interviewees. Some interv ewees asked for questions 
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in advance, and I met this request. It was not uncomm n for me to ask additional 
questions during the actual interview, if interesting points arose, and none of those 
interviewees that had requested questions in advance expressed unhappiness with 
this technique.  
 
I began each interview by requesting to record the session with a Minidisc – only a 
small number of interviewees objected to this. I also stated that results would not be 
attributed to themselves or their firm, but would instead be aggregated or quoted in 
general terms such as “an investment manager states” or “the risk manager of a large 
partnership argues” etc. Each interview ended with an open-ended invitation, as 
suggested by Gaskell (2000); “Is there anything that we had not discussed that you 
think might be relevant?” I thanked interviewees for their time. 
 
Each interviewee is assigned a code in the form of a letter plus a number (e.g. A1, 
B1, B2) where each letter corresponds to a firm and each number corresponds to an 
individual working for that firm, so that it possible to ‘audit’ each quote in this text, 
and refer it back to its original source, if required. 
 
Interviews took place between June 2005 and February 2009. All but three 
interviews took place in person (two were conducted by e-mail; one made use of a 
proxy due to a timing constraint). I allowed the interviewee to choose the location of 
the interview. The majority of interviews took place in the offices of the interviewee; 
however, a small number took place in my own office, and some took place in 
restaurants or coffee houses. Interviews ranged in duration from eleven minutes to 
just over one hour, depending on the responsiveness of interviewee. All but the two 
e-mail interviews was recorded on Minidisc with thepermission of the interviewee. 
Each of the interviews was transcribed, either by myself or by an individual with 
experience in investment matters who is thus familir with the specific language used 
in the interviews. Slightly different sets of interview questions were used with 
different actors. A list of the standard questions used for interviews with investment 





4.5 Analysing the Interview Results 
 
I knew about each firm’s investment process and history prior to the interview, via 
information obtained from each company’s website and from background knowledge 
gained through working in the investment industry over a period of years. This gave 
me the ability to assess the credibility of each answer and to ask probing questions if 
an answer seemed inappropriate or inconsistent with other knowledge. 
 
Within some firms, a number of individuals were interviewed to gain different 
perspectives on an issue. This also provided a check on answers received earlier, and 
allowed for any apparent problems over accuracy of answers or interpretation by 
individuals to be investigated. 
 
The trustworthiness of the results in enhanced by two factors. First, I interviewed 
only senior individuals within firms – these individuals have established their 
reputations over many years, and know that they could s ffer loss of reputation if 
they made false claims. Secondly, I was able to compare the statements of 
interviewees to my own knowledge of the subject, and query any apparent anomalies 
between an interviewee’s responses and finance theory, for example. This is one of 
the advantages in using a semi-structured interview style. I was able to test the 
credibility of interviewee responses by comparing across the statements from each 
firm. I interviewed individuals from a series of firms, some of which have similar 
ownership structures and corporate goals. Any anomalies between firms were 
investigated further.  
 
Another important issue is the transferability, or ‘generalizability’, of the results from 
my interviews within the Scottish investment community. The results I obtained 
could be unique to this community, or biased by specific ‘Scottish’ factors. In fact, 
one interviewee argues that “Edinburgh is an investing city” (as opposed to a 
‘trading’ city) suggesting at least one ‘local’ factor of importance to this study. 
However, I am able to test whether or not a series of constraints suggested in the 
90 
 
literature can be generalized to a global context. Where a suggestion made in the 
literature was found not to hold true amongst my interviewees, the notion that such a 
suggestion is universally true should be rejected. 
 
The ‘confirmabilty’ of this work is underpinned by my taking as objective an 
approach as possible to the interview data – drawing evidence-based conclusions and 
interpreting the responses in light of the existing heory and evidence on the subject. 
    
Research is ‘dependable’, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), if it has been 
conducted with ‘reasonable care’. Through the use of a considered research design, 
the undertaking of preliminary work and the maintenance of a detailed audit trail, 
including the transcription of each interview where permission was given to make a 
recording (and a paper record of the interviews where permission was not given) I 
believe that this research has been undertaken with reasonable care. 
 
In terms of applicability, the results I obtained are ‘plausible’ in the sense that they 
accord with much of the theory on limits to arbitrage and short-sale constraints. 
However, my results contradict some of the suggestion  related to culture that have 
been put forward in the literature to explain the sort-sale reluctance puzzle. My 
results also introduce several institutional, social and risk-related factors that act as 
indirect constraints on short-selling. By identifying and better understanding indirect 
barriers to short-selling, stock market participants should ultimately be able to 
consider short-selling with the fullest information, and this could enable them to 
ultimately improve their investment processes.  
 
I read each interview transcript several times and created a matrix of responses7. 
Most squares in the matrix are left blank as most interviewees suggested only a 
limited number of reasons why they believed short-selling is uncommon or why their 
own firm does not short-sell. I used this matrix to identify the key reasons given or 
themes emerging from the interviews, and to produce s mmary statistics.  
 
                                                




From the transcripts, I drew out key quotes to illustrate the interviewees’ thinking. I 
did not make use of software packages such as NUD*IST or Nvivo, preferring 
instead a thorough reading and interpretation of the reasons given, as this allowed me 
to understand the subtleties of the arguments better. For example, a number of 
respondents mentioned ‘institutional constraints’, but differed in what they mean by 
this. Whereas a mechanical coding mechanism might simply have identified 
‘institutional constraints’ as a barrier to short-selling, I scrutinized the source 
documents to obtain better granularity. For example, institutional constraints could 
include conflicts of interest with respect to client portfolios, problems with a firm’s 
business model or reliance upon an unsuitable investment process – each of these 
being a different concern. 
 
 
4.6 Observations and Themes 
 
The median number of reasons suggested by each interview e for the uncommonness 
of short-selling in equity markets is 5. The mean is around 6. Overall, I count 33 
distinct reasons cited by interviewees. It is clear th t the short-sale reluctance puzzle 
cannot simply be explained by a small number of indirect short-sale constraints. 
Answers were not uniform across interviewees, in the sense that interviewees 
suggested a series of explanations that generally differed from one another. In section 
4.8, I suggest a reason for this phenomenon. Of the explanations given by 
interviewees, some have already been mentioned in the literature, but others, to the 
best of my knowledge, have yet to be described. Some f the explanations are 
similar, over-lapping or related, and I make sense of these by categorizing the 
explanations into related groupings. In Figure 4.1, I show the appropriate linkages 
between the explanations offered. Figure 4.1 reveals a web of inter-linked 
explanations for the short-sale reluctance puzzle. 
 
A further discovery was that several firms were in the process of revising their 
thinking on the issue of short-selling. During the period over which I conducted my 
interview research, two phenomena emerged: first, a number of firms approached me 
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after our initial interviews to ask questions about short-selling and academic research 
on the topic. Secondly, where I interviewed more than one person within the same 
firm, the later interview tended to reveal that thefirm had developed its investment 
approach or attitude towards short-selling, compared to the state of affairs at the date 
of the earlier interview. This provided me with additional interview material and 
allowed me to consider changes over time to indirect short-selling constraints.  
 
Most interviewees highlight both direct and indirect constraints on short-selling. For 
a small number of respondents, direct constraints dominated their initial thinking on 
why short-selling was uncommon and these were the only answers provided until 
further probing was under-taken. The indirect constrain s mentioned by interviewees 
often accorded with those covered in the academic literature. For example, 12 
interviewees highlight either synchronization risk (see Abreu and Brunnermeier, 
2002) or performance-related arbitrage risk (see Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
However, some new suggestions were put forward, including the notion that short-
sellers are not investors, but are instead ‘traders’, and that short-selling lacks 
acceptability amongst a community of clients, consultants and peers.  This concept 
was highlighted by 10 interviewees. 
 
Below I list the main explanations for the short-selling reluctance puzzle that emerge 




cost of borrowing stock 
availability of stock loans 





trading not investing 
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reputational risk  
stakeholder acceptance 
peer effects 
fear of recall risk 
fear of manipulative short squeezes 
crowded exits 
synchronization risk/ time horizon problems 
performance-based arbitrage 
lack of transparency 
benchmark constraints  
unlimited loss potential  
negative expected returns 
unattractive distribution of returns 
negative income 
psychological barrier around ownership 
losing positions grow 
lack of knowledge/  experience 
lack of skill 
unsuitable process 
institutional conflicts 
business model problems 
shortage of short-selling ideas 
high management fees 
 
 
I explain below each of these terms and provide quotes from interviews to further 







Several barriers to short-selling can be described as ‘direct constraints’. These 
include legal constraints, tax barriers, costs associated with borrowing stock, non-
availability of stock loans and operational costs and complexity.  
 
 
Legal Constraints  
 
Legal constraints can include broad regulatory prohibitions (e.g. no stocks listed on a 
particular stock market may be sold short, as is the case on mainland Chinese stock 
markets at the time of writing) or specific regulatory constraints (e.g. In the USA, the 
Investment Companies Act of 1940 allows mutual funds to short-sell only if 
permission is incorporated into the fund prospectus). It can also include legal 
constraints on short-selling set by the client in aclient-agent contract such as an 
investment management agreement. There was some ambiguity over legal 
constraints amongst interviewees. Some (e.g. R1, U1) stated that short-selling is not 
permitted for the funds they manage, before admitting that it was indeed legally 
permitted, merely not mandated in the investment management contracts or 
conditions of employment under which they operate. One interviewee (E2) cited 
legal constraints as the primary reason for the limited use of short-selling in equity 
markets. Deregulation and liberalization were also cited as reasons behind the 





One former investment trust manager commented on the risk of losing the tax 
advantages of investment trust status if an investmn  trust manager is perceived to 
be ‘trading’ rather than investing: 
 
R1: “You had to be careful with [managing] investment trusts…you were limited 
because you could lose your investment trust status if you were perceived to be 
trading…you might want to trade in and out of a stock to take advantage of 
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anomalies such as big short positions, but doing that once too often you could lose 
your investment trust status.” 
 
One investment manager (U1) argued that proposed changes to the tax status of 
income relative to capital gains in the United Kingdom were likely to make short-
selling relatively more attractive in future, suggesting that tax constraints to date 
have been a barrier to short-selling. 
 
 
Cost of Stock Borrowing 
 
The lender of stock to a short-seller typically receives a fee (and collateral) in 
exchange for the stock loan. This fee is normally modest, but on occasion can 
become extreme - in these circumstances, the stock is said to be ‘special’ (see 
D’Avolio, 2002). Long-short managers are sensitive o the high fees associated with 
specials: 
 
J1: “In terms of costs, the costs were very punishig on the Markets Fund.” 
Furthermore:  “Some markets are more expensive than others.  Sometimes you get 
hot stocks and your costs can suddenly change and you have to make a decision on 
that, again thankfully we have not been hit too much by that.” He added: “The costs, 
specifically, that were most punitive were: to get sufficient absolute return we had to 
have emerging markets included and to short these is v ry expensive.  And when you 
are dealing with a back to back swap, which would be analogous to an OTC type 
trade, it is dependent on a counterparty and the prime broker arranges that.  But, for 
example, if you are shorting the market you may have to accept LIBOR-350bps [i.e. 
effectively pay a ‘special’ stock borrowing fee of 3.5% per annum] so you have to be 
really sure.  Also a break fee will attach to it so even if you lock in any gain you are 
maybe paying 1-2%.  So you can see why it would stack up.” 
 
 




One of the prime brokers highlighted the importance of stock loan availability to his 
clients, who included stock borrowers, short-sellers and hedge funds. In particular, 
the availability of hard to locate securities was important: 
 
Question: “So how do you compete with your rivals in terms of service provision?” 
O1: “I think for us on the Securities Lending side t really is the ability to...I guess to 
supply the hedge funds”. Furthermore: ”If you find a portfolio with a very strong 
spread of assets and nobody has been in and borrowed them, then the chances are 
they will be much more valuable to the borrowers within your programme.” 
 
 
Operational Cost and Complexity 
 
Some interviewees cited the complexity and costs of operations and trading needed 
for stock borrowing and short-selling, as a barrier to short-selling itself. They also 
partly attributed the growth in short-selling to improving operational abilities, 
including the growth of the prime brokerage industry: “the facilities have become 
better to do it, although it’s still expensive” (J1). 
 
One interviewee, a prime broker, argued that since 1997, his firm had been able to 
provide a series of prime brokerage services to long-short managers such as hedge 
funds. These services included custody, trade clearance and settlement, securities 
lending and financing, capital introduction and start-up consultancy.  Consequently, 
operational complexity has diminished for long-short managers, provided they were 
able and willing to employ the services of a prime broker.  
 
O1: “This chap [investment manager] can basically carry on with his own investment 





One former long-short manager argued that as equity market–making activity 
occurred mostly around the London Stock Exchange within the United Kingdom, it 
was natural to see London emerge as a long-short equity management centre ahead 
of the Scottish financial community. Market–making involved short-selling as a 
matter of course, and the infrastructure to support this activity grew up near to the 
exchanges. However, he argued that operational complexity is no longer a problem 
for Scottish based managers: 
 
Q1: “...the brokers that we used helped explain the process in terms of the nuts and 
bolts of what you do and of course they make it very easy. You have a number to 
ring – I’m thinking of shorting these stocks...can I borrow them? Back comes the 
answer – no problem, no problem, no problem and away you go, so it’s not as 
foreign or as difficult as you would imagine.” 
 
 
Indirect Constraints:  
 
A number of interviewees argued that although direct constraints helped to explain 
the uncommonness of short-selling, it was some combination of indirect short-sale 
constraints that best explain the uncommonness of short- elling. One employee (H1) 
of a large, diversified investment firm that rejected the management of long-short 
funds cites institutional conflicts of interest in personnel, remuneration and 
investment process (i.e. indirect short-sale constraints) as the main reason for this 
decision. A risk manager (B1) cited a lack of skill and an unsuitable investment 
process as the primary reasons for his firm rejecting short-selling (again, a set of 
indirect constraints). Direct constraints, such as legal and regulatory barriers, were of 
secondary importance in forming this position: 
 
B1: “I think it [a set of direct constraints] would be an additional barrier, but I don’t 
think it would be the key aspect,” 
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Below, I group the ‘indirect constraints’ into five categories: social barriers, risk-
related barriers, distribution of returns problems, institutional constraints and 
personal constraints.  
 
 
Social Barriers –  
 
Short-Selling is Unpatriotic 
 
D’Avolio (2002) suggests that cultural barriers could limit the extent of short-selling. 
Diether et al. (2008) argue that many issuers and media representatives characterize 
short-sellers as “downright un-American”. When questioned on this argument, all 
interviewees responded that they did not believe that patriotic factors were important 
as a barrier to short-selling. Indeed, some respondents were strongly opposed to the 
notion. However, it can be argued that short-selling is ‘un-American’ not because of 
patriotic considerations but instead due to anti-capitalist considerations.  
 
 
Short-Selling is Anti-Capitalist 
 
The notion that short-selling is anti-capitalist struck a chord with some interviewees, 
but was strongly rejected by others. For example: 
 
C1: “The market is not morally neutral, the market is a barometer of a country’s 
health. It is in the interests of every country forits market to grow in a sustained 
fashion rather than for it to fall down and so peopl  who short-sell are not on the side 
of long-term capitalism.” 
 
Amongst those who rejected the notion: 
 





Vilification of Short-sellers 
 
During stock market downturns, short-sellers are oft n ‘blamed’ for falls in share-
prices and short-sellers are consequently vilified by some members of society. The 
fear of vilification could lead some investment managers to reject short-selling in 
favour of long-only investing. 
  
Question: “Do you feel there is a cultural vilification of short-sellers, that it’s 
something in the market that is not well regarded?” 
C1: “Undoubtedly, yes.” 
Question: “How has that developed? Why is that the situation?” 
C1: “Because they are seen as being essentially destructive, I think. You are not an 
owner, you are the reverse of an owner. You are a punter, you are indeed hoping to 
drive down the price of something, not hoping that t e price of something will rise. 
So it does not differ in any way from bear raiding i  centuries past. These people 
were not held up to be great moral exemplars of capitalism.” This comment clearly 
shows the connection between short-sellers being vilified and the notion that short-
selling is anti-capitalist. 
 
M1: “Maybe in Scotland, and perhaps ourselves, another reason why we wouldn’t be 
interested in short selling is that we are very aware of historical impacts and 
atmospheres that short selling has created…and the 1907 crash was blamed a lot on 
short selling.”   
 
One long-short manager (J1), when asked about cultural barriers and fear of 
vilification replied: “The vilification thing: not at all. We are lowly correlated and a 
very transparent, simple, easy to understand sort of product, so the stigmatic stuff 





Short-Selling as Gambling 
 
One pension trustee (R1) states that: “Short-selling is perceived in some quarters as a 
form of sophisticated gambling”.  
 
MacKenzie (2007) discusses the notion that certain market practices could be 
equated with gambling. For example, it was necessary for the developers of financial 
futures on the Chicago derivative exchanges in the early 1970s to persuade regulators 
that those financial derivatives that involved ‘cash ettlement’ (as opposed to 
physical delivery of the underlying asset) did not c nstitute gambling. Academic 
research (such as Black, Scholes and Merton’s work on option pricing formulae) 
played a valuable role in providing validity to fina cial derivatives. Arguably, recent 
academic work on short-selling could play an equally important role in dispelling the 
notion that short-selling is a “sophisticated form of gambling.” For example, Clarke 
et al. (2002, 2004, 2008) show how short-selling can be usd to improve the 
informational efficiency of an actively managed fund (see Section 2.1.2). 
 
One interviewee (U1), an investment manager, rejectd the notion that short-selling 
is related to gambling. However, later in the same int rview he compared short-
selling to betting on a horse race and argued that intr -day short-selling is gambling - 
there is clearly some ambiguity over the distinction between short-selling and 
gambling. One of the interviewees (Q1), a practising long-short sole-trader, stated 
that he expresses his negative opinions on stocks not through short-selling, but 
through the placing of spread-bets with specialist financial counter-parties. Gambling 
on stock prices falling can be functionally equivalent to short-selling, but (in the 
United Kingdom) is exempt from tax. The difference b tween short-selling and 
gambling on falling stock prices is, in at least one experienced practitioner’s mind, 





Short-selling as Trading and not Investing 
 
An argument put forward by a number of interviewees is the notion that short-selling 
is ‘not investing’. Instead, short-selling constitutes a form of ‘speculation’ or 
‘trading’ that has little to do with long-term investing in real assets. Several 
interviewees mentioned this concept: 
 
N2: “Most people like us are owners of stocks rather an traders of stocks. Within 
the Scottish framework, I think you will find perhaps a longer-term horizon taken 
and… most people are not dissimilar to ourselves in that they take the ownership of 
stocks quite seriously.” 
 
N1: “We want to own a part of a company and grow with the company rather than 
trade paper.” 
 
M1: “I think that from most people’s perspective, investing is about buying things.  
So you are trying to buy things that will go up and the concept of selling something 
you don’t have is an alien concept to a lot of peopl .  Particularly in Scotland, the 
concept of selling something you don’t have is very alien.  The concept in Scotland 
is all about fundamental, intense, rigorous knowing what you are investing in and 
buying it.”   
 
Question: “Do you feel that there is a distinction between investing and identifying 
an over-valued share and taking advantage of that opportunity? Do you feel that 
short-sellers are not investors?”  
C1: “Yes, I would agree with that. I think they are sophisticated punters. Their 
horizons are fundamentally short-term, they are not i terested in having title to what 
they are investing in because they are short-selling it. Yes, they’re punters and 
plungers!”  
 
A number of these comments suggest a relationship between investing and 
ownership. Short-selling is distinct from investing ot only because of a generally’ 
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shorter’ time horizon – a rather subjective measure – but also because short-selling 
confers no ownership rights (and responsibilities) on the short-seller. One manager 
(C1) argued that, in addition to ownership, voting rights were an important part of 
investing. It is thus possible to definitively and legally distinguish between the two 
practices: investing involves ownership and voting rights. Short-selling involves 
neither. This matters to some market practitioners b cause of institutional and social 
structures. There is a reputational benefit in being regarded as an investor, as distinct 
from a trader. It is socially acceptable for pensio fund trustees and investment 
consultants to engage the services of an investor, but less acceptable to engage a 
trader. For some tax-exempt organizations (e.g. investment trusts and charities) tax-
exempt status is dependent upon not being judged to be involved in trading activities  
 
Not all interviewees, however, believed that short-selling relates primarily to trading 
and not investing. One pension trustee discussed th role of short-selling in 
promoting market efficiency:  
 
R1: “…short-selling can be a corrective mechanism in the market. Stocks can get 
seriously over-valued and… this was well exemplified in the run up in the 1990s bull 
market that, because so many professional investors had become so benchmark-
orientated, there was a fear that NASDAQ had gone up x% and tech[nology stocks] 
accounted for 35% of the S&P 500 index.” 
 
One hedge fund manager argued that, in conducting rigorous analysis before shorting 
a stock, his activities could be distinguished from pure speculation: 
 
I1: “Ultimately if you are shorting a stock you have to be comfortable fundamentally 
with it. You can’t just...traders...you can be a momentum trader and if you see 
something happen you’re in and out very short-term. That’s not what we do. We’re 
using the skills that we built up on the long-side. Just transferring these skills, and 
these skills are just analysis, fundamentally analysing companies, ideally putting 
them into two baskets and going long of the companies you like and short of the 




Another interviewee, an investment manager, discussed the difficulties in 
differentiating between ‘trading’ and ‘investing’ on the basis of time horizon: 
 
U1: “I mean trading is a bit of an amorphous description anyway because ...how do 
you define trading as a time period? I think if you’re talking intra-day trading I 
would agree with that – that is gambling, in my view. But if you take a position 
because you are convinced that a stock is over-valued on a three year view, assuming 
you’ve got the facilities to do so, and you get that right, then would you call that a 
trading strategy?” 
 
This notion, of there being a distinction between ‘investing’ and ‘trading’ activities, 
is, to the best of my knowledge, new to the academic literature. I show above that 
this view was not uniform amongst interviewees, although a number of respondents 





Several interviewees highlighted the perception of a link between stock market 
crashes and short-selling. With respect to the 1907 and 1929 US stock market 
crashes, references were made to stock price manipul tion, stock pools and short 
squeezes. 
  
R1: “After the 1929 crash, a lot of blame fell on short-sellers. I think it was felt that 
they had distorted the market and caused a crash somehow and the authorities put on 
pretty strict regulations following the 1929 crash...” 
 
M1: “All that short-selling at the time, manipulation etc. – that gave short-selling a 




Such a perception, built on historical examples of t ck price manipulation, short-
selling and dramatic stock price changes, has led to a fear of loss of reputation if 
known to be engaging in short-selling. 
 
M1: “In investment your most important thing is reputation so from our point of 
view we want to keep the purity of our investment style and don’t want ourselves to 
be damaged by anything like that which in itself we don’t really believe in but could 
have added a little bit of performance perhaps but in the longer term could be such a 
damage to our reputation.  And that may be one of the reasons why the Scottish 
investment community in particular doesn’t get involved too much in that.  We know 
fine well how to operate it, we could make money on it but we’re not prepared to do 
it from the point of view of the reputational damage.” 
 
One interviewee, recounting his understanding of shrt-sellers prior to becoming a 
hedge fund manager, states: 
 
Q1: “At that point I knew nothing about hedge funds beyond that they were sort of 
bad boys of the industry who sort of you know came out of the Cayman Islands or 
Dutch Antilles and basically were not controlled and therefore something of a 
slippery wicket.” This individual researched the subject further and, armed with 
greater knowledge and understanding, decided to becm  a hedge fund manager in 
2000 despite the reputational risk. 
 
 
 Acceptance – by Clients, Consultants and Peers 
 
The notion of short-selling being ‘socially unacceptable’ or lacking acceptance by 
stakeholders in the investment process was mentioned by a series of interviewees: 
 
B1:” Most people who still make decisions for big sums of money are still kind of 
lay trustees. The idea of buying a company at a reasonable price is easy to 
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understand. Selling something in anticipation that it is going down is less easy, less 
acceptable and raises questions. I think there is an acceptance issue”.  
 
N2: “Culturally a lot of them [shareholders of an investment trust] would not expect 
us to be doing that [short-selling].” He adds: “It would be seen to be us doing 
something spivvy when it’s not spivvy at all”. 
 
Question: “What do your clients think of short selling?” 
J1:  “Remember that the bulk of [our] business is life related, so this was a bit of a 
new area for them.  We had to go down and present properly, show them the merits 
of it, ... but it took a bit of education and explaining and justification for them to see 
it.” 
 
Scheff, 1988 argues that people are strongly influeced by anticipation of how their 
behaviour will appear to others, even if approval or disapproval has no direct 
material consequence. It can be argued that such a phenomenon is at work amongst 
this community of investors. Alternatively, there could be real consequences 
(perhaps loss of clients) for not conforming. However, not all interviewees agree that 
short-selling is unacceptable. One experienced hedge fund manager (I1) argued: “It’s 
respectable, because it’s exactly just what you’re doing with investing, except that 
you’re short rather than long.” The same manager stated: “I always thought that 
hedge funds would become more and more mainstream, so I think it is acceptance, 
but also it’s a reality that if a company does a good job then it has nothing to fear 
from short-sellers.” As well as highlighting acceptance from clients, consultants and 
peers, his argument also introduced the notion of acceptance from companies who to 
some extent control information flow to investors. Growing attention on short-selling 
from the academic community has also contributed to growing acceptance: 
 
S1:  “I think first of all the growing importance of a quantitative approach to your 
investment process which makes this approach easier. In the context of that, the 
academic research that points out that it’s more effici nt. And also from the market 
point of view, the convergence in returns from markets in the last few years, where 
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generating alpha from just your longs is much more difficult. And I guess finally, a 
bit in line with point one, that there are institutions which have picked it up and 
become very good at this and are competing…” 
Question: “So in a sense, the academic work has led to changes in investment 
approach and changes to how the market works…?” 
S1:  “Yes, I think it gives theoretical support forthat.” 
Question: “And does that also explain the increasingly quantitative approach you are 
seeing in the market or is that separate?” 
S1: “Yes, I also think that some of this is behavioural, in that it worked shorting 
stocks. Some people were good at it as a result of the fact that the mainstream long-
only managers had a psychological blind spot of goin  short, so some of the 
behavioural biases are now being exploited and one of them is shorting. So I guess 
it’s not only the modern finance academic research but also the behavioural finance 
research that is shifting the sands in this busines.” 
 
Nevertheless, lack of acceptance remains important in some quarters. One pension 
trustee commented: 
 
R1: “If you were to stand in front of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
and explain that you were short-selling, hoping to drive a stock down in the hope of 





Hong et al. (2003) use a database of mutual fund holdings to shw that the 
stockholdings of any given fund manager respond more sensitively to the holdings 
and trades of other managers based in the same city, than to holdings and trades of 
fund managers in other cities. They further show that is effect is distinct from any 
local-preference/ home-bias effect in stock selection, and that it is robust to controls 
for investment style. Their work improves our knowledge of how word-of-mouth 




In interviews, I found a number of references to the ‘community of hedge fund 
managers’ and also found evidence that the behaviour of some investment managers 
and firms could act as a catalyst to others. For example, one short-selling 
entrepreneur had trained a number of hedge fund managers who now work in other 
firms, practising short-selling. Whilst under-taking this research, I received a number 
of requests to attend or speak at practitioner seminars on the subject of short-
extension portfolios and the use of short-selling in portfolios – effectively requests to 
share knowledge amongst a community of investors. 
 
In terms of knowledge and staff, as one firm starts to undertake short-selling, the 
pool of potential employees or entrepreneurs who can switch firm or set up their own 
firm increases. This is particularly important where a job market is ‘segmented’ (i.e. 
workers are not fully mobile). To illustrate this segmentation: 
 
H1; “When we were talking about recruiting people for fund of hedge funds we were 
told it would be very difficult to get anyone out of London [to move to Edinburgh] 
and that is where they should be as that is where all the gossip and chat is.” The lack 
of experienced and knowledgeable short-sellers is thu  highlighted as a barrier to 
short-selling. 
 
A comment from a risk consultant (D1) illustrated some of the linkages between the 
various social explanations for limited short-selling: “This is a huge generalization 
but I’ll say the Scottish firms are more conservatie than the others or they like to be 
perceived as being more conservative. It’s back to the old Scottish Protestant work 
ethic that we’re old men of the game and we know what we’re doing, you know. 
Although that’s more perception than reality. If you l ok beneath the surface they’re 
all there at the forefront looking to create new products with interesting bits and 
pieces.” She added: “And I guess the general public who is buying into these 
products is more aware too so they’re demanding more innovative products.” 
Comments such as this reveal some of the linkages between the various social 







The academic literature contains references to a series of risk-related constraints on 
short-selling. These include recall risk, short squeezes, synchronicity risk, 
performance-related arbitrage and the potential for unlimited losses. Interviewees 






Recall risk is described in Section 2.1.3. This risk  well documented in the 
literature, and was known to interviewees. One long-short manager commented on 
his fear of recall risk, but also his own recall of stock loans made to others: 
 
Question:  Did you have any problems with recalls at all? 
J1:  “No, that was a big fear I had. It’s one thing to say we can be patient and 
persevere but recalls could have upset that.” 
Question:  “So the contracts allowed for it but you didn’t suffer that at any point?” 
J1:  “That’s right, although we did do that to other people occasionally where for 
whatever reason we decided to pay the break fee, giving them 48 hours notice or 
whatever” 
Question:  “Is that because you did your analysis and you felt it was the right thing 
for you or was there a little bit of gamesmanship involved thinking you could cause a 
little bit of stress to someone by breaking?” 
J1:  “No, we’re too nice for that.  It would typically be a position where we had made 
a little bit of money and thought there is downside here and the additional gain might 
be small potatoes compared to what we might give up so we just did it.” 
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One interviewee, a prime broker, discussed the lending of stock from within a hedge 
fund’s account with the prime broker, and argued that recall risk was a problem for 
borrowers of stock: 
 
O2: “...hedge fund managers have high turnover and that is not particularly attractive 
to a borrower given the likelihood of recall.”  
 
The prime broker went on to argue that stock would only be borrowed from a source 
likely to recall the stock when other less risky sources of stock borrowing had been 
exhausted. There was good general awareness of recall risk. For example:  
 
G3: “In respect to stock loan recalls, these normally occur around corporate events - 
takeovers etc. where 60 to 90 days shareholder notice is required ahead of the vote, 
or dividend dates.”  
 
There was also some degree of fear around an inability to hold on to short positions 
in the face of loan recall. Prime brokers responded by putting in place processes to 
minimize the risk that clients suffer from loan recalls. 
 
 
Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
Where a loan recall cannot be replaced, the short-seller must repurchase stock in the 
market and this is known as a short squeeze. Short-sellers fear these because of the 
possible market impact from any forced covering. Jacobs and Levy (2007) make the 
point that the fear of short squeezes deters some short- ellers, but that this fear is 
largely unfounded as they argue that these are rare events and confined to illiquid 
stocks. One interviewee refers to manipulative short squeezes, a situation in which a 
manipulator takes a position in a stock and ‘engineers’ a short squeeze so as to profit 




Q1: “I’m sure it goes on among the investment banks; that from time to time they get 
the bit between the teeth and squeeze the shorts.” 
 
 
Crowded Exit Risk 
 
A crowded exit is a liquidity problem that arises in stocks where short-sellers hold 
large positions relative to normal trading volume, and when a catalyst prompts short-
sellers to cover their positions rapidly and simultaneously. Catalysts include, but are 
not limited to, public news releases by companies. The temporary excess of demand 
for stock relative to normal trading volume leads to upward pressure on the stock 
price. Crowded exits can lead to losses for short-sellers and thus act as an indirect 
constraint on short-selling. Several interviewees discussed crowded exit risk: 
 
N2: “you have to have liquidity around it [the stock] to be able to buy it back and 
cover your short.” He adds: “How the doors seem to narrow as you run for the exit!” 
 
V1: “Short-sellers try very hard not to be in crowded trades...” He added: “If they 
end up in crowded trades, what you find is that if  company comes out with good 
news then you can see 6-7% moves even in big stocks and I assume that’s because 
people were short [and covering their positions].” 
 
Some interviewees commented on the relationship between short squeezes and 
crowded exits: 
 
E2: “When you get a squeeze….then there is a panic to get in or out and liquidity 
dries up.” Furthermore; “It’s a crowded ownership or n n-ownership issue divorced 
from the specifics of the stock or bond.” 
 
G3: “Crowded exits can be a problem. I only experienced it once over a three year 
period. It’s more of an issue with an independently enforceable stop loss regime. If 
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your fund doesn‘t get sucked into the initial squeeze then a little patience can be 
rewarded with better exit terms a few days down the line.” 
 
 
Synchronization risk/ time horizon problems – 
 
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) introduce the notion of synchronization risk (see 
Section 2.1.3). Delaying short-selling until other arbitrageurs have also detected an 
over-valuation has the effect of reducing the amount of short activity in overall 
terms. This problem is related to the negative expected return problem and to costs, 
in the sense that short-sellers require rapid convergence in share price to a lower fair 
value to overcome the negative expected returns and costs of short-selling. It is also 
related to noise trader risk (see Section 2.1.3) in that uninformed investors can 
‘overwhelm’ the more informed activities of a short-seller with limited capital. 
 
Interviewees cited specific examples of problems associated with time horizons and 
synchronization risk: 
  
R1: “To my mind, the [1999 technology stock] valuations were grossly over-
exaggerated… and therefore I think there was an opportunity for short-sellers to act 
as a correction mechanism in an over-heated technology market. The corollary of 
that is that if you had shorted the tech market in 1999, you would have had to have 
waited until I think 2002 for the NASDAQ to correct back to its 1999 levels, so you 
would have got killed in the meantime, so there are disadvantages.” 
 
M1: “There is a bit of that in that it is very short term.  Short-selling could be about 
investment and it could use your investment timing a d your investment knowledge 
to see a company is overvalued.  We can see a company is overvalued however we 
don’t claim to have any short term knowledge of that so to us it is the timescale that 
is alien.  We don’t see how you can predict what a sh re is going to do over a very 
short period of days or months.  And there are so many other external factors that 
could influence other people’s ways of valuing the stock that means that although 
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you may believe in your valuation parameters that te stock is overvalued, that may 
not be in other people’s valuation parameters such as venture capital people, asset 
buys, etc.” 
 
One fund manager, when asked if he believed he had any ability to identify over-
valued shares, raised the issue of timing and synchro ization risk: 
 
C1:  “Oh, yes…but no ability whatsoever to predict when that over-valuation will be 
recognized. It may be recognized within five days or it may be recognized within 
five years, it may go on longer than that. So we have considerable faith in our ability 
to say this thing is too bloody dear, but no faith w atsoever to say when that will be 
recognized.” 
Question: “So do you feel that short-selling is riskier than long-holding because of 
the fact that the time horizon is so important…” 
C1:  “Undoubtedly, yes.” 
 
Opinions varied, however, on the importance of synchronization risk as a barrier to 
short-selling. For example: 
 
Q1: “What is difficult is knowing the times of when some of these things are going 
to change”. He adds: “But at the end of the day it’s not that that stopped us.” 
 
I1: “...if you go long of something you need a catalyst as well. The stock could be 
under-valued for years.” He adds; “You’ve got to look for a catalyst on every 
decision, that’s one of the pillars of investment.” 
 
One quote linked the concept of synchronization risk to the costs and the negative 
returns expected from short-selling in an efficient market, but also to the concept of 
short-selling as trading and not investing: 
 
B1: “Short selling is associated with high turnover, vent driven, investment 
speculation if you like. That is a specific type of investment trading really. I don’t see 
113 
 
why it has to be associated with that, maybe it’s because of the cost, if you have the 
view that fundamentally something is over valued, you don’t know when it’s going 
to come down, may be 3 years maybe 5 years…, or other negative costs. Actually 
shorting that stock for that period may outweigh the potential gains you might get, 





Shleifer and Vishny (1997) introduce to the literatu e the concept of performance 
based arbitrage (see Section 2.1.3). Long-short managers were aware of this risk, and 
used ‘lock-up periods’ – whereby clients cannot withdraw funds immediately - to 
mitigate the problem where possible: 
 
Question:  “If clients see losing positions and panic and try and pull out that can 
actually mean closing potentially successful positins.  How do you solve that risk or 
problem? 
 
J1: “We have a lock-up period or a notice period for liquidation of 45 days.  That 
doesn’t solve the problem, it just helps.”   
 
A ‘lock-up’ reduces the ability of a client to liquidate an account at short notice. This 
loss of liquidity can be regarded as a disadvantage to a client. However, lock-ups are 
designed to enhance long-term performance by reducing the need for the fire-sale of 
attractively-priced assets. There is thus a trade-off between liquidity for the ultimate 
client and long-term returns for the fund in which the client is invested. 
 
In Shleifer and Vishny’s model, clients are generally uninformed and have a poor 
understanding of risk arbitrage. One former hedge fund manager argued that not only 
clients but even some specialist agents charged with selecting hedge funds in which 




G3: “On stop losses, it’s standard hedge fund practice to have a stop loss framework 
both at an individual trade and portfolio level – managers are extremely careful to 
prevent drawdown as it hits the reported stats that fund-of-fund managers employ in 
screening investment candidates.”  
 
 
Lack of Transparency 
 
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2005) show how a predator c n exploit the forced sale 
of an asset by another market participant to earn a profit. Their approach could also 
apply to the forced purchase of an asset by a short- eller (such as might happen with 
a short squeeze). To minimize this risk, short-sellers prefer to keep their stock 
positions private. Full transparency about holdings and intentions can not only be 
used by others to earn profits at the short-sellers expense, but can also be used by 
imitators to copy the strategy of a successful short-seller at little cost. Furthermore, 
they could be used to trade ahead of a short-seller whose trading intentions could be 
predicted, so as to benefit from the market impact of the short-seller’s trades. 
Informed short-sellers thus eschew full transparency. However, poor transparency 
can raise suspicion amongst other market actors about the activities of short-sellers. 
 
Most developed stock markets lack a centralized loan m rket (i.e. there is no ‘stock 
exchange’ for stock loans). Jones and Lamont (2002) discuss a centralized loan 
market that existed in 1930s Wall Street, but such markets are rare. Because stock 
loan markets are generally decentralized, this can result in publicly available 
information about stock lending activity being far from comprehensive. Such 
limitations can lead to fear and suspicion amongst investment managers and clients 
about the activities of other market participants. 
 
D1: “Another thing we didn’t touch on that puts off a lot of people is lack of 
information or transparency.” 
Question: “And that lack of transparency leads to a lack of confidence or a lack of 
trust at the client level or the portfolio manager level?” 
115 
 
D1: “At the portfolio manager level. I don’t think the clients are necessarily aware of 
lack of transparency”  
 
Lack of transparency was cited by several interviewe s as a constraint for 
institutional clients such as pension funds. The trustees of such funds tend not to 
want to invest in portfolios or products that are opaque or difficult to understand. 
There is personal risk for trustees if they fail to undertake sufficiently rigorous due 
diligence on investments made for a pension fund. If a hedge fund held within a 
pension fund were to produce large losses, a trustee would not wish to admit in 
public that he/she did not know what securities were held in the portfolio, or admit to 
a poor understanding of the investment process applied by the hedge fund. It is far 
safer for a trustee to avoid investment in products lacking in transparency. This risk-
related argument is also, in a sense, an institutional constraint. Pension fund trustees 
(in the United Kingdom, at least) are generally volunteers and are unpaid for their 
work. However, they can suffer downside risk in terms of personal loss of reputation 
if they produce poor results for the beneficiaries of the pension fund. The 
institutional structure associated with the oversight of some pension funds thus 





A suggestion put forward by D’Avolio (2002) to help explain the uncommonness of 
short-selling is that investment managers fear thats ort-selling will increase their 
tracking error against common benchmarks or indices. The vast majority of 
interviewees adamantly rejected this notion. For example: 
 
E2: “...the concept of tracking error has no traction in the long-short space, it doesn’t 
mean anything. As a hedge fund manager I’ve never us d the phrase once. And the 
reason is that tracking error is a guide to expectation, whereas in terms of risk in the 
hedge fund world they are much more ‘Value at Risk’ based because there is a threat 




One interviewee reinterpreted D’Avolio’s suggestion and argued that the growth in 
short-selling over recent years could be explained partly by investment managers 
seeking to break away from tracking error constraints. This suggests that it is the 
setting of tracking error targets by risk managers or clients that has been a barrier to 
short-selling, rather than investment managers’ fear. A pension consultant suggested 
that tracking error constraints had been a relevant issue: 
 
E1: “In pension funds, to benchmark your long-only manager relative to an index 
was the natural way to look at things and still is, but pension fund trustees and 
consultants, the whole industry, are getting a lot m re comfortable about absolute 
return rather than any benchmark and obviously thatis going to help long-short 
products.” 
 
In a related discussion, one long-short manager argued that any shortfall in returns 
for a hedge fund against a long-only benchmark could be perceived by clients and 
colleagues as failure by the hedge fund manager. When benchmark returns were high 
in absolute terms (i.e. during a bull market in equities) absolute-return funds were 
likely to under-perform a long-only benchmark. This could lead to disappointment 
and a loss of support from clients, ultimately leading to less short-selling. 
Effectively, this is a ‘mis-benchmarking problem’, rather than a tracking error 
constraint. Another interviewee cited peer-group benchmarking as an example of a 
benchmarking problem that limits short-selling:  
 
H1: “we are still measured against our competitors so how we invest our money is 
still largely driven by what everyone else is doing & it would be difficult for us to 
put 20% of the With Profits fund into a hedge fund without being way off what our 
competitors are doing”   
 
Thus, tracking error constraints and the inappropriate benchmarking of long-short 
funds can act a barrier to short-selling. Waring and Siegel (2006) address the 





Potential for Unlimited Losses 
 
A short position has maximum gain of 100%, which occurs when a share price falls 
to zero. Losses, on the other hand, are potentially unlimited, as there is no upper limit 
to the price at which a share can trade. Effectively, this means that short-sellers face 
unlimited liability if they are unable to close their positions, a feature not normally 
associated with investment. One risk consultant argued: 
 
D1: “I think you need stop losses to be a disciplined investor and especially with 
short-selling where things can move very quickly against you and then the cost 
ratchets up almost with a kind of ‘optionality-type’ profile”. Furthermore; “with 
short-selling you’ve got to recognize almost immediately when you’re wrong”. The 
automatic use of stop losses leads to the early recognition of mistakes and, other 
things equal, leads to potentially shorter holding periods for short positions.” 
 
One investment manager (U1) argued that ‘potentially un imited losses’ were one of 
the reasons why his firm prohibits the use of short-selling when managing money for 
its own clients. 
 
 
Distribution of Returns: 
 
 
Negative Expected Returns 
 
In asset pricing models such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the expected return 
from holding a risky asset exceeds the risk free rat of return – there is said to be a 
‘risk premium’ for owning a risky asset. A short-seller holds a negative position in a 
risky asset and the cash proceeds from the short sale must be used to collateralise the 
stock loan. A ‘rebate rate’ that reflects prevailing terest rates less a stock borrowing 
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fee is paid on this collateral (see Section 2.2.2). Any dividends must be manufactured 
by the stock borrower to make the stock lender whole. Within an efficient markets 
framework, a short position in a stock would have an expected return equal to: 
(rebate rate on collateral) – (expected return on long stock position). Where the 
collateral is invested at the risk free rate of retu n, the rebate rate must be below the 
risk free rate of return. Because of the risk premium embedded in the risky stock’s 
expected return, the expected return from the short position will be negative. Thus, 
the short-seller bears investment risk by virtue of having a non-zero holding in a 
risky asset, but expects to receive a negative return. This is an unattractive 
proposition and thus a barrier to short-selling. To expect a positive return from the 
short-sale of a stock, one must believe in some form f mispricing in the market (the 
stock must either be currently mispriced or about t become mispriced) and the ‘re-
pricing’ of the stock must occur quickly enough to outweigh the costs of short-
selling. Finding the catalyst for the stock re-pricing becomes important and 
‘synchronization risk’ (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 200) becomes a consideration in 
investment decision making. According to Credit Suisse/ Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index, a compiler of data on hedge fund assets and performance, ‘dedicated short 
bias’ funds are of limited popularity, accounting for less than 1% of hedge fund 
assets at all times between inception of the index in 1994, and October 1st, 20088. 
Furthermore, dedicated short bias funds recorded negativ  ex-post cumulative returns 
between these dates. 
 
However, it should be noted that many market participants involved in short-selling 
hold a combination of long and short positions. There xists a spectrum of 
investment strategies ranging from pure short-selling to ‘market neutral portfolios’ 
and through to ‘beta-one portfolios’ such as short-extension portfolios (see Clarke et 
al., 2004, 2008). For a market neutral investor, the investor earns the difference in 
expected returns between the long and short equity positions, plus the risk-free return 
on cash deposited as collateral or held back to cover margin calls, less stock 
borrowing fees. The investor assumes no market risk (if market neutral) but suffers 
exposure to the relative movements of the two securities. In an efficient market, 
                                                




he/she expects to receive the risk-free rate of return less stock borrowing fees. With a 
short-extension portfolio, short positions are balanced with additional long positions 
so that the portfolio remains 100% net long. The expected return is similar to that for 
a long-only position in shares, but with the added cost of the stock borrowing fees 
and a credit risk premium (for borrowing additional money to provide the active 
extension). Assuming efficient pricing in a market, the expected return from all the 
above strategies that use short-selling is unattractive, on a risk-adjusted basis. The 
cost of borrowing stock provides a ‘headwind’ that diminishes the return per unit of 
risk. Only with a mis-pricing story does the return per unit of risk become more 
attractive. 
 
The problem of negative expected returns was mentioned by several interviewees. 
 
M1: “I would think that anyone who is slightly knowledgeable would realise that 
equity markets on the whole tend to go up and produce positive returns therefore by 
short-selling you are intrinsically going to under-perform and lose money over the 
long term.” 
 
One experienced hedge fund manager argued that shor-selling was against the 
‘mentality’ of many Scottish investment managers, who had programmed themselves 
to buy securities that were falling, secure in the belief that this provided an attractive 
entry point for long-term investment. A more short-termist approach might be to 
exploit the momentum effect (see, for example, Jegad esh and Titman, 1993, 2001) 
and short-sell securities whose prices were falling. Thus, the ‘negative expected 
return’ problem can be linked to that of the time horizon of the investor: a long-term 
investor would tend to view falling share prices as an opportunity to accumulate 
‘depressed’ stock; a shorter-term market participant would see negative momentum 
and thus a short-selling opportunity. The origins of the Scottish investment 
community are most associated with longer-term investing, rather than with ‘trading’ 
or shorter time horizon investing. 
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A relatively new type of portfolio structure, generally known as ‘short-extension 
portfolios’, provides a possible solution to the negative expected return problem. 
These portfolios build upon the Fundamental Law of Active Management (Grinold, 
1989) and the generalised version of the Fundamental Law (Clarke et al., 2002). A 
typical short extension portfolio is described in Clarke et al. (2004). Short-extension 
portfolios permit a limited degree of short-selling and this is entirely offset by 
borrowing (or its equivalent) so as to purchase securities to the same value of those 
sold. As an illustration, a portfolio might be 120% long of stocks, 20% short of 
stocks and thus 100% net long of stocks. This has te effect of setting the beta of the 
portfolio to (approximately) one, so that the expected return of the portfolio is similar 
to that of a traditional long-only portfolio. Amongst interviewees, awareness of this 
type of portfolio was rather limited, but I am aware of at least two Scottish firms that 
at the time of writing are planning to establish short-extension portfolios. If such 
portfolios are successfully launched, then (everything else equal) short-selling will 
increase amongst the Scottish investment community. The acceptance of the ‘short-
extension’ portfolio structure – one that ‘solves’ the negative expected return 
problem associated with short-selling - suggests that negative expected returns have 
been a significant barrier to short-selling. 
 
Question: “What stops you from investing long-term in short positions? Are there 
constraints there?” 
M1: “Yes, there’s a couple of things.  We actually looked at that in the study we did 
– stocks that were at extreme valuations produced poor returns.  The poor returns 
were often still positive.  So although these stocks were massively under-performing 
the market, they were still producing positive absolute returns.  So over the long term 
that would suggest that you don’t invest.  Also if you believe markets do produce 
between 5-7% real returns, so 8-10% nominal, your ppulation of stocks which are 
negative nominal is going to be quite small.  So just on pure numbers it is not a 
sensible view point.”  
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Unattractive Distribution of Returns 
 
Related to the negative expected return from short positions is the skewed 
distribution of returns associated with some long-short hedge fund strategies. For 
example, merger arbitrage strategies tend to produce small gains under most 
circumstances. However, as highlighted by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), large stock 
market falls tend to lead to failed merger and acquisition activity, resulting in large 
losses for merger arbitrage strategies. This leads to a pattern of small gains in 
successive periods punctuated by the occasional large loss. Such a distribution of 
returns can be unattractive to some clients, and could interact with the performance-
based arbitrage effect described earlier. It might also be referred to as ‘blow-up risk’, 
in recognition of a number of high profile hedge fund failures, including Long-Term 
Capital Management in 1998, or Amaranth in 2006.  
 
M1: “…some of the more adventurous [hedge funds] have gotten themselves into 
some difficulties and they’ve collapsed and they tend to make the headlines, so the 
investing public tends to look at these and think: ‘This is something we want to steer 
well clear of.” This shows a link between an unattrac ive distribution of returns and 
reputational risk. 
 
A number of interviewees commented on the perception of risk from clients, even if 
this was not fully justified by the strategy employed or structure of the investment 
vehicle that undertakes short-selling: For example: 
 
H1: “I know as a trustee of one of our pension funds that pension funds generally are 
very nervous of short-selling.  I think most of them don’t understand that if they 
invest in a hedge fund they can’t lose any more money than they put in, they believe 
that if the fund is short selling they can lose their shirt.”  And further: “When 
Prudential went into hedge funds the headline in the Evening Standard was 
‘Prudential breaks the last taboo of investment management and bets on hedge 
funds’. It doesn’t matter what they say in the Financi l Times as the man who buys 
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the Prudential products is reading the Evening Standard and thinking: ‘Oh my God, 
I’m going to lose my shirt’, even though the amount invested was a tiny £65million.” 
 
A particular risk associated with short-positions is that of a take-over bid. A typical 
bidder will be required to pay a premium to the ‘undisturbed’ share price – 
effectively a premium for control. This works in favour of long-holders of a stock 
and is thus a risk to short-sellers. It would be difficult to argue, though, that this risk 
makes short-selling any riskier than long-only investing. For example, long holders 
face the risk of profit warnings, which can produce sharp and sudden drops in a share 
prices, and this would work to the advantage of a short-seller. Nevertheless, fear of 
take-overs was mentioned by one investment manager: 
 
M1: “Stocks in the overvalued part of the curve, if you look at the survivor bias 
element of it, a lot of the stocks that are very expensive actually get taken out [i.e. 
acquired] one way or another.  Some do go bust but a lo actually get taken over for 






Some portfolios are run to generate a high or rising tream of income for clients to 
whom income is important (this clientele might include retired individuals who 
require a regular income from their investments). Such income is generated primarily 
from the dividends received from companies as a result of ownership of shares in 
those companies. As explained in Section 2.2.2, the borrower of a share is required to 
manufacture a dividend for the lender of that share, so as to ‘make the lender whole’ 
in terms of income foregone as a result of lending out the shares. This results in a 
negative income for the borrower of a share. Accordingly, short-sellers do not 
receive income, but instead suffer negative income as a result of their activities. This 
can create a ‘negative clientele effect’ – income-se king investors will tend to 




To illustrate this, several managers highlighted the importance of income to the firm.  
 
F1: “They [my clients] require an income flow”. 
 
N2: “We seek to grow our dividend as well, so yield is important to us”  
 
This latter manager argued though that this would not prevent the firm from short-
selling, as capital gains could be transformed into i come through the use of a 
trading subsidiary and the payment of capital gains as a dividend to the holding 
company. Nevertheless, for more constrained or less creative firms, income 
requirement could act as a barrier. Manager F1 argued that a need for income flow 
prevented her from suggesting short-selling to her cli nts. 
 
Another manager (C1) argued that dividend income compensates long-holders of 
equity as they wait for convergence to the perceived higher fair value of a share. 
Dividend income works against short-sellers awaiting convergence to a lower share 





Psychological Barrier around Ownership 
 
One interviewee (S1) argued that ‘psychological’ barriers are the main impediment 
to short-selling being more common. “Particularly fundamental qualitatively-
oriented managers have a tendency to pick stocks that they believe in, feel 
comfortable with management and believe the story. It’s much harder 
psychologically to go through that same process, gathering information and then 
deciding that I don’t like the company, I don’t have faith in management and I’m 
going to short the stock.” The same interviewee described a “psychological blind 




D1: There’s a psychological aspect...there’s also certainly managers that come from 
a long-only environment [who] tend to fall in love with their stock – their babies – 
and they don’t want to get rid of them and that aspect goes on and that’s why they 
don’t tend to make very good short-sellers.”  
 
Both interviewees thus argued that long-only investing involved ownership, and that 




Losing Positions Grow 
 
One long-short fund manager argued that it is: “psychologically difficult to see 
losing positions grow.” This refers to the fact that short positions held in stocks that 
rise more in price than others become a greater proporti n of the overall portfolio. 
The portfolio manager’s mistakes thus become a ‘growing problem’ in the portfolio.  
This is in contrast to the situation experienced by long-only managers, where under-
performing (losing) positions become a smaller part of he total portfolio, and thus 
might appear to have become smaller problems for the portfolio manager. Arguably, 
this barrier is related to risk, in the sense that b d short-sales become a larger 
proportion of the portfolio and so a bigger risk con ern, but it is described by the 
interviewee as a psychological barrier. 
 
 
Lack of Knowledge/ Experience 
 
Lack of knowledge or experience of the process, benefits and risks of short-selling is 
one of the most commonly cited constraints on short-selling.  
 
H1: “It [short-selling] is difficult to understand.  The people in the UK who are 
responsible for most investment decisions, trustees of institutions, individuals and 
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even actuaries within our assurance company who set the investment strategy don’t 
understand how you make money out of an arbitrage strategy.  It is difficult for them 
to justify the time it would take them to understand it for the actual difference it is 
going to make.”   
 
C1: “We don’t have clients as such, we have sharehold rs. I would imagine most of 
them would regard it [short-selling] as anathema, but that’s because most of them are 
private individuals, private shareholders, and do not understand or appreciate what 
short-sellers are trying to do.” 
 
One manager involved in charity fund management, commented on a lack of 
knowledge amongst some fund trustees about short-selling, and suggested that this 
serves to limit the extent of short-selling. 
 
F1: “I don’t think you should have any product in a client portfolio without them 
understanding how it operates. That just leads to disaster further down the road.”  
 
The same interviewee also highlighted her own lack of knowledge on the subject.  
 
F1: “There might be some knowledge problems. People have to go out and learn – I 
don’t feel I know enough about it.” 
 
One investment manager argued that even well-educated market practitioners could 
be lacking in knowledge of short-selling: 
 
U1: “I suspect a lack of knowledge primarily, even amongst the market 
professionals. I think even if you asked an investment manager who is fairly highly 
qualified, but not a specialist in that field, he would profess to have very little 
knowledge.” This suggests not so much a lack of knowledge in investment matters, 




One experienced hedge fund manager argued that lack of knowledge was a possible 
reason for lack of interest in short-selling in Scotland, but stated that “that’s why you 
bring [new] people in, but I think obviously maybe the people at the top would have 
to get comfortable with it.”  
 
One former hedge fund manager argued: 
 
Q1: “The textbooks, all the textbooks that people lik me learned from did not have 
anything on short-selling. It might have been referred to briefly as something that 
stock jobbers [market-makers] did but it wasn’t something that investors needed to 
know about.”  
 
To explore this notion further, I identified six popular textbooks used by graduate 
students in business schools, and analysed the index of ach, to identify the number 
of pages devoted to short-selling, stock lending, arbitr ge, risk arbitrage and hedge 
funds. This is a crude measure, but nevertheless instructive. The results are displayed 
below in Table 4.1. In each cell, I show the number of pages devoted to a specified 
topic. In brackets in each cell is the number of discrete index references to the topic 
(noting that some index references span several pages). I find that standard business 
school textbooks on investment management contain little material on short-selling 
(between 0.2% and 1.5% of total page count in all cases). Stock borrowing or lending 
is not listed in the index of any of these books, although stock borrowing is generally 
mentioned in most of the textbooks as a line or two in the summary of the mechanics 
of short-selling. Arbitrage is more frequently mentio ed in most of the textbooks (up 
to 4% of total page count in one case), primarily because each seeks to describe 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory, a major finance theory. It should be noted however, that 
this theory makes simplifying assumptions about short-selling (namely, that it is 
inexpensive, unrestricted and widely practised) that are unrealistic in practice. Thus, 
the theory suggests that arbitrage is a standard prctice, but give few clues as to how 
to practice arbitrage. Hedge funds are, perhaps surprisingly given their growing 
popularity, scarcely mentioned in the editions of the extbooks studied. In several of 
the textbooks, there are references to ‘hedging’ within the context of derivatives, and 
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I include these in Table 4.1 when directly related to short-selling, and exclude when 
these refer solely to the concept of removing some form of risk (e.g. exposure to 
commodity price moves). 
   
Table 4.1  References to Short-Selling, Stock Lending and Arbitrage Amongst 
Popular Textbooks on Investment 
Author(s) Fabozzi & 
Modigliani 

























644 589 1174 914 641 734 
Short-
Selling 
4 pages (3 
references) 
1 (1) 4 (3) 5 (3) 9 (6) 6 (6) 
Stock-
Lending 
0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
















These findings correspond with my interview results, where lack of knowledge is 
cited by a number of interviewees as a barrier to sh rt-selling. Q1 argued that it is 
those with practical experience of the mechanics of short-selling – the market-
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makers and traders who are principally London based within the UK- who have 
tended to practice short-selling within the investment industry. This suggests that a 
lack of education in short-selling, combined with a lack of practical experience due 
to the limited scale of market-making and prime broke age in Scotland, has 
contributed to the scarcity of short-selling within the Scottish investment community. 
Furthermore, lack of experience can be ‘location specific’.  
 
One of the interviewees (M1) is Partner at a recently established firm that is staffed 
by a small number of very experienced professionals. The CEO studied economics 
for his D. Phil. and has written a number of academic articles and a book on 
investing that includes sections on short-selling. The firm chooses not to short-sell. 
This example indicates that amongst those who do not practice short-selling, not all 
suffer from a lack of knowledge. 
 
 
Lack of Skill: 
 
Skill can be defined as the ability to generate positive risk-adjusted returns over the 
long-term. It is sometimes referred to as ‘alpha’ in the jargon of the industry. Only if 
the manager has skill is it worth paying an active management fee; otherwise it 
should be possible to employ low-cost, passive investm nt management or to use 
derivatives such as index futures. When studying the performance history of an 
investment manager, it is difficult to separate luck from skill over the short-term, 
although a variety of performance measurement techniques attempt this task (see, for 
example, Edwards and Caglayan, 2001)). Active long ly managers deliver ‘beta’ 
(passive market or index returns) and ‘alpha’ (or skill-related) returns. In ‘market 
neutral’ funds, beta should be zero, and the expected return is the return from cash 
plus manager skill, less costs. In long-short funds, beta is generally expected to be 
close to zero over time, and alpha is expected to dominate (but long-short funds 
sometimes have beta greater than zero, as alluded to in some of the interviews). 
Generally though, alpha dominates beta in long-short funds because of the low-beta. 
As a result, obfuscation between the two sources of return is lower than for long-only 
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funds that combine beta and alpha. Consequently, it is easier for investment 
consultants and clients to detect a lack of skill in a long-short fund manager.  
 
Where performance is measured in risk-adjusted terms, the sum of alpha in the 
market amongst all participants is, by definition, zero. Thus, not all participants can 
exhibit positive alpha or ‘skill’. With long-only funds, beta and alpha components of 
return are commingled, and clients of investment managers might be content with 
returns that are positive (because of the impact of beta in a generally rising market 
environment) even though there is no evidence of skill. With long-short funds, 
under-performance is quickly detected by clients, and this can lead to the rapid 
termination of management contracts by clients. As such, the increased transparency 
of skill can become a constraint on the amount of long-short management that takes 
place in a market. This issue was raised by two long-short managers who had 
abandoned their long-short portfolios. One manager (Q1) stated that returns had been 
satisfactory in average magnitude, but not consistent enough to appeal to prospective 
clients. This suggests that risk-adjusted returns ad consistency of alpha are 
important to clients. The greater ‘transparency of skill’ in long-short funds that have 
a target beta near to zero can combine with a ‘lack of skill’ amongst long-short 
managers to limit the amount of short-selling in the market.   
 
Investment managers who had not yet practiced short- elling were often unsure if 
they have skill in this activity: 
 
 B1: “first, we are not sure if we are any good at short-selling” 
 
G1: “....we could debate whether we have the skills to do it [short-selling] even if we 
thought it was a good plan.” 
 
One investment consultant commented: 
 
E2: “I think the advisory business is very uncomfortable with alpha as a durable 
source. It’s hung up on [the notion that the total added value of investors] is less than 
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or equal to zero.” In other words, investment advisors know that the weighted sum of 
all risk-adjusted returns in the market is zero. Including trading costs, it is negative. 
They are sceptical of claims by investment managers of their ability to earn positive 
risk adjusted returns.” This is sometimes referred to as the ‘Lake Wobegone 
syndrome’ - a reference to the Garrison Keiller novel in which it is claimed that all 
children in a mythical town are ‘above average’. Active managers might all aspire to 
produce positive risk-adjusted returns, but they cannot all succeed. After fees and 
costs, the average investor fails to out-perform the market. 
 
Each interviewee was asked if they believed that short-sellers had special skills 
relative to long-only managers. Answers were mixed, but the most common answer 
was ‘yes’, based on the need to be more aware of the catalyst for convergence to fair 
value, and the time horizon for the short-seller. A typical comment on the additional 
skills required of short-sellers was: “The mindset is much more objective and will 
probably translate into a separate process where th separation between companies 
and stocks (if we talk about equities) is much clearer, whereas here traditionally I 








Investment management firms, especially those that interact with investment 
consultants in an attempt to win additional clients, are required to make their 
investment processes known, so that the consultant can undertake ‘due diligence’ on 
the investment manager. Developmental changes to investment processes, so as to 
incorporate new research or new financial tools, are generally acceptable to an 
investment consultant. However, dramatic changes to investment processes can be 
regarded with suspicion, as they lead to the creation of new and untested processes, 
at least until a track record has been established. Consequently, there is a cost to an 
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incumbent manager in changing an investment process. Thi  can act as a barrier to 
the introduction of short-selling at successful long-only firms. Consequently short-
selling is more likely to involve new products or new divisions within an existing 
firm (requiring a gradual building up of assets under management from a zero base) 
than the conversion of existing long-only business to a long-short process. This has 
the effect of slowing any transition from long-only to long-short management. Thus, 
there exists an institutional constraint on short-selling, in the sense that time must 
elapse for a process to become ‘proven’ in the eyes of others. There are also costs 
associated with acquiring new skills and knowledge to develop an investment 
process. A number of interviewees described how their current investment processes 
were ill-adapted to long-short equity management: 
 
B1: “A lot of our process is aimed at identifying quality companies, in terms of 
sifting through potential investment opportunities, identifying attractive companies 
then looking into them further, and so you don’t necessarily look into the ones you 
dislike to find out which ones you really hate.” 
Question: “Would it require a change to the current process?” 
B1: “I think that is the issue.” 
 
H1: “We don’t have the support, risk processes, etc. to enable people to do that 
[short-selling].” 
 
M1: “The other main reason is, to look at these stocks long term you have to focus 
on stocks and take a long time to decide your parameters and what the valuation is.  
Once we decide a stock looks overvalued we abandon it at that point, we don’t do the 
intensive work to find the stock is overvalued, so it wouldn’t fit in with that 
parameter at all.” 
 
N1; “[we] have a team of investment managers who tend to look at things positively 






Institutional Conflicts of Interest 
 
Institutions can impose constraints on themselves in an attempt to avoid conflicts of 
interest, minimize staff rivalries or demonstrate srong corporate governance. Such 
constraints were mentioned by several interviewees. A typical line of argument was 
that larger institutions might hold permanent minimum positions in some larger 
companies, even if the stock were disliked, because of tracking error constraints that 
were self-imposed or else set by clients or consultants. Taking short positions in 
some portfolios could create the appearance of a confli t within such a firm, as the 
stock might also be held ‘long’ at the same time in other portfolios. 
 
I1: “If you are running a lot of money…if you are going to short something, it may 
be in direct conflict with what you were doing.”  
 
L1: “the key thing on clients’ minds is how we manage contradictory positions and 
how we manage potential conflicts of interest.” 
 
G1: “If you are short-selling within one of your funds then this could push down the 
price of that stock and this might not be conducive to the absolute value of a fund 
that has a [long] position in that [stock].” He adds that this problem is “not 
insurmountable but gives us something to think about.” 
 
Arguably, smaller or more focused firms might be less constrained in this respect, 
and so more likely to practice short-selling.  
 
A number of interviewees highlighted remuneration problems within firms that 
undertook both long-only and long-short fund management. For example: 
 
G1; “I’ve seen hedge fund operations set up within lo g-only asset management 
companies, feeding off the same research and taking a perhaps bigger than deserved 




H1: “I know why we don’t do hedge funds - mainly because of the conflict of the key 
selling points of hedge funds in the market at the moment (e.g. star manager) with 
our team process that we sell ourselves on, particularly within our most successful 
strategies.  The people running our teams producing the most alpha at the moment 
are not keen on hedge funds at all.” 
Question: “Is it more to do with conflicts of process or conflicts in personnel to do 
with remuneration, etc?” 
H1: “Without doing any detailed work, conflicts in personnel and pay.  A small 
amount of feasibility work shows conflicts in administration and process as well. 
e.g., will you be allowed to short sell something that is on your Winners list in the 
long only funds, etc?” 
 
Not all investment managers felt constrained by institutional problems:  
 
Question: “What about institutional constraints within the way an organisation like 
this works?  Did you find the organisation said yeslet’s do it, let’s push for it, or did 
you find that they were reluctant or did you find issues in the nature of your client 
base?” 
J1:  “Good question.  I felt that the management here were actually very supportive 
of it, in fact in some ways they drove it, they said to me ‘would you consider doing 
this?’ and I almost played Devil’s advocate so perhaps it was the reverse of normal.” 
 
 
Business Model Problems: 
 
Two former hedge fund managers described how each of their hedge funds failed due 
to lack of growth and insufficient capital to survive. Growth from a tiny base did not 
come quickly enough to allow for the survival of their firms on a thin base of capital. 
Because large companies can suffer from conflicts of interest, unsuitable processes 
and compensation problems, some aspiring long-short managers set up small 
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companies as breakaways. Such firms have problems that are typical of small 
businesses, including high failure rates. 
 
Two small specialist firms each said that they had imposed a business model upon 
themselves that did not permit short-selling. One of these firms had considered short-
selling when designing the business model and investment process, but chose to 
focus its resources on long-only investing. The other firm had held discussions with 
investment banks about business opportunities involving short-selling, but rejected 




Shortage of Short-Selling Ideas 
 
Within a fund management company, there is the needto determine which securities 
are attractive or unattractive (investment analysis) and to create and manage a 
portfolio of securities (portfolio management). The two roles are combined in some 
firms, separated in others.  
 
Sell-side analysts/ stockbrokers (often employed within the brokerage divisions of 
banks and investment banks) liaise with investment analysts and portfolio managers 
at fund management companies, seeking to win business i  the form of commissions 
on trades. As such, brokerage firms employ investmen  analysts to identify ‘buys’, 
‘sells’ or ‘holds’ and to generate ideas that prompt trading. These ideas and 
recommendations are communicated via electronic, telephonic or paper media to 
analysts and portfolio managers at fund management companies. Analysts working 
for brokerage firms are generally referred to as ‘sell- ide analysts’ (as they are 
seeking business); whereas analysts at fund management firms are generally referred 
to as ‘buy-side analysts’.  
 
Barber et al. (2006) highlight the low proportion of ‘sell’ recommendations relative 
to other types of recommendation amongst sell-side analysts. One suspicion is that 
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conflicts of interest within integrated investment banks could prevent sell-side 
analysts from announcing sell recommendations on unattractive firms. This is so as 
not to offend a potential corporate client (i.e. a firm that might wish to use the 
investment bank for, say, a secondary offering, capital restructuring or acquisition). 
An alternative notion is that a buy recommendation might catalyse action from any 
of the broker’s clients, whereas a sell recommendation would only catalyse action 
amongst those who already owned the stock, or those who were able to short-sell. A 
third explanation (Chasan, 2007) is that sell-side analysts fear lawsuits and other 
forms of pressure from companies that are the subject of negative research reports. 
Whatever the true reason for this bias, Hong and Kubik (2003) show that sell-side 
analysts with positive biases to their investment recommendations achieve greater 
career success. Regulatory reforms during 2002 (specifically, the issuance of NASD 
2711 and SEC Rule 472) require, amongst other things, the proportion of an issuing 
firm’s recommendations that are buys, holds and sells to be made public, and for 
sell-side analysts to sign-off on the integrity of their recommendations. Table 4.2 
below shows the proportion of UK stock recommendations that were ‘buys’, ‘holds’ 




























that are ‘buys’ 
Percentage of 
recommendations 
that are ‘holds’ 
Percentage of 
recommendations 
that are ‘sells’ 
Morgan 
Stanley 
2,345 43 42 15 
Goldman 
Sachs 
2,994 29 58 13 
Merrill 
Lynch 
3,706 46 45 9 
Dresdner 
Kleinwort 
625 61 26 12 
Citigroup 3,421 50 37 12 
Cazenove 720 51 35 14 
Source: Author, based on published documents from each of the investment banks. 
 
From Table 4.2, it is clear that sell recommendations remain scarce in comparison to 
‘buys’ and ‘holds’. The notion that a lack of short-sale ideas could impedes short-
selling emerged in one discussion, where the interviewee remarked that some of his 
colleagues, responsible for ‘market-neutral’ funds, were in fact ‘net-long’. They had 
cited a shortage of ‘sell-ideas’ as their rationale. This might merely have been an 
excuse to allow for speculation on a rising market tr nd, or might have been a valid 
problem for the ‘market neutral’ managers – it is dfficult to prove either way. I 
sensed a note of scepticism in the interviewee’s voice, suggesting that he felt it was a 
‘story’ to excuse speculation on a rising market trnd. Nevertheless, it raises the 
possibility that conflicts of interest within integrated investment banks, combined 
with the dominance of such banks in sell-side analysis, lead to a scarcity of ‘sell’ 
ideas. To compensate for this, greater buy-side resa ch would be required and this 




There have been a number of studies into information fl ws in the investment 
community. For example, Hong et al. (2003) examine ‘word-of-mouth’ effects in 
mutual fund management; and Hardie and MacKenzie (2007) study a hedge fund 
from an anthropological perspective. Both studies highlight the importance of 
communication between different parties in identifying investment ideas. As 
Scotland has a limited community of long-short or hedge fund managers, this 
suggests less word-of-mouth activity, and thus provides a barrier to further growth: 
stock research costs are higher as a consequence of less idea-generation. Hedge funds 
appear to cluster in certain parts of the world (Greenwich, CT, USA, London’s West 
End, Zurich, Geneva etc.) and several interviewees r ferred to these clusters as 
‘communities’ of long-short managers. In so far as information is shared amongst 
community members, short-sale stock ideas are more plentiful and research costs are 
likely to be lower in these clusters. 
 
 
High Management Fees: 
 
The majority of interviewees believed that the hedge fund industry as a whole does 
not justify its management fee levels. However, they also believed that some 
managers within the universe of hedge funds do justify their fees, based on strong ex-
post performance. One consultant argued that he finds t difficult to recommend 
hedge funds to his clients, because of high fees: 
  
E1: “The perception has been that fees have been an issue, but we’re reaching the 
conclusion that maybe fees are not such a big issue compared to long-only managers 
for the alpha being generated.” 
 
Whereas some argued that high fees deter investors from using hedge funds (i.e. high 
fees curtail the demand for long-short management), others suggested that high fees 




Question: “What reasons do you believe lie behind the growth in short-selling over 
the past, say, five or ten years?” 
C1: “Because people see there’s a buck to be made. And people are always trying to 
make a buck, that’s life...” This argument was also pr posed by an experienced long-
short manager (Q1) and these sentiments are echoed by a number of renowned 
practitioners including Warren Buffett, who is reported to have described hedge 
funds as a “compensation scheme dressed up as an industry”9.  
 
 
4.7 Discussion and Analysis 
 
Many of the arguments as to why short selling is uncommon put forward by the 
interviewees fit into themes. In accordance with Nagel (2005), I initially group these 
into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ constraints.  I categorize five types of short-sale constraint 
as direct constraints: these are ‘legal’, ‘tax’, ‘cost of borrowing stock’, ‘availability 
of stock loans’ and ‘operational cost and complexity’. All others I categorize as 
indirect constraints. I further group indirect constraints into a series of themes, 
entitled ‘risk’, ‘distribution of returns’, ‘social’, ‘personal’ and ‘institutional’. As an 
illustration, synchronization risk, recall risk and a fear of manipulative short squeezes 
can all be considered as ‘risk’ barriers to short-selling – each is related to an increase 
in some form of risk (for example, the risk of suffering losses) that might arise if 
short-selling were to be introduced into a traditional long-only portfolio.  
 
Amongst the various constraints, some help to explain why a client might be loathe 
to fund short-selling, others help to explain the reluctance of (some) investment 
managers to practice short-selling. In general, direct constraints, such as cost of 
borrowing stock and tax problems, were well-understood by interviewees. A number 
of indirect constraints, such as the potential for unlimited losses or the loss of 
income, were also well-understood. Others, though, appear to be more subtle and 
ambiguous - in particular, the social constraints on short-selling.  
 
                                                
9 Source: The Daily Telegraph, 14th November, 2008. 
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The results of these interviews also reveal the opini ns of a set of market 
practitioners on some of the theories and suggestions n indirect constraints 
described in the literature. For example, the theoretical work of Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2002) on synchronization risk; and Shleifer & Vishny (1997) on 
performance-based arbitrage risk, met with universal acceptance. Interviewees 
described how long-short managers have devised practical means of mitigating both 
these types of risks. D’Avolio (2002) suggests that a fear of tracking error amongst 
money managers could serve to explain the short-sale reluctance puzzle. This notion 
was not met with strong acceptance amongst the interv ewees in this study. It is 
possible that the results of my interviews are ‘location specific’ or ‘group specific’. 
However, this alone reveals that D’Avolio’s suggestion is not universally 
generalizable – an important finding. One interviewe  re-interpreted D’Avolio’s 
argument and suggested that it is the setting of tracking error limits by risk managers 
or clients that has been a barrier to short-selling, rather than investment managers’ 
fear of tracking error. 
 
Market practitioners with different functional roles believe that different factors 
hinder short-selling. As an illustration, one investment consultant (E1) who advises 
pension funds on investment strategy, argued that his firm had “been reasonably 
sceptical of hedge funds; a) because of transparency issues and being able to know 
what’s going on inside, and; b) fees – they’ve taken a view that fees seem very high 
relative to what they are trying to generate.” He further argued that this had not been 
a client-led view, but instead was one that had been generated inside the firm and 
then communicated to advisory clients. By contrast, n investment risk consultant 
(D1) whose clients are money managers, argued quitedifferently: “I think the things 
that stop them are : 1) they don’t want to be seen as speculators, but as 
investors,...and 2) they don’t necessarily have the expertise to do it”. This suggests 
that different factors create barriers for different market participants with respect to 
short-selling. 
 
A number of interviewees (e.g. B1, H1, M1) argued that although direct constraints 
help to explain the uncommonness of short-selling, it is some combination of indirect 
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short-sale constraints that best explains why their own firms do not practice short-
selling. This confirms the importance of indirect short-selling constraints in 
understanding the short-sale reluctance puzzle. 
 
For many firms, there is no single indirect constrain  to explain their reluctance to 
short-sell, but instead a series of constraints. A comment from the Head of Risk at a 
long-only investment firm (B1) highlights the multi-faceted nature of indirect short-
sale constraints from the perspective of each organization: “there are certain things 
associated with hedge funds: high turnover, speculation, star fund managers, high 
fees and a question mark about integrity. All of those things go against some of the 
founding principles of the firm and what people do believe in.” He thus referred to a 
series of constraints: ‘speculation not investing’, ‘institutional constraints’, ‘high 
fees’, ‘reputational risk’ and ‘stakeholder acceptance’ – rather than just one 
constraint - in explaining why his firm was not invol ed in short-selling.  
 
My interviews also reveal the inter-relatedness of various constraints on short-
selling. For example (B1): “short-selling is associated with high turnover, event 
driven, investment speculation if you like. That is a specific type of investment 
trading really. I don’t see why it has to be associated with that, maybe it’s because of 
the cost, if you have the view that fundamentally something is over-valued, you don’t 
know when it’s going to come down, maybe 3 years, maybe 5 years...or other 
negative costs.” – he thus argued that the ‘trading not investing’ problem is linked to 
‘direct costs’, ‘synchronization risk’ and ‘negative expected returns’ – three different 
types of barrier. As a further example, the notion hat large pension funds should not 
invest in funds that short-sell is related to lack of transparency around short-selling (a 
risk related constraint), but also to the institutional framework that surrounds pension 
funds and the role and incentives of trustees (an institutional constraint). 
Furthermore, this framework also creates a culture of ‘unacceptability’ around short-
selling and pension funds - it becomes socially or culturally unacceptable for 
‘prudent’ market participants to become involved in short-selling. It becomes clear 
from this example that social, institutional and risk-related constraints are not 




To understand better the relationships that exist between the various explanations and 
reasons proposed by interviewees, I create a ‘map’ of the explanations given by 







I have placed ‘direct’ short-selling constraints in the centre of Figure 4.1. I have 
grouped indirect constraints into the five themes entitl d ‘risk’, ‘distribution of 
returns’, ‘social’, ‘personal’ and ‘institutional’. Where there exists a clear connection 
or association between two constraints on short-selling, I have joined these with a 
line. Some of these connections exist between two constraints within one theme (e.g. 
the social constraint entitled ‘lack of acceptance’ is connected to the social constraint 
‘trading not investing’). Other connections span two themes (e.g. the direct constraint 
entitled ‘legal’ is connected to the risk-related in irect constraint named ‘unlimited 
loss potential’, as legal prohibitions on short-selling are sometimes the result of the 
potential for unlimited losses that short-selling itroduces.). A closer examination of 
the diagram reveals that some constraints on short-elling appear to be more 
‘connected’ than others. The two most connected short-sale constraints are both 
social in nature. These are ‘trading not investing’ and ‘lack of acceptance’. It is also 
possible to observe a series of connections that form a complex around the risk-
related constraints: ‘recall risk, ‘manipulative short squeezes, ‘crowded exits’, ‘lack 
of transparency’ and ‘unlimited loss potential’. There are also connections between 
‘lack of skill’, shortage of ‘short-sale ideas’, ‘operational costs’ and ‘high 
management fees’. Finally, there are connections between ‘unattractive distribution 
of returns’, ‘unlimited losses’ ‘reputational risk’, ‘negative expected returns’ and 
‘negative income’.  
 
Interviewees made only limited references to academic work on short-selling. 
MacKenzie (2006) and Bernstein (2007) consider the impact of academic theory and 
thinking on financial markets. Each notes that it can take many years for academic 
thinking to permeate market practice and to become wid ly accepted. Short-selling 
and arbitrage play a central role in several neo-classical finance theories, including 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model, both 
of which are over 30 years old. The more recent work of Clarke et al. (2002, 2004, 
2008) demonstrates that actively-managed portfolios can be made more 
‘informationally efficient’ by permitting the limited use of short-selling, Such 
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research assists in building an academic ‘framework’ in which to place short-selling, 
thus making the practice more ‘acceptable’ to practitioners. Nevertheless, short-
selling comprises only a small proportion of most current postgraduate textbooks on 
finance and investment. Even some apparently well-educated and experienced 
investment managers admitted to me in interviews that t ey had poor knowledge of 
short-selling. 
 
A key finding from this research relates to the description of two ‘social’ short-
selling constraints. First, I describe a distinction between ‘investing’ and ‘trading’. 
There are two facets to this argument. One is that long-only investing differs from 
short-selling in terms of rights and responsibilities. Effectively, there is a legal 
distinction between the two activities. Long-only holders of shares are owners of part 
of the business, and have the right (and arguably, the responsibility) to vote on 
certain routine and extraordinary corporate matters. There is thus a relationship 
between ‘investing’ and ‘ownership’. The other facet to this argument concerns time 
horizon – investment is associated with longer-term ti e horizons. Speculators or 
traders are associated with shorter-term time horizons, because of phenomena such 
as negative expected returns and synchronization risk. This difference between the 
two activities is somewhat blurred, in the sense that long-only holders can have short 
holding periods for ‘investments’ and short-sellers can also have long-term short 
positions. Indeed this ‘greyness’ in how to define long and short-term was 
highlighted by some interviewees. To the best of my knowledge, this ‘trading not 
investing’ barrier to short-selling is new to the literature on indirect short-selling 
constraints. 
 
Secondly, there has developed a social perception or general belief that short-selling 
is less socially ‘acceptable’ and less productive than long-only investing. Only a few 
interviewees counter-balance this perception with the potential benefits to market 
efficiency arising from risk arbitrage activities. In fact, one highly experienced fund 
manager (C1) argued that “short-selling is essentially parasitical.” This lack of 
acceptance amongst stakeholders is partly related to the ‘trading not investing’ 
barrier discussed earlier, but is also related to an understanding amongst 
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stakeholders, such as trustees and consultants, of he unique risks in short-selling 
(including, for example, unlimited loss potential). It is further related to knowledge 
of historical market abuses involving short-selling, leading to an air of suspicion and 
unacceptability around short-selling. Short-selling becomes marginalized, despite its 
academic credentials. However, interviewees argued that the lack of stakeholder 
acceptance for short-selling had been diminishing i importance, lessening an 
important indirect constraint. This is consistent wi h increased short-selling over 
several years. 
 
Dechow et al. (2001) suggest two possible explanations for the gradual growth in 
short-selling over the previous thirty years: deregulation and the growth of the hedge 
fund industry. I investigated this question through my interviews. Interviewees cited 
a series of possible explanations for the growth in short-selling in recent years, 
including the attraction of high fees for managers of long-short funds, increasing 
acceptance by clients and investment consultants, deregulation, improved technology 
and systems, greater availability of derivative instruments that can be used to 
implement short-positions, improving knowledge of short-selling and more 
developed (i.e. more marketable) track records. Some f these possible explanations 
relate to reduced direct constraints (e.g. deregulation), others to reduced indirect 
constraints (e.g. reduction in the ‘lack of acceptance’ and ‘lack of knowledge’ 
barriers). As an example of the impact of deregulation, one long-only investment 
manager comments: 
 
G1: “ The UCITS III legislation will prove quite a powerful force in providing more 
tools in the tool kit for running funds and this may change the way firms like ours 
look at short-selling.” 
 
The ‘attraction of high fees’ is a business-driven, supply-side arguments for the 
growth in short-selling – high fees are also regarded by some as a barrier to short-
selling. The development of more marketable track reco ds could be regarded as a 
supply side argument, or could alternatively be perceived as evidence of some 
investment managers’ knowledge, experience and skill in short-selling (and thus the 
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diminishment of two indirect short-sale constraints – ‘lack of knowledge’ and ‘lack 
of skill’). The ability of short-selling to generate positive returns in falling markets is 
seen by some (I1, U1) as an attractive feature both for clients wishing to manage risk, 
and for businesses seeking to diversify their revenue streams and offset declining 





There exist many constraints on short-selling. In this study, I categorize five direct 
constraints and twenty-eight indirect constraints. The indirect constraints can be 
grouped into five broad themes: risk, distribution of returns, institutional constraints, 
social constraints and personal constraints.  There are links between these different 
themes. There are also connections between constraint  that fall within the same 
themes and relationships between some direct constrai t  and indirect constraints. 
 
I find that market practitioners with different functional roles believe that different 
factors account for the short-sale reluctance puzzle. Indirect constraints are 
sometimes more important than direct constraints in explaining why some firms that 
invest or advise on investment are reluctant to practice short-selling. 
 
Diether et al. (2008) suggest that it could be considered ‘un-American’ to short-sell. 
If this is a reference to patriotism, I find that this cannot be generalized globally. 
Patriotic reasons are firmly rejected by all intervi wees. In so far as it suggests that it 
is ‘anti-capitalist’ to short-sell, there is only limited evidence to back up this notion. 
There is also limited evidence at best to support D’Avolio’s (2002) notion that ‘fear 
of tracking error’ is a key constraint to short-selling. Arguably, it is the setting of 
tracking error limits by risk managers or clients that has been a barrier to short-
selling, rather than investment managers’ fear of tracking error. The results from 
these interviews could be ‘location specific’ or ‘group specific’. However, these 
results reveal at the very least that some suggestions made in the literature cannot be 




I identify two key social indirect constraints on short-selling: the ‘trading not 
investing’ constraint and the ‘lack of stakeholder acceptance’ constraint. Several 
interviewees argued that the latter had been diminishi g and believed that this had 
contributed to the growth of short-selling in recent years. The distinction between 
investing and trading is an important finding from this research. There are two facets 
to this argument. First, there is a legal distinction between the two activities: 
investing confers ownership and voting rights and responsibilities; short-selling does 
neither. The second distinction concerns time horizon – investors are perceived to 
have long-term time horizons in the main, but speculators or traders are perceived to 
have shorter-term time horizons. Social and institutional constraints are rational in 
light of the specific roles and responsibilities that exist within the investment 
industry. For example, trust law requires trustees to invest in a ‘prudent’ manner. 
Investment consultants are hired to advise trustees amongst others. The social 
constraints of ‘lack of acceptance’ and ‘trading not investing’ are, in a sense, the 
collective wisdom of market participants built up over many years. This collective 
wisdom serves to guide or warn responsible members of society on how to behave 
(or how not to behave) in investment matters. In any legal dispute over prudent 
behaviour, the trustee who has observed social constrai t  is on safer ground. 
Personal constraints, such as ‘lack of knowledge’, however, lack this rationality. 
Academics have a role to play in solving this problem. I find that the works of Clarke 
et al. (2002, 2004, 2008) have had a profound impact to date on interest in short-
selling. The acceptance of the ‘short-extension’ portfolio structure – one that ‘solves’ 
the negative expected return problem by maintaining a 100% net long position, 
suggests that the ‘negative expected return problem’ has been a significant barrier to 
short-selling. Additionally, interviewees highlighted a benchmarking problem, 
whereby returns from long-short portfolios are someti s compared to those of 
traditional long-only portfolios. This indirect short-sale constraint is also solved by 
the short-extension portfolio structure. The success of the Clarke et al. work suggests 
that there are rewards for those able to design portfoli  structures that overcome 
specific indirect short-sale constraints. Furthermore, such work assists in the gradual 
convergence of market practice towards the theoretical assumption of a stock market 
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with many arbitrageurs, constantly trading in such a manner as to drive stock prices 
towards fair value. 
 
 
4.9 Further Research 
 
Amongst the many indirect constraints on short-selling described by interviewees, 
the risk-related constraints remain under-researched and poorly understood. These 
constraints should lend themselves well to quantitative analysis and are of relevance 
to analysts, portfolio managers and risk managers involved in short-selling. In 
particular, two of these constraints: crowded exits and manipulative short squeezes, 
are related to liquidity problems. Geczy et al. (2002) argue that if short-selling 
problems explain the availability of factor portfolio returns to unskilled managers, 
then these short selling problems are not borrowing costs, but perhaps liquidity 
constraints. I contribute to the literature in Chapters 6 and 7 by studying these short-
sale constraints from the perspective of liquidity problems and risk. 
 
Whereas the maximum loss that a long-only investor can suffer is 100% of the 
amount invested, short-sellers are exposed to potentially unlimited losses. This can 
deter short-selling, according to several of my interviewees. Gamboa-Cavazos and 
Savor (2007) investigate short-covering and find that short-sellers close their 
positions in response to rising stock prices. In Chapter 8, I refine their techniques and 
examine the response of short-sellers to accounting losses. 
 
To undertake this research into liquidity and risk-related indirect short-selling 
constraints, I create a new dataset by merging a commercial stock lending database 
from Data Explorers Ltd. with data on returns and other stock characteristics from 
Datastream. This new dataset comprises daily stock lending and stock return data for 
up to 681 of the largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 







5.1 Data Sources 
 
I create a new dataset for the purposes of this theis by merging data from two 
sources. The first of these is a commercial database of UK stock lending data from 
Index Explorers Ltd10. This contains daily information on stock lending starting on 
September 3rd 2003 when the database came into existence. At inception, this 
database included stocks from the 350 largest companies traded on the London Stock 
Exchange. The data is sourced from CREST - the organisation responsible for 
settlement of all trades on the London Stock Exchange. The amount of stock on loan 
is updated daily, but with a three day reporting la (before December 12th, 2005 the 
lag was five days). Over time, the coverage of companies in the database increases 
through the addition of smaller capitalization stocks so that by the end date for this 
sample, May 31st 2007, there is stock lending data for 681 companies. The smallest 
of these companies have market capitalizations of approximately £25 million 
(approximately USD 40 million) as of 2007. A number of companies cease to exist at 
some point during the 45 months (979 trading days) studied. This could be as a result 
of a merger or acquisition, the lapsing of the company into administrative 
receivership, or a change to private ownership. Such companies are included in the 
database until the date of their de-listing, to prevent survivor bias. I make use of all 
stocks in the database and all dates in the sample for which stock lending data is 
available - public holidays and weekends are naturally excluded. 
 




• Name of company 
• SEDOL (a unique company identifier code) 
                                                




• Turnover (defined as the number of shares traded that day)  
• Stock Price (defined as the previous day’s closing tock price) 
• Volume (defined as turnover multiplied by stock price) 
• Market Capitalisation (defined as number of shares in issue multiplied by 
stock price) 
• Shares on Loan (defined as the number of shares reported to CREST as being 
on loan11) 
• Volume on Loan (defined as shares on loan multiplied by stock price) 
• Percentage of Market Capitalization on Loan (defined as the volume on loan 
divided by the market capitalization) 
• Dividend Record Dates (the dates on which the recorded owners of shares on 
that day become entitled to receive the next dividend payment) 
• Stock Utilisation Rate (the percentage of shares made available for borrowing 
by stock lenders that are actually borrowed) 
• Weighted Mean Stock Lending Fees (the weighted average of the fees paid 
by stock borrowers to stock lenders on initiation of the stock loan, measured as a 
proportion of the value of shares borrowed). 
 
I use Datastream to obtain the following data for all for all FTSE All Share Index 
constituents from September 1st, 2002 to May 31st 2007: 
 
• Date 
• Name of company 
• SEDOL (a unique company identifier code) 
• Daily stock returns (defined as the total return for a stock on that date) 
• Book value per share (this value is generally update  annually for each UK 
company and is reported to the public via financial st tements that are published up 
to six month in arrears. Datastream then ‘backfills’ the new book value to the end of 
the last financial year. To account for the possible delay in reporting book value per 
                                                
11 Mackenzie and Henry (2008) argue that the use of such industry-wide data removes the problem of 
substitution effects across lenders that might be present in studies, including D’Avolio (2002), Geczy 
et al., (2002) and Cohen et al. (2007), that are based on a single stock lender. 
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share, I shift the ‘book value per share series’ back by six months for each company, 
thus reflecting what is ‘knowable’ to market participants at any time) 
• Free float percentage of shares (defined as the percentage of the total number 
of shares in issue that are available to ordinary investors i.e. that are not held away 
from the market by government or close family interests). 
 
To facilitate the estimation of abnormal stock retuns using an asset pricing model, I 
collect daily stock returns for the year before the start of the Index Explorers 
database. This ‘formation period’ runs from Septembr 1st 2002 to September 1st 
2003 and the daily stock returns collected are used to estimate the beta of each stock 
in the study.  
 
Using each company’s SEDOL code as a unique identifi r o reconcile stocks across 
the two databases, I merge the two databases, and construct a data set that includes 
stock return, trading, lending and fundamental information for up to 681 stocks listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, during the period from 3rd September 2003 to 31st 
May 2007. Overall, the dataset is an unbalanced panel of data for between 350 and 
681 companies covering 979 trading days with 12 data items per firm day, plus a 
series of transformations such as the natural logarithms of daily stock returns. The 
dataset was compiled and rearranged in Microsoft Office Excel 2003 for import into 
Eviews 5.1. For the remainder of the study, EViews 5.1 was used. This new dataset 
is used to address the research questions posed in this thesis, but is also a key 
contribution in its own right, and can be made avail ble to future researchers.  
 
5.2 Stock Lending as a Proxy for Short-Selling 
 
Direct data on short-selling is not publicly available in the UK. Instead, stock lending 
data is available, on a daily basis. Stock lending acts as a proxy for short-selling, as 
the process of short-selling generally requires stock to be borrowed to facilitate 
settlement of the trade. MacKenzie and Henry (2008) state that: “The use of 
securities lending data is a fairly new innovation n the literature and only a handful 
of papers have had access to this type of data, includi g D’Avolio (2002), Cohen et 
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al. (2007) and Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007).” However, there are a number of 
problems with using stock lending data as a proxy fr short-selling.  
 
First, shares do not need to be borrowed to undertake ‘naked’ short-selling (see 
Section 2.3). Naked short-selling for periods of one day or longer is unlikely to be 
common, however, as it involves failed settlement.  ‘Repeat offenders’ would soon 
become known to the brokers for such trades, who would cease dealing with them. 
So (1998) reports that the Hong Kong Stock Exchange conducted 768 investigations 
and made 15 prosecutions in 1997 for breach of short-selling rules that included a 
prohibition of ‘naked’ short-selling.  Intra-day short-selling, though, does not require 
the delivery of stock for settlement at the end of the day, and so would not be 
revealed by daily stock lending data. Jones (2004) finds that intra-day shorting 
represents about 5% of daily volume in the early 1930s. 
  
Secondly, stock lending occurs for a number of reasons other than short-selling. In 
general, borrowing shares results in the temporary receipt of legal ownership of the 
securities and so the borrower is entitled to dividen s, voting rights and so forth. 
Strategies exist to benefit from these arrangements. These include dividend tax 
arbitrage and vote-buying (see Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4). As an illustration, if the 
‘borrower’ has a tax advantage over the ‘lender’, dividend tax arbitrage is feasible. 
Christoffersen et al. (2002, 2005) demonstrate increases in securities lending around 
dividend record dates. With regard to the exercise of the voting rights by the 
borrower, while being illegal in the US, it is merely regarded as unethical in the UK. 
Stock lenders are recommended to recall their share, p ior to record dates for voting 
(see Myners, 2005). As a result of these various practices, the dataset can become 
obfuscated. Christophe t al. (2005) discuss the problem of obfuscation in short-
interest data arising from the aggregation of short p sitions from market participants 
with differing motivations (e.g. market makers, opti n-market arbitrageurs, traders 
expecting stock price declines). They provide evidence that some of the component 
parts that are aggregated in short interest data are negatively correlated with one 
another. With stock lending data, an even greater number of motivations can exist, 
including financing purposes and borrowing to exercise voting rights. One of the 
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crucial issues for this study concerns the time around the dividend dates, since 
dividend tax arbitrage is common (see Section 2.2.4) and may obfuscate the data. To 
minimize the risk that stock lending for dividend tax arbitrage is confounded with 
borrowing to facilitate short-selling, I remove data from three weeks before until 
three weeks after the dividend record date for each stock in this study of stock 
lending data. This is consistent with the method employed by Saffi & Sigurdsson 
(2007). In studies that use stock lending data, but that do not adjust for dividend tax 
arbitrage (e.g. Au et al., 2007), results have not been fully consistent with those 
found in the core literature.  
 
Thirdly, the extent to which market practitioners fail to fulfil their obligations to 
report stock lending to the market authorities is a further limitation on the use of 
stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling. Discussions with practitioners 
involved in stock lending suggest that this problem is rare, but unavoidable. 
 
Finally, derivatives can be used to effect transactions that are economically 
equivalent to short-selling (see, for example, Ofek et al., 2004). The extent to which 
the use of derivatives to facilitate short-selling s transmitted into the stock lending 
market influences the usefulness of stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling. 
Discussions with stock-lending practitioners suggests that the majority, but not all, 
short-sale-equivalent trades using derivatives are ultimately hedged by the counter-
parties to those trades, through borrowing stock and selling short.  
 
 
5.3 Advantages and Limitations of the Dataset 
 
A number of studies into short-selling make use of m nthly data (e.g. Senchack and 
Starks, 1993, Dechow et al., 2001, and Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor, 2007). 
Christophe et al. (2007) criticise the use of monthly short-selling data, as it 
“represents only a snap-shot of total shorted share on one day during the month.” 
Cohen et al. (2007) find that almost half the securities lending contracts they study 
are closed out within two weeks, while the median co tract length is 11 days. This 
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suggests that monthly data could be inadequate for understanding the trading 
practices of short-sellers. The dataset used for this study incorporates daily data on 
shares borrowed (a proxy for shares shorted). This higher frequency data allows for 
an appropriate degree of granularity for the proposed tudy of manipulative short 
squeezes, crowded exits and the use of stop losses.  
 
Some studies obtain trade-by-trade (or ‘flow’) data on stock lending or short-selling. 
These same studies tend to investigate shorter time periods. There is a balance to be 
had, though: although flow data provides the highest d gree of granularity, it would 
be arduous to study flow data for long periods of time. However, studies over longer 
periods could reveal trends and cycles not found in shorter periods. Christophe et al. 
(2007) take flow data for a ten month period and aggre ate it into daily data. 
Similarly, Diether et al. (2008) obtain tick by tick short-sale data for over 3,800 
stocks during 2005 and aggregate it for each stock to the daily level. 
 
Due to differences in regulatory and institutional fr meworks, evidence from studies 
of US data are not necessarily representative of behaviour outside the US markets. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority does not 
ordinarily impose specific restrictions or controls n short-selling, unlike in the USA 
(see Section 2.3). Instead, short-sellers are subject to general market and regulatory 
arrangements, including market abuse principles. Furthermore, studying data from 
outside the USA can be used to counter the criticism that observed regularities in 
empirical studies are simply due to data mining. A limited number of studies 
investigate short-selling and its impact on stock prices outside the USA (e.g. Aitken 
et al., 1998, Biais et al., 1999, Poitras, 2002, Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005, and Au 
et al., 2007). However, these studies do not involve an investigation of the indirect 
short-sale constraints that I propose to study in this thesis.  
 
Geczy et al. (2002) examines shares available for borrowing (and thus available for 
shorting), based on a single lender of stock for a twelve month period. D’Avolio 
(2002) examines an eighteen month period of data from one stock lender. This thesis 
draws on a longer time period than either Geczy et al. or D’Avolio, and uses market-
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wide data on stock lending, rather than just data from a single lender. As such, it 
makes a contribution to the empirical literature. 
 
By observing the differences in returns between equally-weighted and value-
weighted portfolios, Asquith et al. (2005) demonstrate that the level of short-selling 
is more informative as a negative sentiment indicator for smaller capitalization stocks 
than for larger stocks. Au et al. (2007) suggest that a study based on larger 
capitalization stocks will produce more conservative estimates for the relationship 
between short-selling and stock returns compared to a study that includes smaller, 
less liquid stocks. The smallest stocks in my dataset have a market capitalization of 
approximately £25 million. Thus, ‘micro-cap’ stocks are not included in my dataset, 
suggesting a degree of conservatism in any findings.    
 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dataset forms an ‘unbalanced panel’ dataset in wh ch some cross-sectional units 
have some of the time periods missing. This form of panel is a result of the number 
of companies recorded in the Index Explorers database growing over time as smaller 
capitalization stocks are added. The resulting dataset contains 10,259,946 
observations in the overall sample; 6,542,712 of which are non-blank, and represents 
an EViews file of approximately 400 Mb.  
 
In Table 5.1, descriptive statistics are produced for three points in time: the first day 
of the sample time period for which all the variables existed (01/09/2003), the last 
day of the sample time period (31/05/2007) and the mid-point (15/07/2005). The 
mean percentage of market capitalization on loan is a low figure for each of the 
snapshot dates (less than 3.5%), but the distribution is positively skewed. From the 







Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Raw Dataset 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided for three points in time: the first day of the sample time period 
(01/09/2003), the mid-point (15/07/2005) of the sample time period and the final day of the sample 
time period (31/05/2007). The descriptive statistics are parameters that measure central tendency, 
dispersion, minimum/maximum values, number of observations, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera 
statistics for stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on loan, shares on 




Histograms for each of six variables are presented in Table 5.2 below. For the 
purpose of visualization the histograms are constructed using the mid-point 
snapshots. In order to improve granularity of the histograms, any outliers further than 
three standard deviations from the mean are removed (this is done only for 
illustrative purposes with these histograms and does not affect the rest of the study).  
 
Table 5.2: Histograms for the raw dataset 
 
Histograms for six variables (stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on 
loan, shares on loan, book value per share and free float number of shares (%)) are constructed. For 
the purpose of visualization the histograms are produced using the mid-date snapshot (15th July, 
2005). In order to improve the granularity of the histograms, outliers of greater than three standard 




Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present descriptive statistics for the logarithms of the six variables 
considered earlier.  
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for the logarithmic dataset 
 
Descriptive statistics are provided for three points in time: the first day of the sample time period 
(01/09/2003), the mid-point (15/07/2005) of the sample time period and the final day of the sample 
time period (31/05/2007). The descriptive statistics are parameters that measure central tendency, 
dispersion, minimum/maximum values, number of observations, skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera 
statistics for six variables: stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on 





Table 5.4: Histograms for the Logarithmic Dataset 
 
Histograms for six variables (stock price, market capitalization, percentage of market capitalization on 
loan, shares on loan, book value per share and free float number of shares (%)) are constructed. For 
the purpose of visualization the histograms are produced using the mid-date snapshot (15th July, 
2005). In order to improve the granularity of the histograms, outliers of greater than three standard 





An analysis of the time series of percentage of market capitalization on loan series 
for each stock shows that this can be a highly volatile series. Dividend-paying stocks 
often experience large increases in shares on loan around divided record dates, 
indicating a dividend capture effect that is consistent with dividend tax arbitrage. 
Nevertheless, some cross-sections experience a consistently high level through the 
observed period. During some dates in the sample the maximum value for this series 
exceeds 100% for some companies, signifying that borrowed shares have been re-
lent.   
 
 
5.5 Outliers  
 
For the first and last snap-shot dates (01/09/2003 and 31/05/2007), I construct box-
plots for each of the six variables considered in Section 5.4, to provide a visual 




















Table 5.5: Box-plots 
 
Box-plots are constructed for each of the six variables in the dataset for the first (01/09/2003) and for 
the last (31/05/2007) snap-shot dates. They intend o provide a visual summary of the outliers in the 
dataset. For most of the variables there are more outliers in the last snapshot of data than in the first





For each variable, I identify outliers in the study sample using two techniques. First, I 
observe data points that lie more than three standard eviations from the mean for 
each variable. Secondly, I observe daily changes in each variable that are more than 
three standard deviations from the mean daily change. Table 5.6 below reports the 
frequency of these outliers by variable.  
 
 
Table 5.6: Outliers 
 
The top panel of the table shows for each of the six variables the number of observations greater than
three standard deviations from the mean as well as its equivalent presented as a percentage of the total 
number of observations. The bottom panel of the table presents the number of occasions (and its 
percentage equivalent) each variable has changed in one day by more than three standard deviations 
from the mean daily change. Both measures aim to capture ‘exceptional’ data points.    
 
 
In studying manipulative short squeezes and crowded exits in the next sections of 
this thesis, I am concerned with exceptional situations for short-sellers. As such, 
‘outliers’ in each variable are likely to be importan  and so are not removed from the 
dataset.   
 
 
5.6 Asset Pricing Model for Estimating Abnormal Returns 
 
In choosing an asset pricing model for the purposes f calculating abnormal returns, I 
note that Asquith and Moelbroek (1996) establish that e negative relation between 
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excess returns and short positions is robust to a variety of techniques for calculating 
excess returns. Dechow et al. (2001) measure excess returns by adjusting each firm’s 
return by the equal weighted return for all NYSE and AMEX shares over the same 
time period. They make no adjustment for risk across firms and cite previous 
research in this field that has been robust to changes in the asset pricing model used. 
Figlewski (1981) and Figlewski & Webb (1993) make use of the CAPM model. 
Asquith et al. (2005) and Boehmer et al. (2008) use several asset pricing models to 
estimate abnormal returns for short-sellers and finno significant difference in the 
results. Cavazos and Savor (2007) apply both benchmark-adjusted returns approach 
and Fama-French three factors regression to study the relationship between short 
selling activities and subsequent abnormal returns, a d obtain similar results for both. 
In fact, results in this research area have been uniformly robust to changes in asset 
pricing model. I note this phenomenon, and in this re earch, I choose to use the 
CAPM model for its simplicity. Abnormal returns are calculated as: 
 
( )[ ]tftmitftiti RRRRAR ,,,,, −+−= β               (1) 
 
Where tiR ,  is the return of stock i on day t, and tfR ,  is the risk-free rate on day t. 
tmR ,  is the market return on day t, which is calculated from the total return index for 
the FTSE All Share index. iβ  represents the correlation between the returns on stock 
i and the market return premium, which is estimated using CAPM over the period 
from 2nd September 2002 to 31st August 2003, which is a one-year period that 
precedes my stock lending sample data period. I use3-month LIBOR as the risk free 
rate. LIBOR is commonly used as a risk-free proxy. I note that this series was ‘well-
behaved’ during the period of study, but became unus ally dislocated during the 
2007-2009 US and UK banking crisis.  In a  study that uses UK stock lending data 
from CREST, Au et al. (2007) use weekly one-month LIBOR rates as their measure 
of the risk-free rate and estimate one-month cumulative abnormal returns relative to 










Geczy et al. (2002) argue that if short-selling problems explain the availability of 
factor portfolio returns to unskilled managers, then these short selling problems are 
not borrowing costs, but perhaps liquidity constraints. In this chapter, I consider 
crowded exits, a liquidity problem that is unique to short-sellers. Crowded exits have 
yet to be examined in the literature, and this study fills this gap. Crowded exits arise 
in stocks where short-sellers hold large positions relative to normal trading volume, 
and when a catalyst prompts short-sellers to cover th ir positions rapidly and 
simultaneously. Catalysts include, but are not limited to, public news releases by 
companies. The temporary excess of demand for stock relative to normal trading 
volume leads to upward pressure on the stock price and these events are associated 
with losses to short-sellers that are economically nd statistically significant. As 
such, the risk of a crowded exit represents an indirect constraint on short-selling. My 
strategy of enquiry is to explore the database described in Chapter 5 to develop an 
understanding of how liquidity constraints can impact on short-sellers. 
 
As part of any description of crowded exits, it is helpful to explain how a short 
position might become ‘crowded’ in the first instance. One possible scenario is 
outlined below. Initially, one or more traders with negative information about a 
company short-sells stock in that company. This represents informed trading and 
leads to an increase in the number of shares shorted. In the interest of transparency, 
most developed stock markets require the publication of data on short-selling or 
stock lending, and so the above increase in short-interest is made public. Note that a 
substantial body of empirical research shows that heavily shorted stocks perform 
poorly (see, for example, Dechow et al. (2001), Angel et al. (2003), Gopalan (2003), 
                                                
* This chapter forms the basis of a University of Edinburgh Working Paper entitled “Caveat Venditor 
– Crowded Exits!” by James Clunie, Peter Moles and Yuan Gao. The paper was presented at the 
Midwest Finance Association conference in Chicago in March, 2009 and has been accepted for 
presentation at the European Financial Management conference in Nantes in April, 2009. 
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Ackert and Athanassakos (2005), Diether et al., 2008 and Boehmer et al., 2008). 
Market participants who are aware of this literature can simply short-sell stocks that 
are seen to be heavily shorted, in an attempt to benefit from the short-sellers’ 
information. This is an ‘imitation strategy’, other xamples of which are described in 
Fligstein (1996, 2001), White (1981, 2001) and MacKenzie (2006). In so far as this 
imitation strategy occurs in markets, it follows that heavily shorted stock positions 
contain both informed traders and noise traders. Imitation strategies, however, 
contain the seeds of their own destruction. In thisillu tration, imitation leads to an 
increase in the size of the short position relative o the liquidity of the stock. A 
crowded position thus develops, based on a mix of informed short-selling and 
‘rational imitation’.  
 
I refer to short positions that are large relative o normal trading volume as ‘crowded 
positions’. With a catalyst, rapid and simultaneous short-covering can commence and 
the crowded position becomes a ‘crowded exit’. The idea is akin to the audience in a 
crowded theatre rushing to a narrow exit door once the fire alarm sounds…only so 
many can leave the building in any given interval of time. A variety of catalysts for a 
crowded exit are possible: a company could release new, positive information to the 
market; a sell-side analyst could upgrade his earnings forecast or trading 
recommendation on a stock; or informed short-sellers could receive new, private 
information and start to cover their positions, to be followed by imitators. Another 
catalyst could be that short-sellers become unable to hold their short positions 
(because of client redemptions, stock loan recall, margin calls or risk control 
mechanisms) and are forced to cover their positions; as this is revealed to the market 
via public stock-lending data, it could be misconstrued as informed buying and act as 
a catalyst for short covering by imitators. Finally, manipulators buying shares in a 
company could prompt short covering amongst traders who misinterpret the 
manipulative trades as informed buying. From interviews with practitioners, I find 
that short-sellers perceive crowded exits to be risky: it could become difficult to 
cover a short position when desired, or the short-seller could suffer losses due to 




I examine crowded exits in detail by using the comprehensive dataset described in 
Chapter 5. This dataset contains stock lending data for up to 681 stocks listed on the 
London Stock Exchange from 1st Sep 2003 to 31st May 2007. The main findings of 
this research are as follows: crowded exits are associated with positive abnormal 
returns (i.e. losses to short-sellers) of up to 27% over a period of 60 days, and this 
result is both statistically and economically significant. I infer that short-sellers thus 
face an important indirect constraint on short-selling in the form of crowded exits. 
New, long-only investors would generally be unable to xploit this finding by buying 
into crowded exits, as by definition these are illiquid positions; however, incumbent 





6.2.1 Definitions of Variables 
 
In this chapter, I standardize shares on loan first by the number of shares outstanding 
and, second, by the free float number of shares. Each of these measures serves as a 
proxy for short interest.  
 
The proportion of market capitalisation on loan (MCOL) of a stock on any given day 





 loanon  Shares
=tiMCOL          (6.1) 
 
This measure represents the proportion of a company i’s outstanding shares that are 
on loan on day t. By dividing by outstanding shares, this ensures that he measure of 
short interest is not dominated by larger firms.  
 
I introduce the proportion of free float on loan (FFOL) as a second measure of short-






, Float Free of Size
 Loanon  Shares
=tiFFOL           (6.2) 
 
The ‘size of free float’ is the total number of shares in issue that are available to 
ordinary investors (i.e. excluding shares held by government or long-term family 
interests). 
 
I also measure the shares on loan relative to the normal trading volume for each firm 
day. I calculate the ‘Days to Cover Ratio’ (DCR) as a key factor for identifying 




ti, Volume TradingDaily  Average
Loanon  Shares
 (DCR) RatioCover   toDays =           (6.3) 
 
ti,Loanon  Shares  is the closing number of shares on loan for stock i on day t. 
ti,Volume TradingDaily  Average  is the moving average of the trading volume for 
stock i from days (t-61) to (t-1). I choose 60 days of trading volume as a comproise 
between the risk of including out-dated information on trading volume and the risk of 




6.2.2 Constructing Portfolios 
 
The primary goal of this chapter is to measure the abnormal returns of stocks 
experiencing crowded exits. A portfolio approach is applied as it allows the 
researcher to replicate gross and risk-adjusted returns for a potential trading strategy; 
and it captures certain non-linearities that might c aracterize the patterns of 
subsequent returns (Pan and Poteshman, 2006). For each day, I sort the data to 
construct equal-weighted portfolios containing stocks identified as going through 
crowded exits. I study the characteristics of the securities included in the crowded 
exit portfolios, and estimate the abnormal portfolio returns for subsequent time 
periods. 
         
I use two approaches to select portfolios of stocks. The first approach is a ‘simple 
sort’, identifying stocks on each day based on their Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) 
ranking relative to other stocks. The DCR is a liquidity ratio: the higher the ratio, the 
more difficult it should be for short-sellers to liquidate their positions without having 
market impact. This simple sort thus creates portfolios that differ by the 
‘crowdedness of short positions’. The second approach is a ‘double sort’. In addition 
to sorting by DCR, I also divide portfolios according to whether or not each stock is 




For each day, I rank all stocks by DCR. I then construct three portfolios containing 
the 99th, 95th, and 90th percentile of stocks by DCR. These higher percentiles 
represent the most ‘crowded’ short positions. A prerequisite of a crowded exit is that 
the stock should have a high level of short interest lative to its liquidity, and this 






I carry out simultaneous sorts, creating portfolios based on a ranking of stocks by 
DCR and also whether or not they meet the test of sh wing an ‘exceptional’ decrease 
in shares on loan. Instead of sorting stocks into idependent percentiles twice, I sort 
stocks into 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles based on DCR, and narrow down the 
portfolios by controlling for ‘exceptional’ changes in short interest on the previous 
day. I define the resultant portfolios as portfolios f stocks experiencing crowded 
exits: these portfolios include stocks with high DCRs and showing ‘exceptional’ 
changes in short interest on the previous day. To define an ‘exceptional’ reduction in 
short interest level, I use two criteria. First, I filter the data to include only stocks 
with decreasing shares on loan. See equation (4) below: 
 
Change in shares on loan (t) = shares on loan (t) – shares on loan (t-1) (6.4) 
 
A negative number indicates that short-sellers are covering their positions on day t. 
 
Only publicly-traded stocks are generally loaned anso it important in any study of 
liquidity problems to consider each firm’s free-float rather than total shares 
outstanding. I use the proportion of free float on l an in defining an exceptional 
decrease in short interest level. I first calculate th  change in the free float on loan 
(CFFL) from day t-1 to day t. The average change across all stocks for day t is 
defined as the cross sectional mean on day t, ccording to the equation below: 







    (6.5) 
 
Where n is the total number of stocks in the universe on day t. I adjust the daily 
change in free float on loan for stock i ( tiCFFL , ) for the market average change, and 
obtain the adjusted daily change in free float on lan relative to the market average 
change, as shown in the equation below: 
 










Next, I test whether or not each tiRCFFL,  is ‘exceptional’. For each firm day, I 
calculate tiRCFFL,  for each day from day (t-21) to day (t-1) and measure the mean 
and standard deviation of this series. If  tiRCFFL,  exceeds ± 2 standard deviations, I 
determine this to be an ‘exceptional’ change. If this exceptional change is 
accompanied by fewer shares on loan and a lower CFFL, it is defined as an 
exceptional decrease in the level of short interest. U ing this technique and having 
already undertaken a simple sort, I proceed to separate each of the DCR groups into 
two smaller portfolios: a ‘Crowded Exit Portfolio’ (where each stock experiences an 
exceptional decrease in short interest) and a ‘Not Cr wded Exit Portfolio’ (the stocks 
do not experience an exceptional decrease in short inte est). 
 
I study the characteristics of securities found in the ‘Crowded Exit Portfolios’ and 
compare to those for the ‘Not Crowded Exit Portfolios’. These characteristics include 
the short interest ratios defined in Section 6.2.1; and liquidity factors (daily trading 
volume and percentage of outstanding shares that are free floating). I also measure 
fundamental factors, including market capitalization, market-to-book, volatility of 
returns, and past returns. The ‘past return’ is the raw return for a portfolio of stocks 
over the previous 20 trading days. 
 
6.2.3. Abnormal Returns around Crowded Exits 
 
Portfolio abnormal returns are estimated from the CAPM model, as described in 
Chapter 5. I calculate equal-weighted portfolio abnormal returns for each portfolio 
resulting from a sort. In measuring abnormal returns following crowded exits, for 
each portfolio I skip one day and hold the portfolios over N trading days. I start the 
holding period on day (t+2) to reduce the risk that stock prices are disproportionately 
at either ‘bid’ or ‘ask’ (see, for example, Kaul and Nimalendran, 1990, for a 
discussion of the ‘bid-ask bounce problem’). I calculate Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) over a series of holding periods (1, 5, 10, 20 and 60 days) to 





Cumulative abnormal returns for periods of up to 60 days are estimated for each day, 
and thus there is a problem of ‘overlapping’ data to address. Estimates based on 
overlapping periods could capture autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in a firm’s 
excess returns, thus biasing the results. Senchack and Starks (1993) use monthly data 
and apply an event window covering 15 days before and fter short interest 
announcement date to avoid the overlapping problem. Angel et al. (2003) study 
stocks returns by partitioning their study sample into non-overlapping four-day sub-
samples. However, I am using daily data to obtain greater granularity in studying 
liquidity problems, and such techniques would not be suitable for this study. Since I 
rank by DCR daily and hold portfolios for a subsequnt N days, I need to adjust for 
unknown autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in returns. The Newey-West (1987) 
Heterockedasticity Autocorrelation Covariance (HAC) Matrix Estimator is widely 
used for such adjustment. Diether et al. (2008) sort stocks into quintiles based on the 
percentage of daily trading volume due to short selling, and study the day (t+2) to 
day (t+5) holding period. They use the Newey-West (1987) approach with lag 5 to 
adjust for autocorrelation over the overlapping holding period. However, Petersen 
(2008) notes that, although the Newey-West HAC matrix estimator is more efficient, 
its weighting scheme is not as optimal as clustered White (1980) standard errors. 
Also, if there is a requirement to adjust for autocorrelation, the test is mis-specified. 
To solve this problem whilst making full use of the daily data, I undertake a 
calendar-time approach to calculate average daily returns. This approach is used by 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Boehmer t al. (2008) to address the overlap 
problem.  
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tiAR,  is the abnormal return for the 
thi  stock assigned to portfolio p based on the 




I skip one day to avoid the bid-ask bounce problem and estimate the abnormal return 
from day (t+2). I establish the window for one day [t+2, t+3], 5 days [t+2, t+6], 10 
days [t+2, t+11], 20 days [t+2, t+21], and 60 days [t+2, t+61]. The Cumulative 






Table 6.1 below shows summary statistics for the entire sample period (1st September 
2003-31st May 2007) and for three ‘snapshots’: the sample beginning date (1st 
September), the sample mid-date (15th July 2005), and the sample end date (31st May 
2007). Panel A presents statistics for variables related to stock lending. Panel B 
presents statistics for stock characteristics.  In Pa el A, by comparing the mean to the 
median and the upper percentiles for shares on loan, it is clear that the distribution of 
shares on loan is skewed. Likewise, the Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) distribution is 
also skewed.  Whereas Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) find increasing short 
interest for NASDAQ stocks between 1988 and 2001, there is no obvious increasing 





Shares on loan (millions) Market cap on loan (%) Free float on loan (%) DCR (days)
01 Sep 2003-31 May 2007 mean 23.39 2.90 4.68 7.88
median 4.40 1.84 2.70 4.48
Std.Dev 74.99 3.07 5.68 29.29
01 Sep 2003 (Snapshot 1) mean 28.84 2.43 4.57 6.74
median 5.50 1.64 2.79 3.51
Std.Dev 81.60 2.43 5.18 19.01
15 Jul 2005 (Snapshot 2) mean 33.38 3.55 4.55 7.94
median 9.90 2.41 2.69 5.02
Std.Dev 77.58 3.18 4.39 15.65
31 May 2007 (Snapshot 3) mean 33.27 3.37 4.42 8.42
median 4.35 2.18 2.53 4.30
Std.Dev 191.39 3.66 5.49 28.49
Market Cap (millions) Daily Trading Volume (millions) B/M Free Float (%)
01 Sep 2003-31 May 2007 mean 2293.7 3.24 0.67 66.54
median 370.0 0.31 0.50 69.00
Std.Dev 8485.1 15.74 1.51 21.64
01 Sep 2003 (Snapshot 1) mean 1571.2 4.95 0.89 56.95
median 272.0 1.19 0.65 57.00
Std.Dev 7165.7 11.56 3.36 14.69
15 Jul 2005 (Snapshot 2) mean 2495.5 6.14 0.69 82.07
median 383.5 1.75 0.53 85.00
Std.Dev 10011.4 12.76 1.19 15.66
31 May 2007 (Snapshot 3) mean 2700.5 4.71 0.48 74.99
median 459.5 0.84 0.36 78.00
Std.Dev 7817.9 10.96 0.37 17.68
Panel B: Stock Characteristics Summary Statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for a series of short-selling measures. Shares on Loan is the number of shares borrowed over the
period (01 Sep 2003 to 31 May 2007), which acts as a proxy for the number of shares shorted. Market Cap on Loan is the number of
shares on loan divided by market capitalization over the sample period. Free Float on Loan is the number of shares on loan divided by the
size of the free float, providing a liquidity-adjusted meaure of short interest. DCR (Days to Cover Ratio) is the number of shares on loan
divided by average daily trading volume, which measures how many days of normal trading volume it would take for short-sellers to cover
their positions. Panel B reports summary statistics for stock characteristics. Market Cap is used to measure the firm size, and B/M refers
to lagged book-to-market ratio as defined in Fama and French (1993). Trading Volume is the number of shares traded in the market per
day. Free Float shows the percentage of outstanding shares which are publicly traded. Each panel reports statistics for the whole sample
period and also snapshots for the beginning sample date (01 Sep 2003), the mid-date (15 Jul 2005), and the final sample date (31 May
2007).
Table 6.1 Summary Statistics




6.3.1 Simple Sorts 
  
For each day, stocks are ranked according to DCR and portfolios containing the 99th, 
95th and 90th percentile of stocks by DCR are constructed. The portfolio 




All 99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
DCR>19.4 DCR>12.4 DCR>8.11
DCR (days)  Mean 7.88 147.26 52.87 34.71
 Median 4.48 62.68 25.76 19.36
 Std. Dev. 29.29 224.63 119.21 86.97
Shares on Loan  Mean 23.39 25.90 26.31 33.17
(in millions)  Median 4.40 14.10 7.80 9.40
 Std. Dev. 74.99 63.48 58.36 67.72
Mkt Cap on Loan (%)  Mean 2.90 5.60 6.22 6.20
 Median 1.84 3.54 4.66 4.90
 Std. Dev. 3.07 4.19 4.39 4.52
Free Float on Loan(%)  Mean 4.68 9.82 10.77 10.66
 Median 2.70 6.75 7.76 7.93
 Std. Dev. 5.68 7.93 9.05 9.04
Turnover by shares  Mean 3.24 0.45 1.21 1.94
(in millions)  Median 0.31 0.10 0.16 0.26
 Std. Dev. 15.74 2.10 3.82 5.35
Free Float (%)  Mean 66.54 65.34 66.07 66.64
 Median 69.00 65.00 68.00 69.00
 Std. Dev. 21.64 21.64 20.00 20.42
Volatility  Mean 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25
 Median 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23
 Std. Dev. 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mkt Cap  Mean 2294 697 983 1574
(in millions)  Median 370 444 443 499
 Std. Dev. 8485 3740 2980 5093
Book to Market ratio  Mean 0.67 6.21 1.86 1.21
 Median 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.49
 Std. Dev. 37.91 15.36 7.68 5.52
Past Return (%)  Mean 1.93 2.23 1.41 1.49
 Median 1.60 1.67 1.34 1.36
 Std. Dev. 8.37 8.72 7.81 7.60
Table 6.2 Portfolios based on Simple Sorts
Panel A. Short Interest
Panel B. Stock Liquidity
Panel C. Other Stock Characteristics
This table reports the characteristics of portfolios sorted daily by Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) over the
period 01 September 2003 to 31 May 2007. DCR is calculated as shares on loan divided by average daily
trading volume. The first column shows variables for the entire sample, the following three columns show
the 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles by DCR respectively. Past Return is calculated as the raw percentage
return of each portfolio over the previous 20 trading days.
 
 
Panel A reports the variables related to short interes . Unsurprisingly, the higher 
DCR percentiles have higher short-interest. Panel B presents statistics associated 
with liquidity factors: As expected, liquidity is generally poorer in portfolios with 
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higher DCRs. A high DCR thus typically results from the combination of high short 
interest and poor liquidity. Panel C presents statistics for other portfolio 
characteristics, including market capitalization, stock return volatility, book-to-
market ratio and past returns. Boehmer et al. (2008) find that high shorting tends to 
occur in small stocks. In addition, small stocks are expected to have lower trading 
volume and poorer liquidity. Considering these two features, I expect the higher 
DCR percentiles to be dominated by smaller stocks. Panel C reveals that the higher 
DCR portfolios show a lower mean market capitalization han for the whole sample. 
In fact, mean market capitalization declines monotoically with the higher DCR 
portfolios. The mean portfolio book-to-market ratio rises with DCR ratio and each of 
the higher DCR portfolios has above average book to market ratio. Based on 
medians, however, no clear relationship exists. This suggests that a small number of 
‘value’ stocks dominate the mean figures. Boehmer et al. (2008) point out although 
short-sellers are able to identify over-valued stocks, high levels of short-selling are 
neither necessarily nor sufficiently related to a low book-to-market ratio. Financial 
distress risk is likely to be present with extreme value stocks. There is no apparent 
relationship between volatility and DCR, or between past returns and DCR. 
 
Table 6.3 below presents the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 




AR(+1)  Mean 0.034 0.020 0.027
t-Stat 1.345 1.720 * 2.429
CAR(+5)  Mean 0.127 0.127 0.116
t-Stat 1.188 2.710 *** 2.951 ***
CAR(+10)  Mean 0.291 0.307 0.263
t-Stat 1.032 3.250 *** 3.423 ***
CAR(+20)  Mean 0.348 0.562 0.622
t-Stat 1.742 * 2.989 *** 4.265 ***
CAR(+60)  Mean 2.027 1.203 1.463
t-Stat 1.682 * 1.970 ** 3.419 ***
The Table reports abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for higher-percentile DCR
portfolios from 01 Sep 2003 to 31 May 2007. Stocks are sorted into 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles based
on their Days to Cover Ratio (DCR). Portfolios are re-balanced daily. By skipping one day to avoid concerns
about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated
using a calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All returns are
quoted as percentages. 
Table 6.3 Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on Simple Sorts (%)
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
Note: * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.
 
 
Table 6.3 reveals positive abnormal returns for each of the higher DCR portfolios 
over each time period considered. Statistical significance is generally stronger over 
the longer holding periods; and for the 90th and 95th percentiles compared to the 99th 
percentile. This latter effect is due to the lower volatility of abnormal returns in the 
90th and 95th percentile portfolios, such that statistical significance can be established 
at a lower abnormal return. 
 
 
6.3.2 Double Sorts 
 
Table 6.4 below shows portfolio characteristics forthe higher percentile DCR 
portfolios, separated into ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolios and ‘All’ portfolios. This allows 
for a comparison between the characteristics of stock experiencing crowded exits, 
and all stocks that belong to higher percentile DCR portfolios. 
176 
 
First Sort (By DCR)
Second Sort (By Exceptional Change) All Crowded Exits All Crowded Exits All Crowded Exits
DCR (days)  Mean 147.26 91.43 52.87 36.55 34.71 25.76
 Median 62.68 57.30 25.76 24.56 19.36 18.58
 Std. Dev. 224.63 94.80 119.21 48.08 86.97 34.74
Shares on Loan  Mean 25.90 27.70 26.31 33.41 33.17 45.37
(in millions)  Median 14.10 18.90 7.80 15.70 9.40 16.60
 Std. Dev. 63.48 24.54 58.36 57.53 67.72 84.69
Mkt Cap on Loan (%)  Mean 5.60 4.51 6.22 6.73 6.20 6.73
 Median 3.54 2.98 4.66 5.90 4.90 5.90
 Std. Dev. 4.19 3.87 4.39 4.58 4.52 4.53
Free Float on Loan(%)  Mean 9.82 7.89 10.77 12.02 10.66 12.11
 Median 6.75 3.63 7.76 9.91 7.93 9.90
 Std. Dev. 7.93 7.48 9.05 9.74 9.04 9.73
Turnover by shares  Mean 454.9 0.4 1206.1 1.7 1936.7 3.0
(in millions)  Median 103.2 0.1 161.9 0.3 260.7 0.5
 Std. Dev. 2096 899 3823 3908 5346 8116
Free Float (%)  Mean 65.34 67.21 66.07 64.56 66.64 64.64
 Median 65.00 71.00 68.00 66.00 69.00 67.00
 Std. Dev. 21.64 23.05 20.00 20.82 20.42 21.22
Volatility  Mean 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
 Median 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
 Std. Dev. 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12
Mkt Cap  Mean 696.8 642.7 982.8 1257.5 1573.8 1953.6
 Median 444.0 497.0 443.0 503.0 499.0 587.0
 Std. Dev. 3740 692 2980 2224 5093 6234
B/M  Mean 6.21 0.11 1.86 0.49 1.21 0.49
 Median 0.47 0.15 0.55 0.46 0.49 0.43
 Std. Dev. 15.36 0.86 7.68 0.59 5.52 0.51
Past Return  Mean 0.022 0.02 0.014 0.02 0.015 0.02
 Median 0.017 0.02 0.013 0.02 0.014 0.02
 Std. Dev. 0.087 0.08 0.078 0.07 0.076 0.07
Table 6.4 Portfolios based on Double Sorts
Panel A. Short Interest
Panel B. Stock Liquidity
Panel C. Other Stock Characteristics
99th Percentile 95th Percentile 90th Percentile
This table reports the characteristics of portfolios sorted according to both Days to Cover Ratio (DCR) and
exceptional decreases in the percentage of free float on loan over the period 01 September 2003 to 31 May 2007.
DCR is calculated as shares on loan divided by average daily trading volume. Exceptional decreases in free float on
loan are identified as described in the Methodology section. For each percentile, the column 'All' shows variables for
all stocks in that percentile group based on a simple sort; the Crowded Exits column reports portfolios which have a
high DCR combined with exceptional falls in short interest, as defined in the Methodology section. Past Return is




From Panel B, it can be seen that mean and median turnover by shares is 
dramatically lower for the ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolis compared to the ‘All’ 
portfolios, suggesting that lower trading volume is an important factor in explaining 
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crowded exits. Panel C reveals that the Book-to-Market atio is lower for ‘Crowded 
Exits’ portfolios than for the ‘All’ portfolios. 
 
I examine each of the stocks appearing in the ‘Crowded Exits’ portfolios to identify 
if there are regulatory news releases around the time of the crowded exit. In 
approximately half the cases, there are regulatory news announcements in the period 
from 7 days before the start of exceptional short cvering. This suggests that public, 
company-specific news could be the catalyst for a cowded exit in some, but not all, 
cases. Stocks typically stay in the crowded exit por folio for a limited number of days 
(a mean of 3.35 days for the 99th percentile portfolios, 3.55 days for the 95th 
percentile portfolios and 4.45 days for the 90th percentile portfolios). 
 
For the crowded exits portfolios, I calculate equal-weighted portfolio returns using 
the calendar-time approach over holding periods of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. 
As before, I skip one day to counter the bid-ask bounce problem. This approach is 
repeated every day. I expect stocks experiencing crowded exits to show higher 
positive AR and CARs than stocks that do not experience crowded exits. Results are 
shown in Table 6.5 below: 
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AR(+1)  Mean 0.518 0.233 0.158 0.026 0.151 0.105
t-Stat 0.915 0.641 2.161 ** 0.256 1.332 1.512 *
CAR(+5)  Mean 1.833 0.647 0.404 -0.050 0.402 0.320
t-Stat 0.862 0.523 1.409 -0.133 0.873 1.157
CAR(+10)  Mean 4.916 4.125 1.005 1.065 1.051 0.986
t-Stat 2.191 ** 1.949 ** 2.344 ** 0.834 1.773 * 1.611 *
CAR(+20)  Mean 5.254 5.858 3.403 1.869 3.610 1.986
t-Stat 1.831 * 1.506 * 4.413 *** 1.426 * 2.994 *** 2.012 **
CAR(+60)  Mean 18.930 14.446 5.033 3.022 6.370 3.640
t-Stat 2.065 ** 1.298 * 1.964 ** 0.758 1.703 * 1.324 *
DifferenceCrowded Exits Difference Crowded Exits Difference
Note: * indicates significance at 10% level, ** indicates significance at 5% level, and *** indicates significance at 1% 
Table 6.5 Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns based on Double Sorts (in %)
The Table reports mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for crowded exit portfolios from 01
Sep 2003 to 31 May 2007. For each day, stocks are first sorted into 99th, 95th, and 90th percentiles based on their Days
to Cover Ratio (DCR). Within each percentile, stocks showing exceptional decreases in short interest (as defined int he
Methodology section) are studied - these stocks are said to experience a 'crowded exit'. For each percentile, the first
column reports the abnormal returns for stocks experiencing a crowded exit. The second column reports the difference in
mean returns between portfolios of stocks experiencing crowded exits and those that do not experience crowded exits. By
skipping one day to avoid concerns about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-
statistics are calculated using a calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All
numbers are quoted as percentages. 




For each percentile, the ‘Crowded Exits’ column reports the AR and CARs for 
portfolios of stocks that have high Days to Cover Ratios but that also show 
exceptional decreases in short interest – each of tese stocks is said to experience a 
‘crowded exit’. The ‘Difference’ column shows the difference between stocks 
experiencing crowded exits and those do not, within each percentile group. ‘Crowded 
Exit’ portfolios have positive AR and CARs, most ofwhich are statistically 
significant. Comparing to the simple sorts, these AR and CARs are also all higher. 
For example, the highest CAR is observed in the 99th percentile over the holding 
period of 60 trading days, with 18.93%, which is stati tically significant at the 5% 
level, while the CAR(+60) for the 99th percentile based on a simple sort is only 
2.03%, significant at the 10% level. The mean CAR(+60) for the 99th percentile 
Crowded Exit portfolios, at 18.93%, is also economically significant. This indicates 
potentially large losses for short-sellers during crowded exits. Noting from Table 6.4 
that stocks in the 99th percentile portfolio have an average DCR of over 147 days, it 
is unsurprising that such stocks could remain crowded after 60 days. Although the 
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positive CARs are not statistically significant over shorter periods, they are all 
statistically significant over periods of 10 days or greater.  
 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that crowded exits are a risk to short-
sellers. For longer holding periods, results are both statistically and economically 
significant. The greatest CARs are in the highest DCR portfolios. As a robustness 
check, I consider stocks that have high Days to Cover Ratios and that also exhibit 
any decrease in shares on loan over a 5 day period (as opposed to exhibiting  
‘exceptional’ decreases in shares on loan as defined in Section 6.2.2.). I find that the 
abnormal returns for each category are generally no lo ger positive, and that none is 
statistically significantly different from 0. This reveals that it is the ‘exceptional’ 




6.3.3 Adjustment for Arbitrage 
 
Not all short-sales are motivated by negative opinions on a stock. For example, short-
sellers might short stocks to conduct convertibles arbitrage and so take advantage of 
relative mispricing between a stock and a convertibl  bond issued by the same 
company. Where a short-seller is arbitrage-motivated, he will be partially hedged 
against movements in the stock price. The presence of such arbitrageurs could thus 
obfuscate our results and weaken the power of the tests. I use Thomson One Banker 
to identify firms with convertible bonds as part of their capital structure and re-
estimate abnormal returns and CARs for the Double Sorts, separating firms with 
convertible bonds from those without. Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) separate 
firms with convertible securities outstanding in exc ss of $10M, from those firms 
below this threshold. In this study, I separate firms with any convertible bonds in 
issue from those without convertible bonds, to completely remove any obfuscation 
due to convertible bond arbitrage. Approximately one fifth of stocks in the panel 
have convertibles within their capital structure. Table 6.6 shows the results from my 




AR(+1)  Mean 0.728 -0.451 0.190 0.040 0.167 0.076
t-Stat 1.117 -1.408 1.295 0.332 1.895 * 1.079
CAR(+5)  Mean 2.350 -0.545 0.494 0.142 0.466 0.108
t-Stat 0.096 -0.476 0.825 0.285 1.443 0.194
CAR(+10)  Mean 6.106 -0.559 1.327 0.338 1.095 0.721
t-Stat 2.279 ** -0.319 1.815 * 0.286 2.120 * 1.054
CAR(+20)  Mean 8.083 -7.759 3.763 3.173 3.569 3.197
t-Stat 2.235 ** -1.831 2.571 ** 1.570 3.974 *** 1.920 *
CAR(+60)  Mean 26.981 -18.103 8.312 0.815 5.514 3.526
t-Stat 2.508 ** -1.423 1.949 * 0.105 1.967 * 0.594
Note: * indicates significant at the 10% level, ** indicates significant at the 5% level, *** indicates significant at the 1% level.
convertible non-convertible convertible
Table 6.6 Double Sort Results Adjusted For Arbitrage
The Table reports mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for crowded exit portfolios from 01 Sep
2003 to 31 May 2007. First, stocks that are experiencing crowded exits are identified based on double sorts. Any company
with a convertible bond in its capital structure is identified as being exposed to arbitrage-motivated short-selling. Crowded
exit stocks are then seperated into 'non-convertible' portfolios and 'convertible' portfolios. By skipping one day to avoid
concerns about bid-ask bounce, daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and t-statistics are calculated using a
calendar-time approach with a holding period of 1, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. All numbers are quoted as percentages. 





I expect greater CARs for the non-convertible portfolios compared to the convertible 
portfolios, as short positions in the non-convertible portfolios are not hedged by long 
positions in convertible bonds. In all cases I find greater ARs and CARs for the non-
convertible portfolios, as expected. For the arbitrage-motivated ‘Convertible’ 
portfolios, all but one of the AR and CARs are insig ificant at any level. This is 
consistent with the findings of Diether t al (2008) and Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor 





It is rational for investors to take account of published evidence on stock market 
anomalies. In particular, a number of quantitative analysts incorporate empirical 
evidence on stock market anomalies into their investm nt processes, in their search 
for out-performance. Lev and Nissim (2004) study short-selling and the ‘accrual 
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anomaly’ and find that in recent years institutions have altered their portfolio 
positions more actively in response to accrual disclosures, suggesting that the 
publication of academic research influences investor behaviour. Wu (2008) argues 
that “short sellers appear to exploit the [post earnings announcement] drift by 
increasing (decreasing) shorting immediately following negative (positive) earnings 
surprises.” There exists a substantial body of literature showing that heavily shorted 
stocks perform poorly. Furthermore, Cohen t al. (2007) show that increasing 
borrowing demand for a stock is followed by poor performance. These studies 
suggest a potential trading strategy for short-sellers: identify heavily shorted stocks 
(or stocks with increasing borrowing demand) and build short positions in those 
stocks. This is an imitation strategy, similar to th se described by Fligstein (1996, 
2001), White (1981, 2001) and MacKenzie (2006). However, the act of imitation 
changes the market dynamics and can lead to unexpect d consequences (see 
Surowiecki, 2004). With imitation, short-positions become more crowded, and the 
risk of ‘crowded exits’ increases. This could lead to examples of ‘counter-
performativity’, as described by MacKenzie (2006), whereby the widespread and 
plentiful practice of short-selling, as assumed in economic models such as Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory, leads not necessarily to a more effici nt market, but to an increasing 
number of occasions on which stock prices move temporarily away from fair value. 
Indeed, Irvine (2005) finds that stocks with higher short interest in any given month 
also have greater return skewness the next month. 
 
Crowded exits are a liquidity problem unique to short-sellers. They have yet to be 
examined in the literature, and this study fills this gap. Crowded exits arise in stocks 
where short-sellers hold large positions relative to normal trading volume, and when 
a catalysts prompts short-sellers to cover their positions rapidly and simultaneously. 
Catalysts include, but are not limited to, public news releases by companies. I find 
that crowded exists are associated with losses to short- ellers that are economically 
and statistically significant. As such, the risk of a crowded exit represents an indirect 




I show that stocks with higher short interest, smaller sizes and poorer liquidity are 
more likely to have crowded exits. This research makes a contribution to the 
literature by furthering our knowledge of indirect short-sale constraints. It also makes 
a practical contribution, as my findings suggest practical steps that short-sellers can 
take to mitigate crowded exit risk. First, short-sellers should be risk-aware when 
short-selling smaller, less liquid stocks with high days-to-cover ratios. Secondly, 
given the prolonged nature of crowded exits, short-sellers should cover their short 
positions immediately upon observing exceptional levels of covering by other short-
sellers in crowded positions. However, such short-cvering will in itself exacerbate 






























My interviews revealed that some practising (and pros ective) short-sellers fear 
becoming victims of stock manipulation. This fear cn serve to limit the extent of 
short-selling, and so acts as an indirect constraint on short-selling. Of course, long-
investors can also become victims of stock manipulation but short-sellers are 
particularly vulnerable due to the possibility of stock loan recall.  If a stock loan is 
recalled and cannot be replaced, the short-seller must cover his position by buying 
stock in the market. A stock loan recall thus has the potential to create ‘forced 
trading’, making manipulation more effective. It isthe recall mechanism that 
distinguishes manipulation against short-sellers from manipulation against long-
investors. 
 
Since at least the Great Depression, there has beensuspicion amongst some 
politicians, media commentators and firms that short-sellers could be the instigators 
of stock manipulation (see sections 2.3 and 3.3.3 for examples of this phenomenon). 
A recent example of this, from 2008, was the widely-r ported claim that short-sellers 
were manipulating the price of shares in Halifax Bank of Scotland plc (HBOS), using 
false rumours and short-selling to drive the price lower. This led to a formal 
investigation by the Financial Services Authority, involving a series of interviews 
with market participants and the examination of phone conversations and trading 
records. Ultimately, the regulator found no evidence of manipulative behaviour. 
Much less comment is given, however, to manipulation against short-sellers. A 
recent exception to this is provided by comment surrounding activity in the shares in 
Volkswagen AG, a German-based automobile manufacturer, during October 200812. 
At the time of writing, this case is the subject of an investigation by BaFin, the 
                                                
* This chapter forms the basis of a University of Edinburgh Working Paper entitled “Manipulating the 
Shorts” by James Clunie, Peter Moles and Nelly Terekhova. 
12 See for example, Financial Times: 28th October, November 5th and 25th, 2008. 
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German financial regulator. In section 7.3 I undertake a case study, examining stock 
lending data for Volkswagen AG around the time of the alleged manipulation.  
 
A short squeeze is described by Dechow et al. (2001) as a situation where a stock 
loan is recalled and the stock borrower is unable to find an alternative lender. The 
stock borrower must then purchase shares in the open market to repay the stock loan 
and to close the position.13 Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between crowded 





Crowded exits and short squeezes can be seen to be distinct, but potentially over-
lapping, phenomena. Where a short-squeeze occurs in a highly liquid stock, the 
                                                
13 A similar definition is offered by Duffie et al. (2002): “The lender may opt out of a continuing 
lending arrangement by issuing a recall notice, in which case the borrower must return the 
stock.” …“In some cases, called ‘short squeezes’, the borrower (or its broker) is unable to locate 
lendable shares and is ‘bought in’, that is, must by the stock outright. If the borrower fails to deliv r 
the security in standard settlement time, the lender its lf may buy it, using the cash collateral.” 
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short-seller simply buys stock in the market to cover his position, and these 
purchases would have little market impact. The short-seller bears trading costs and 
would also suffer an opportunity cost if the stock price fell subsequent to the short 
covering. By contrast, consider a short squeeze where a stock’s liquidity was ‘poor’ 
in the context of the scale of the recall. Short covering would have market impact, 
imposing losses on the short-seller. In an extreme case, a crowded exit could ensue 
as other short-sellers begin to cover their positions. Thus, a short squeeze can result 
in a crowded exit if the market impact of the initial short covering is large, or if the 
squeeze precipitates much additional short covering relative to the stock’s liquidity. 
  
It is possible to divide a short squeeze into two types: ‘manipulative’ and ‘non-
manipulative’ short squeezes. A non-manipulative short squeeze occurs naturally 
when a stock lender recalls his stock (say, to settle a stock sale) and the short-seller is 
unable to replace his stock loan, due to limited supply. By contrast, a manipulative 
short squeeze is associated with deliberate recall by the stock lender as part of a 
broader manipulation strategy. Consider the situation where a manipulator owns 
shares in a company and those shares are on loan to a sh rt-seller. The manipulator 
wishes to ‘pump up’ the share price and so buys additional shares in the company, 
demanding liquidity from the market. Simultaneously, he recalls the stock that is on 
loan. If unable to locate new stock to borrow, the s ort-seller must cover his position 
by buying stock in the open market. The market impact of these purchases places 
further upwards pressure on the stock price. The short-seller suffers a loss as he 
covers his position at a price above the initial, undisturbed share price. Finally, the 
manipulator ‘dumps’ his shares at the new, higher sa e price. In so doing, he secures 
a profit and completes the manipulation process. 
 
Figure 7.2 below expands upon Figure 7.1 and illustrates the relationship between 







Manipulative short squeezes can be seen to be a subset of short squeezes. 
Furthermore, some manipulative short squeezes belong to the set of crowded exits. 
This chapter is concerned with manipulative short squeezes. In particular, I study 
situations where short-sellers become the victims of manipulative short squeezes. 
This topic is important because some market practitioners state that they fear 
manipulative short squeezes, and that this fear is a barrier to short-selling. My 
research questions are: “how frequent are manipulatve short squeezes?”; “what type 
of stocks are associated with manipulative short squeezes?”; “what are the abnormal 
returns associated with manipulative short squeezes?” and “should short-sellers fear 
manipulative short squeezes?” 
 
Stock loan recalls and short squeezes are frequently described in the literature, but 
are rarely researched further. One exception is D’Avolio (2002), who investigates 
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stock loan recalls and finds that it can be difficult to re-borrow stock after a recall. 
He finds that 2% of stocks on loan are recalled during an average month, and that it 
takes a mean of 23 days (and a median of 9 days) to replace a recalled stock loan. 
Under existing regulations (e.g. Regulation SHO), a short-seller would be unable to 
hold onto a short position for such extended periods f time without a stock loan. 
This suggests that the recall of a stock loan typically leads to the need to cover the 
short position. Accordingly, a manipulator can use a stock loan recall to induce short-
covering, thus making manipulation more effective. 
 
The motivation for engineering a manipulative short squeeze is provided by two 
strands of the finance literature: the emerging literature on predatory trading and the 
literature on manipulation. 
 
Predatory Trading 
Predatory trading is a form of trading whereby a market participant seeks to exploit 
his knowledge of the positions and strategies of one r more other investors, by 
benefiting from the market impact of forced transactions by those investors (see also 
Section 3.3.6). Attari et al. (2005) show that strategic traders can use knowledge of 
the financial state of an arbitrageur so as “to benefit from the predictable price 
deviations caused by a financially constrained arbitrageur’s trades.” They state that: 
“for a healthier but still financially fragile arbitrageur, the trades of the sophisticated 
traders can be detrimental enough to tip the balance against recovery of the 
arbitrageur, forcing it into insolvency.” When the arbitrageur experiences financial 
distress, the strategic traders provide liquidity by buying the sole asset as the 
arbitrageur liquidates. Strategic traders choose between inactivity when the 
arbitrageur is well capitalized, and predatory trading as financial distress nears. 
   
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) explore a market equilibrium approach to forced asset 
sales and describe how liquidity can disappear, imposing costs on the liquidation 
seller of assets. When financial distress is experienced by several parties within an 
industry and a liquidation sale takes place, liquidity must come from outsiders who 
are likely to have lower valuations for the asset and thus bid lower. Coval and 
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Stafford (2007) study asset “fire sales” in equity markets. These are forced, 
immediate sales for which counter-parties can demand l rge liquidity premia. In 
particular, they find “considerable support for the notion that widespread selling by 
financially distressed mutual funds leads to fire sale prices”. The price effects are 
long-lasting and the ‘fire sale’ effect increases with the number of sellers and the 
level of financial distress. They find example of limits to arbitrage in funds that are 
unleveraged and not subject to margin calls – the forced selling pressure comes about 
as a result of the collective actions of investors who have placed assets on call with 
the agent (mutual fund manager) and who choose to rdeem simultaneously. Even 
funds initially unaffected by financial distress can l ter become distressed: the selling 
by distressed funds of commonly held securities hurts performance of non-distressed 
funds, leading to investors’ redemptions and subsequent distress. The authors argue 
that as “mutual funds cannot easily co-ordinate with each other their 
contemporaneous selling of overlapping holdings, combined with an outsider’s 
ability to predict which funds will be forced to transact gives rise to an incentive for 
predatory trading. This can create a situation where arbitrageurs have an incentive to 
destabilize prices relative to informationally-efficient values by exploiting firms that 
have chosen a capital structure and organizational form that relies on immediately 
demandable capital.” They further state that “the asset fire sale story provides a 
mechanism for rational mispricing. The market is clear y somewhat inefficient, in 
that market prices are not perfectly reflective of all available information. However, 
the basis of this mispricing requires neither irratonal investors nor managers. Prices 
eventually reflect available information, but someti es with a significant delay.”  
 
In summary, ‘forced trading’ at a time of diminished liquidity, whether by virtue of a 




Fischel and Ross (1991) assume that share prices react principally to the arrival of 
information, and argue that manipulating prices through trading, without the use of 
false statements or fictitious trades, cannot succeed. However, Mahoney (1999) 
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argues that “there are plausible conditions under which profitable trade-based 
manipulation can occur.” He suggests that other traders might interpret a large 
manipulative trade as being ‘information based’, thus prompting a revaluation of the 
stock and possible further buying. Rhee (2003) argues that “it is believed that highly 
liquid stocks are less vulnerable to manipulation and buse than securities that are 
less liquid”. Khwaja and Mian (2005) examine brokers in an emerging market 
colluding and trading amongst themselves and find that manipulation is not confined 
to small stocks. Zhou and Mei (2003) use a model that assumes that a single trader is 
large enough to manipulate prices. They investigate how a trade-based manipulator 
can exploit biases in other investors’ behaviour, sch as loss aversion or trend-
following. They show how trade-based manipulation ca move security prices away 
from fair value, and suggest that this poses a challenge to the EMH. Aggarwal and 
Wu (2006) describe how a single broker, acting as principal, can manipulate prices 
by using informational asymmetry relative to other investors. However, on 
examining SEC manipulation cases, they conclude that “most manipulation schemes 
are undertaken jointly by several parties.”  
 
The activities of ‘stock pools’ in the USA in the 1920s – groups of investors who 
actively traded (and allegedly manipulated prices) in specified securities are, 
according to Jiang et al. (2005), “the main reason for the current anti-manipulation 
laws in the United States.” Mahoney (1999) suggests that “the regulatory concern 
that prompted [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] was the prevention of 
manipulation, uninformed trading that influences stock prices.” This Act brought US 
stock exchanges under federal regulation, and created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Jiang et al. (2005) state: “The SEC brings enforcement actions against 
alleged manipulators, primarily in small and illiqud stocks. During the internet boom 
in particular, the SEC took action against “pump and dump” schemes in which a 
trader makes large purchases (sometimes coupled with the release of false 
information) and then sells after a price increase.” Jiang et al. (2005) find no 
evidence that the 1920s stock pools’ trades drove share prices to artificially high 
levels. As a result, they argue that Congress’ investigations into uncovering evidence 
of manipulation on the New York Stock Exchange during the late 1920s were 
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unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee (1932 to 
1934) concluded that stock pools represented attemps to manipulate the prices of the 
targeted stocks. Jiang et al. (2005) find that the size, liquidity and disclosure 
standards in that market “may have been sufficient to protect investors against 
manipulation.” and suggest that enforcement resources should be targeted on discrete 
segments of the securities markets, such as futures markets for commodities or 
financial instruments that must be delivered (and where the supply of this deliverable 
can be ‘cornered’), or in relatively small and illiquid markets.   
 
For manipulators, information about the stock positi ns and capital strength of short-
sellers’ can be valuable. Such information would allow the manipulator to 
understand better the ‘ecology’ of the stock market (s e Lo, 2004). By knowing the 
price at which a short-seller established his short p sition, the manipulator also 
knows at what stock price the short-seller would experience a loss; by knowing the 
capital strength of the short-seller, the manipulator better understands the short-
seller’s ability to meet margin calls and thus to maintain losing positions. Such 
information allows the manipulator to gain a better understanding of when 
manipulation is likely to succeed. Manipulators can infer much valuable ‘ecological’ 
information from publicly disclosed data on stock lending, trading volume, stock 
returns and share holdings. However, market participants with access to ‘proprietary’ 
client trade flows hold a further advantage, as they can obtain more timely data with 
greater granularity. Such proprietary information would be very valuable to a 
manipulator, and firms with access to this type of data normally establish policies to 
disallow its use for manipulative purposes. Nevertheless, De Long et al. (1990) 
suggest that such information is commonly used by traders within investment 
banks.14 The Social Studies in Finance literature shows that trading and risk arbitrage 
are social phenomena, performed amongst a community of traders largely known to 
one another. The social aspects of trading and information flows are discussed by 
MacKenzie (2004) and Zaloom (2006), and in more general terms by Granovetter 
(1973, 1985). ‘Well-connected’ traders, who receive rumours or information about 
                                                
14 De Long et al. (1990) state: “Another, perhaps more common example of destabilizing rational 
speculation would be front-running by investment banks. Investment banks and brokers familiar with 
the customer order flow have perhaps the best information about future levels of demand.” 
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the activities of other traders, are at an advantage o those without such information. 
Legal and ethical considerations apart, it is a ‘rational’ strategy for traders to obtain 
and use this information, given the theoretical foundations for generating abnormal 
returns via manipulation and predatory trading.  
 
Characteristics of a Manipulative Short Squeeze 
 
The literature on security price manipulation also offers insights into the 
characteristics of a manipulative short squeeze. There are three classes of 
manipulation, according to Allen and Gale (1992). Manipulation can be 
‘information-based’ (spreading false rumours or using false accounting); ‘action-
based’ (e.g. launching a take-over bid); or ‘trade-based’ (e.g. ‘pump and dump’ 
trading). In the latter case, a manipulator ‘pumps u ’ the share price with buying. 
Unable to distinguish between informed buying and manipulative buying, positive 
feedback traders are attracted to the rising share pric and buy shares in the company, 
leading to further stock price increases. The manipulator then ‘dumps’ his stock at 
the higher price, securing a profit. The literature contains empirical evidence that 
‘pump and dump’ manipulation can secure profits for manipulators: Khwaja and 
Mian (2005) study a 32 month period of data for the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 
from December 1998 to August 2001. Their dataset con ains aggregated daily trades 
for each broker and for each stock on the KSE. They find evidence of trade-based 
“pump and dump” price manipulation: “When prices are low, colluding brokers trade 
amongst themselves to artificially raise prices andttract positive-feedback traders. 
Once prices have risen, the former exit leaving the latt r to suffer the ensuing price 
fall.” The authors argue that several factors, crucial to successful price manipulation, 
favour brokers over other market participants. First, brokers have lower transaction 
costs in conducting frequent trading; secondly, they ave superior information on 
prices, trade volumes and traders’ expectations; thirdly, they “possess a natural 
advantage in spreading rumours or false information in the market.”  Easterbrook 
(1986) and Pirrong (1995) examine commodity markets and argue that a sharp rise in 
the price of a commodity, followed by a fall of similar size, is characteristic of 
manipulation. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) study US SEC actions in stock manipulation 
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cases and find that prices trend throughout the manipulation period and reverse in the 
post-manipulation period.  
 
A ‘manipulative short squeeze’ follows this same general pattern of ‘pump’ and 
‘dump’ but also involves the recall of a stock loan. A manipulative short squeeze 
thus combines two of the three classes of manipulation described by Allen and Gale 
(1992): trade-based manipulation (‘pump and dump’) and action-based manipulation 
(stock loan recall). I refer to the full manipulative short squeeze process as ‘pump, 
squeeze and dump’ and an understanding of this process informs my methodology in 
this chapter.  
 
There are considerable practical challenges to resea ching this topic. Jiang et al. 
(2005) note that “it is difficult to reject a hypothesis of informed trading in favour of 
a hypothesis of trade-based manipulation, solely by examining short-run trading 
data.” Thus, it is difficult to use market data, such as the panel data described in 
Chapter 5, to distinguish between a ‘manipulative short squeeze’ and ‘informed 
trading’. In addition to this problem, note that stock lending markets are 
decentralized and there is no legal requirement to rep rt a stock loan recall. That is to 
say, publicly available data does not explicitly identify stock loan recalls. Thus, it 
will not be possible to affirmatively identify a manipulative short squeeze from 
public data on stock lending or short-selling – it is only possible to infer stock loan 
recalls from patterns in the data. Even with private data that reveals stock loan 
recalls, the motivation behind a recall will remain u known. Mahoney (1999) argues 
that it is difficult to test for profitable manipulation in actual trading, as manipulation 
is deemed illegal in the United States of America, and so is likely to be disguised. 
Fischel and Ross (1991) argue that trade based manipul tion is often confounded by 
false statements and fictitious trades, making it difficult to affirmatively identify 
manipulation from direct questioning of market participants. In light of the practical 
difficulties in identifying manipulative short squeezes, it is little surprise that this 




To overcome these problems, I define a pattern of market data with respect to stock 
returns and total shares on loan that is consistent with a manipulative short squeeze. I 
call such an event an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. I describe a set of rules 
for identifying apparent manipulative short squeezes in the methodology section. It 
is, of course, possible that patterns in the stock and stock loan market that are 
consistent with manipulative short squeezes could simply be the result of noise. 
Consequently, my group of ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ should mark the 
upper count on the actual occurrence of manipulative short squeezes. Although this 
appears to be a limitation of the research, one of the purposes of this research is to 
examine the frequency of manipulative short squeezes. If I find that ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeezes’ are rare, this finding would be consistent with the 
assertion that manipulative short squeezes are rare. 
 
Jacobs and Levy (2007) assert that the fear of short squeezes deters some short-
sellers, but that this fear is largely unfounded as short squeezes are rare events and 
confined to illiquid stocks. The authors do not, however, provide any evidence to 
back up this claim. Empirical evidence that manipulative short squeezes are rare and 
confined to illiquid securities could assist in reducing fear amongst short-sellers. By 
reducing fear, we reduce an indirect short-sale constraint and so promote market 
efficiency. The aim of this research is to examine th frequency and nature of 
manipulative short squeezes, the losses that short-ellers suffer and the type of stocks 
affected. I use the panel of data described in Chapter 5. From this dataset, I find that 
manipulative short squeezes are rare for larger, moe liquid companies. If they occur 
at all, it tends to be in smaller, less liquid stocks. In the early stages of events 
identified as ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’, stocks experience statistically 
significant positive abnormal returns. Short-sellers would experience losses and 
short-covering (because of loan recall) would lead to the crystallization of these 
losses. 
 
My practitioner interviews reveal an awareness of manipulative short squeezes and a 
fear of the type of predatory trading described by Brunnermeier and Pederson (2005) 
and Attari et al. (2005). The contribution of this research is that my results should 
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assist in replacing the fear of manipulative short squeezes with a more evidence-
based perspective. The empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that the 
fear of manipulative short squeezes is, in the main, unjustified for larger, more liquid 
stocks. This evidence should serve to reduce an indirect constraint on short-selling, 
thus promoting market efficiency. The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the 
next section I describe my methodology. I then present the results of my tests. In 
Section 7.4 I study the case of Volkswagen AG in autumn 2008. In the last section I 





The literature proposes several ways of testing for manipulation. Mahoney (1999) 
and Jiang et al. (2005) focus on the ‘stock pools’ of the 1920s. Each pool represented 
a group of investors who came together to trade in the shares of a specific company. 
Stock pools were suspected of price manipulation, and thus the creation of a stock 
pool provides an a priori view as to which stock will be targeted for manipulation 
and when that manipulation will start. To test for manipulation in a specified stock at 
a specified time, one can use nonparametric runs test and event studies (in the latter 
case, comparing the performance of a control portfolio, matched in terms of industry 
classification and market capitalisation, to that of stocks targeted by stock pools). 
However, stock pools do not openly operate in the UK stock market at the time of 
this study, and so without any such a priori views, an alternative approach is 
required. To this effect, I draw upon Mahoney’s (1999) suggestion that a large 
abnormal return in the absence of a news announcement, followed by a reversal of 
similar magnitude (as investors learn that the trading was not information-based) is 
indicative of manipulation. Furthermore, as I am interested in cases where borrowed 
stock is recalled and cannot be replaced, I expect to observe a decline in the total 






Definition of an ‘Apparent Manipulative Short Squeez ’ 
 
I identify a pattern of stock returns and changes to hares on loan that is consistent 
with a manipulative short squeeze. I call this an ‘pparent manipulative short 
squeeze’ and define it as any situation in which all of the following occur: the stock 
price rises ‘exceptionally’ over some limited time period (the ‘pump’ phase), 
followed by a fall in the number of shares on loan (the ‘squeeze’ phase); 
subsequently, the stock price reverts towards the original, undisturbed level (the 
‘dump’ phase). Furthermore, these events should not coincide with any regulatory 
news announcements - these might include trading statements, corporate results, 
announcement of share buybacks, change of directors e c. This latter requirement 
avoids the confounding of a manipulative short squeeze with reaction to new, public, 
company-specific information. By requiring that an exceptional price rise is followed 
by a price reversal, I am able to separate a manipulat ve short squeeze from 
‘informed’ trading upon private information (a price reversal would not be expected 
in the latter case). The remaining difficulty is in separating an apparent manipulative 
short squeeze from noise trading. Noise trading could also lead to a rise in share 
price followed by a reversal. I attempt to separate the two phenomena as follows: 
first, by requiring that the initial share price rise is ‘exceptional’. Noise treading is 
associated with trading by uninformed market participants. Traditional asset pricing 
theories generally consider the actions of noise trade s to be uncorrelated amongst 
one another. Under such a framework, their market impact is less likely to be large, 
and so any stock price reaction to noise trading is likely to be limited and thus 
excluded by this criterion. Secondly, I require that shares on loan fall after the stock 
price rise. Whereas loan recalls mechanically create pressure for a reduction in shares 
on loan, there is no similar mechanical link between price changes due to noise and 
shares on loan. Nevertheless, it is not possible to fully disentangle the two 
phenomena and this becomes a limitation of the work that follows.   
 
Next, I must define an ‘exceptional’ rise in stock price. I choose to define an 
exceptional rise in stock price as one that is large relative to the volatility of returns 
for that stock. Furthermore, I measure price changes ov r a three day period. A three 
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day period is chosen because, in the UK, stock loanrecalls are settled in the same 
way as stock purchases, meaning that borrowers have t re  working days to return 
the stock (Faulkner, 2006)15. In particular, once a stock loan is recalled, a borrower 
who has shorted stock has three options: first, he could successfully find replacement 
stock; secondly, if unable to successfully find replacement stock, he could delay the 
return of the stock loan for up to three days in the hope of finding an alternative 
source of borrowing in this time; thirdly, he could cover his short position 
immediately and return the stock loan. Thus, even where the ‘pump phase’ coincides 
with a stock loan recall, it could take up to three days before the short-seller covers 
his position. For this reason, I measure the pump phase over three days. For each 
firm day, I measure the standard deviation of returns for the preceding sixty days. 
Sixty days is sufficiently long to allow for a meaningful estimate of stock return 
volatility, but also short enough to be ‘current’. By measuring return volatility in this 
way for each firm day, I take account of the fact that volatility varies over time. I 
regard an exceptional stock price increase to be one where the stock price rises over 
any three-day period by at least 2.5 times the standard deviation of daily returns for 
that stock. Assuming an approximately Normal distribution of stock returns, this 
method would generally isolate situations that fall within the top percentile of stock 
price changes. By setting this specific definition, I establish an upper limit to the 
frequency of ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. I later undertake robustness 
tests using different thresholds. 
 
After receiving an order to return a stock loan, I expect a short-seller will search for 
alternative sources of borrowing. If a replacement loan is found, the short position 
need not be covered. However, the UK lending market is decentralised and thus 
finding replacement shares can take time. D’Avolio (2002) observes for his sample 
of US stocks that when loans are recalled, there is usually no immediate replacement 
available. Since in the UK it takes three days to deliver purchased stock under 
standard settlement arrangements, some short-sellers might be expected to cover 
                                                
15 A typical stock lending agreement in the UK requires the return of stock within three days of recall. 
Failure to return recalled stock within this time entitles the lender to claim costs from the borrower, 
and to serve a written notice of ‘Event of Default’, which can have repercussions for the borrower 
with respect to other counter-parties. 
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immediately upon loan recall. However, there is another group of borrowers who 
may prefer to delay covering their positions and look for replacement loans in 
subsequent days. If unsuccessful and eventually forced to cover, they will have to 
pay a premium for the delivery of stock to be made in one or two, rather than three 
days. Moreover, uninformed traders might start taking long positions around the 
same time, believing that the buyers they observe ae informed market participants 
(see Hong and Stein, 2003). On the whole, there is likely to be a lot of noise in the 
stock price on the days immediately after the recall, but it is realistic to expect that 
the initial stock price rise will start to reverse by the third day after the stock loan 
recall. I define the event date (day 0) as the first day following the exceptional rise in 
share price on which the number of shares on loan falls. I ensure that there are no 
Regulatory News Service announcements from five days prior to the event date until 
ten days after the event date. Thus, the observed patterns are not the result of 
reactions to new, public information. 
 
It is not clear over what time period the stock price reversal should take place. Most 
theoretical models of predatory trading or price manipulation assume complete price 
reversal, but use ‘notional’ time periods (see, forexample, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2005, and Aggarwal and Wu, 2006). Thus, I expect complete price reversal 
over some unknown time period. If I over-estimate th ime period, I should expect 
to observe complete price reversal, but am more likly to introduce confounding 
influences such as a change in company or economic fundamentals. By under-
estimating the time period, I would expect to see partial price reversal only.  Without 
a good theory on the time taken for a stock price to revert fully to its fair value, I 
prefer to identify partial reversal over a limited time period, as this reduces the risk 
of confounding factors contaminating the study. I report cases with a price reversal 
of at least 70% over a ten day period following the ev nt date.  
 
Estimating Abnormal Returns around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
Having identified a number of ‘apparent manipulative short-squeezes’, I then 
estimate abnormal returns for the stocks involved. As described in Chapter 5, I use 
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the CAPM model to estimate abnormal returns and employ a one-year formation 
period to estimate betas. Due to the small number of observations in each sample and 
the presence of some large-cap stocks, I prefer to use equally-weighted returns when 
aggregating the results. However, Canina et al. (1998) warn that using equally-
weighted returns can result in large biases and consequently, I also weight by 
market-capitalization. 
 
I estimate abnormal returns for each of the three phases associated with an ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeeze’. “Phase 1” (the ‘pump’ phase) lasts for three days, from 
day -3 to -1; “Phase 2” (the ‘squeeze’ phase) also la ts for three days, from day 0 to 
day 2;  and “Phase 3” (the ‘dump’ phase) lasts for ten days, from day 3 to day 12 




The final step is to calculate how much short-sellers lose as a result of the 
manipulation. I calculate average cumulative abnormal returns from the start of the 
‘pump’ phase to the end of the ‘squeeze’ phase (i.e. from day -3 to day 2). By this 
time, short covering is expected to have been completed and the short-seller should 
no longer be exposed to stock price movements. However, during the ‘pump’ phase 
(i.e. day -3 to day -1) short-sellers are highly likely to have experienced negative 
abnormal returns, because stock prices were increasing by definition. Including this 
interval in the analysis might result in a biased outc me. As a solution to this 
problem, I adopt an alternative approach that starts to measure cumulative abnormal 
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returns from event day (day zero) until the end of the squeeze phase (day 2). I then 
test if these returns are statistically significantly different from zero, by comparing to 
the relevant 2.5% t-test statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
companies in the sample minus one. 
 
Characteristics of Stocks around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
I also examine the characteristics of stocks around the time of ‘apparent manipulative 
short squeezes’. In the literature, manipulation is as ociated with the following 
characteristics: 
 
1. Smaller size 
 
Jiang et al. (2005) argue that “successful trade-based manipulaton is difficult for all 
but the smallest and most illiquid companies.” I compare the market capitalisation of 
the stocks affected by apparent manipulative short squeezes with the average market 
capitalisation of all the stocks in the dataset on hat day.  
 
2. Lower liquidity 
 
Brunnermeier and Pederson (2005) show in their model that predatory trading 
against other traders has the effect of reducing the liquidity of that stock in the 
market. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) find that price manipulators target stocks that are 
illiquid. I obtain two proxies for liquidity in those stocks subject to ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeezes’. First, the free float v lue of shares and second, the 
number of days of normal trading volume that it would take a short-seller to cover 




ti, Volume TradingDaily  Average
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ti,RatioCover   toDays  is the ‘days to cover ratio’ for stock i on day t. 
ti,Loanon  Shares  is the closing number of shares on loan for stock i on day t. 
ti,Volume TradingDaily  Average  is the moving average of the trading volume for 
stock i from days (t-61) to (t-1). I choose 60 days of trading volume as a comproise 
between the risk of including out-of-date information on trading volume and the risk 
of one or more exceptional days influencing the moving average figure. 
A stock with a high days to cover ratio is deemed to be less liquid (from a short-
seller’s perspective) than a comparable stock with a lower days to cover ratio. For 
each day during the manipulation period, I compare the DCR of a stock with its 
average value over the three preceding months. This allows me to observe any trend 
in this liquidity ratio during the apparent manipulative short squeeze. I also compare 
the free float number of shares for each stock with that of the average stock on the 
event day. 
 
3. Elevated volatility of stock returns 
 
Mahoney (1999) and Aggarwal and Wu (2006) argue that the stock price volatility of 
a manipulated stock would be greater than that of a similar ‘un-manipulated’ stock. I 
measure the volatility of stock returns for each company that is subject to an apparent 
manipulative short squeeze, from 20 days prior to the event date through to 10 days 
after the event date. For each of these days volatility is calculated as the standard 
deviation of returns for the twenty preceding days.16 For each firm day, I compare 
the stock volatility measure to the year’s average for that firm.  
 
4. Elevated trading volume 
 
Zhou and Mei (2003) argue that “excessive trading volume and price movements 
without news on fundamentals” can assist in distinguishing manipulative trading 
from other forms of trading. Aggarwal and Wu (2006) state that stocks investigated 
                                                
16 The number of days needs to be as small as possible to grasp the changes in volatility that we expect 
to see around the manipulative short squeeze. Neverthel ss, this number still has to be sufficient to 




in US SEC actions in stock manipulations cases exhibit elevated trading volumes. 
For each stock subject to an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’, I record trading 
volume for the five days preceding the start of the manipulation process and compare 





I observe thirty-six incidences where a stock price s s exceptionally, then shares on 
loan decreases, followed by a stock price reversal, in accordance with my definition 
from section 7.2 above. Of these thirty-six, some could represent ‘noise’ rather than 
manipulation. To consider how many might be due to noise, I run a ‘mirror-image 
test’ on the full dataset to identify the number of times the opposite pattern in market 
prices and shares on loan occurs (i.e. significant decreases in share price, followed by 
a rise in the number of shares on loan, followed by a reversal in share price).  This 
mirror-image pattern would not be associated with manipulation against short-sellers, 
but would be expected to be subject to a similar degree of noise. If manipulative 
short squeezes do not occur in the market at all, one would expect the mirror image 
test to produce approximately the same number of observations as the ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeeze’ test. I observe twenty-five ‘mirror-image test events’, 
compared to thirty-six ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. This lower number of 
‘mirror image test events’ is consistent with the notion that some but not all 
‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ are simply the result of noise.  
 
Of the thirty-six ‘apparent manipulative short squeez s’ identified above, sixteen are 
associated with regulatory news announcements. I eliminate these, as it is not 
possible to distinguish between a reaction to a news release and a manipulative short 
squeeze.  This leaves twenty incidences matching my definition of an apparent 
manipulative short squeeze and free from the confounding effects of any regulatory 
news releases. This is a small number of incidences to observe over 979 days for 
between 350 and 681 stocks. Thus, an ‘apparent manipul tive short squeeze’ as 




I examine the abnormal returns for stocks involved in ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeezes’ for each day during the manipulation process (days -3 to 12). I group the 
companies into portfolios and test the null hypothesis of daily returns being equal to 
zero. Results are reported in Table 7.1. Panel A show  the equally-weighted 
portfolios: returns for these portfolios are significantly different from zero for eight 
of the 16 days. Panel B shows the market cap-weightd portfolios: only two of the 16 
days exhibit returns that are significantly different from zero. The greatest 
magnitudes for the daily abnormal returns are observed during the pump phase and 
on the event day. The difference in results between th  equally-weighted and market-
cap weighted portfolios is consistent with the notion that abnormal returns are greater 
in smaller stocks.  
 
Table 7.1 Abnormal Returns around Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Returns
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average -0.35% 1.47% 2.33% 2.25% 0.21% -0.21% -0.94% -0.90%-0.62% -0.83% -0.80% -0.37% -0.95% -1.03% -0.28% -0.18%
Std. Deviation 1.42% 1.20% 1.49% 2.13% 2.34% 1.24% 1.51% 2.23% 1.59% 1.28% 1.44% 1.21% 1.95% 1.17% 1.90% 1.78%
t-stat. (abs.) 1.09 5.47 7.00 4.74 0.40 0.75 2.79 1.80 1.75 2.90 2.50 1.38 2.19 3.94 0.66 0.46
Prob. 2 tails 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.46 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.52 0.65
Prob. 1 tail 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.26 0.32
Panel B: Market Cap-Weighted Portfolio Abnormal Returns
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average -0.01% 0.08% 0.06% 0.05% 0.00% 0.04% -0.02% -0.05% -0.01% -0.07% -0.01% 0.01% -0.02% -0.04% 0.00% -0.01%
Std. Deviation 0.03% 0.23% 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.19% 0.07% 0.17% 0.06% 0.19% 0.06% 0.11% 0.09% 0.11% 0.09% 0.03%
t-stat. (abs.) 1.47 1.55 2.61 2.62 0.65 0.93 1.03 1.29 0.72 1.57 0.60 0.55 0.91 1.64 0.21 0.68
Prob. 2 tails 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.52 0.36 0.32 0.21 0.48 0.13 0.56 0.59 0.37 0.12 0.84 0.50
Prob. 1 tail 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.07 0.28 0.29 0.19 0.06 0.42 0.25
 
 
To consider the potential losses to short-sellers, I e timate the cumulative abnormal 
returns for each phase of the ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. Table 7.2 
presents the results: Panel A shows cumulative abnormal returns by phase for the 
equal-weighted portfolios and Panel B shows cumulative abnormal returns by phase 






Table 7.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
 
Panel A. Equally-Weighted Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Phase 1 2 3a 3b
Average 3.45% 2.26% -4.09% -6.91%
Std. Dev. 2.63% 3.43% 4.28% 5.17%
t-stat. (abs.) 5.86 2.95 4.27 5.98
Prob. 2 tails 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Prob. 1 tail 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B. Market Cap-Weighted Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Phase 1 2 3a 3b
Average 0.13% 0.10% -0.15% -0.21%
Std. Dev. 0.31% 0.24% 0.32% 0.36%
t-stat. (abs.) 1.92 1.74 2.12 2.60
Prob. 2 tails 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.02
Prob. 1 tail 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01
Phase 3 has been shown in two ways: as sub-period 3a ( ays 3 to 7) and full period 3b (days 3 to 12) to provide greater granularity.  
 
From Panel A, I can reject the hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for the equally-
weighted portfolio for each phase. I observe signifcant positive abnormal returns of 
3.45% in the first phase (days -3 to -1) and signifcant positive abnormal returns of 
2.26% in the second phase (days 0 to 2). These positive abnormal returns are 
followed by significant reversals in the third phase. In Panel B I observe much lower 
abnormal returns, as a small number of large-cap stock observations have lower 
abnormal returns but large weights in the portfolio.  The positive abnormal returns in 
phase one and phase two are significant at the 5% level using a one-tailed test. The 
above results indicate significant losses for short-sellers around ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeezes’ 
 
Table 7.3 below shows cumulative abnormal returns for portfolios by day, rather 
than by phase, up until the start of the expected price reversal. Panel A shows 
equally-weighted portfolio cumulative abnormal retuns by day. Cumulative 
abnormal returns peak at 5.91% by day 1 and start to reverse thereafter. I also show 
the upper and lower thresholds to the 95% confidence i tervals for these cumulative 
abnormal returns. Recall that during days -3 to -1 (the ‘pump’ phase) short-sellers are 
highly likely to have experienced negative abnormal returns, because stock prices 
were increasing by definition. Including this interval in the analysis might result in a 
biased outcome. Consequently, I adopt an alternative pproach in Panel B, and start 
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to measure cumulative abnormal returns from event day (day zero). Cumulative 
abnormal returns peak at 2.47% on day 1. In Panel C and Panel D, I show the 
corresponding results for market-cap weighted portfolios. Cumulative abnormal 
returns peak at day 2, at much smaller magnitudes than with the equally-weighted 
portfolios.   
 
Table 7.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Day
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Portfolios (starting from day -3)
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Average -0.35% 1.12% 3.45% 5.70% 5.91% 5.71% 4.77%
Std. Deviation 1.42% 1.81% 2.63% 2.89% 4.53% 4.39% 4.50%
Std. Error 0.32% 0.40% 0.59% 0.65% 1.01% 0.98% 1.01%
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.32% 1.97% 4.68% 7.05% 8.03% 7.76% 6.87%
Conf. Int.: Lower Value -1.01% 0.27% 2.22% 4.35% 3.79% 3.65% 2.66%
Panel B: Equally-Weighted Portfolios (starting from day 0)  
Day 0 1 2 3
Average 2.25% 2.47% 2.26% 1.32%
Std. Deviation 2.13% 3.57% 3.43% 3.61%
Std. Error 0.48% 0.80% 0.77% 0.81%
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 3.25% 4.14% 3.86% 3.01%
Conf. Int.: Lower Value 1.26% 0.79% 0.65% -0.37%
 
Panel C: Market-Cap Weighted Portfolios (starting from day -3)
Day -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Average -0.01% 0.07% 0.13% 0.19% 0.19% 0.23% 0.21%
Std. Deviation 0.03% 0.21% 0.31% 0.38% 0.38% 0.55% 0.57%
Std. Error 0.01% 0.05% 0.07% 0.09% 0.08% 0.12% 0.13% 
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.00% 0.17% 0.28% 0.37% 0.37% 0.49% 0.48%
Conf. Int.: Lower Value -0.02% -0.03% -0.01% 0.01% 0.02% -0.03% -0.05%
Panel D: Market-Cap Weighted Portfolios (starting from day 0)
Day 0 1 2 3
Average 0.05% 0.06% 0.10% 0.08%
Std. Deviation 0.09% 0.08% 0.25% 0.26%
Std. Error 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.06%
Conf. Int.: Higher Value 0.09% 0.09% 0.21% 0.20%
Conf. Int.: Lower Value 0.01% 0.02% -0.02% -0.04%
 
The tables above reveal averages for a portfolio of st cks subject to ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeezes’. By examining the underlying data I observe that the 
maximum loss a short-seller would have suffered from any individual stock was 
8.16% in phase one and 13.74% in Phase two. Note tha  a trader or long-short fund 
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manager would normally hold a number of short positi ns at any time. Stocks subject 
to manipulative short squeezes are likely to form a subset of these short positions. 
When considered in this broader context, the abnormal eturns observed above, while 




As a robustness check, I filter for ‘phase one’ stock price rises that represent two 
(and three) standard deviation changes in stock price, as opposed to the original 2.5 
standard deviations. I also filter for ‘phase three’ stock price reversals that are both 
greater and lower than the criterion of a 70% reversal. Unsurprisingly, I obtain a 
greater number of ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ when I test using looser 
criteria (and a smaller number of observations with the stricter criteria). I find that 
the magnitude of the mean abnormal returns varies inversely with the number of 
‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ that pass throug  the defining filter. By using 
looser criteria, I am likely to be collecting more observations that are simply the 
result of noise. Accordingly, I have lower confidenc  that the greater number of 
observations represents true manipulative short squeezes. When filtering using 
stricter criteria, I am likely to be excluding a greater number of true manipulative 
short squeezes (or at least those that have been less effective in generating large 
stock price movements). The mirror-image test (described earlier in this section) 
provides a means of estimating the amount of noise in the observations. 
 
I also consider an entirely different means of detecting a manipulative short squeeze. 
The manipulation process comprises the recall of a stock loan, the removal of the 
recalled stock from the pool of stock available to borrow, and an attempt by the 
original stock borrower to replace the recalled stock. As such, a manipulative short 
squeeze should be associated with a reduction in share  on loan for the stock 
concerned. There should also be a rise (or at least no reduction) in stock lending fee, 
as demand for borrowing stock is unchanged but the supply of stock available for 
borrowing has fallen. The stock loan utilisation rate (i.e. the proportion of shares 
available for borrowing that are actually borrowed) should increase as the victim of 
206 
 
the recall seeks to replace his loan from the remaining pool of stock available for 
borrowing. To take account of the time taken for a stock loan recall to be reflected in 
the stock lending data, I use a five day period for the measurement of these three 
variables (shares on loan, stock lending fee and stock utilisation rate). For each stock 
i and day t, I model these three variables as dummy variables in the following least 
squares regression equations: 
 
(Cumulative Abnormal Return)i, t = -3,0  =  α + β(D1i, t * D2i,t  * D3i,t ) + u i,t     (7.2) 
 
(Cumulative Abnormal Return)i, t = 0,3  =  α + β(D1i,t * D2i,t * D3i,t )  + u i,t    (7.3) 
 
where dummy variable D1i,t is set to 1 if shares on loan falls during the five day 
period prior to day t, or 0 otherwise; dummy variable D2i,t is set to 1 if the stock 
lending fee has not fallen during the five day period prior to day t, or 0 otherwise; 
and dummy variable D3i,t is set to 1 if the loan utilisation rate increases during the 
five day period prior to day t, or 0 otherwise. In Equation 7.2, the dependent variable 
is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i from three days before the three dummy 
variables are all ‘1’, to the day they are all ‘1’. In Equation 7.3, the dependent 
variable is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i from the day the three dummy 
variables are all ‘1’, to three days after.   
 
Stock loan utilisation data is available from November, 2004 (the start of collection 
of such data by Data Explorers Ltd) and my results are based on the period from 
8/11/2004 to 28/5/2008 (taking account of the five working days required for 
measuring the dummy variables and the four working days required for estimating 




Table 7.4 Robustness Check with Three Dummy Variables
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (day -3 to day 0)
Dependent Variable: ABN_CUM_MINUS3
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 8/11/2004 5/31/2007
Cross-sections included: 624
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 199024
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 9.38E-04 7.14E-05 13.137663 2.08E-39
D1*D2*D3 1.79E-08 1.15E-08 1.5468436 0.1219026
R-squared 1.20E-05     Mean dependent var 9.38E-04
Adjusted R-squared 7.00E-06     S.D. dependent var 0.0318513
S.E. of regression 0.03185118     Akaike info criterion -4.0554746
Sum squared resid 201.9073536     Schwarz criterion -4.0553721
Log likelihood 403570.3872     F-statistic 2.3927251
Durbin-Watson stat 0.566594047     Prob(F-statistic) 0.1219026
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (day 0 to day 3)
Dependent Variable: ABN_CUM_PLUS3
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 8/11/2004 5/28/2007
Cross-sections included: 624
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 197711
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 1.21E-03 7.15E-05 16.870364 8.24E-64
D1*D2*D3 1.07E-08 1.15E-08 0.9247395 0.3551026
R-squared 4.33E-06     Mean dependent var 1.21E-03
Adjusted R-squared -7.33E-07     S.D. dependent var 0.0318051
S.E. of regression 0.031805157     Akaike info criterion -4.0583665
Sum squared resid 199.9961     Schwarz criterion -4.0582634
Log likelihood 401193.8479     F-statistic 0.8551431
Durbin-Watson stat 0.570749774     Prob(F-statistic) 0.3551026 
 
 
The β-coefficient is not significantly different from zero for either measurement 
period. The adjusted R-squared for each analysis is also vanishingly small (less than 
0.01% in each case). This pattern is consistent with the notion that there are many 
false positive signals in such an analysis. Discussion  with stock lending agents and 
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prime brokers suggests that the true number of recalls that are passed onto clients 
(i.e. where the recalled stock cannot be replaced quickly) over any given twelve 
month period is likely to be in single digits, consistent with my original definition of 
a manipulative short squeeze. 
 
I refine the above analysis to include a fourth dummy variable, D4i,t, which equals 1 
if the stock loan utilisation rate is in the top 5% of all such observations, or 0 
otherwise17. Manipulative short squeezes are more likely to occur in stocks with high 
utilisation rates, as a stock lending agent is more likely to pass a recall on to the stock 
borrower when the utilisation rate is high (i.e. the loan is harder to replace). By 
adding this fourth independent dummy variable to the regressions in Equations 7.2 
and 7.3, I obtain the results shown in Table 7.5 below.  
                                                
17 Thanks to Will Duff-Gordon at Data Explorers Ltd. for this idea. Dummy variable D4i,t is partially 
correlated with dummy variable D3i,t and this is a limitation to this analysis. 
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Table 7.5 Robustness Check with Four Dummy Variables
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (day -3 to day 0)
Dependent Variable: ABN_CUM_MINUS3
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 8/11/2004 5/31/2007
Cross-sections included: 624
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 199024
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.000946 7.15E-05 13.23244 0
D1*D2*D3*D4 -0.002691 0.001266 -2.125301 0.0336
R-squared 0.000023     Mean dependent var 0.000938
Adjusted R-squared 0.000018     S.D. dependent var 0.031851
S.E. of regression 0.031851     Akaike info criterion-4.055485
Sum squared resid 201.9052     Schwarz criterion -4.055383
Log likelihood 403571.4     F-statistic 4.516904
Durbin-Watson stat 0.566578     Prob(F-statistic) 0.033563
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (day 0 to day 3)
Dependent Variable: ABN_CUM_PLUS3
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 8/11/2004 5/28/2007
Cross-sections included: 624
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 197711
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.001209 7.16E-05 16.8744 0
D1*D2*D3*D4 -0.000754 0.001269 -0.594186 0.5524
R-squared 0.000002     Mean dependent var 0.001207
Adjusted R-squared -0.000003     S.D. dependent var 0.031805
S.E. of regression 0.031805     Akaike info criterion-4.058364
Sum squared resid 199.9966     Schwarz criterion -4.058261
Log likelihood 401193.6     F-statistic 0.353057
Durbin-Watson stat 0.570745     Prob(F-statistic) 0.552388 
 
 
Panel A of Table 7.5 shows that the β-coefficient for the period from day -3 to day 0 
is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, it is very 
small in magnitude. The adjusted R-squared for this analysis is again vanishingly 
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small. Clearly, if each of these incidences reflects an attempted manipulative short 
squeeze, they are of limited economic significance to short-sellers. The β-coefficient 
in Panel B is not significantly different from zero. 
 
 
Characteristics of Stock Subject to Apparent Manipulative Short Squeezes 
 
Table 7.6 summarizes the key characteristics (size, volatility, trading volume, 
liquidity and utilisation rate) for each stock and for the portfolio of stocks involved in 
‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’.  
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Rate (at day 
0 as % of 3m 
Average)
1 133.2% 194.8% 176.9% 132.4% 2.5 57.7% 61.2% 10.0 96.9% 6.6 45.3%
2 64.5% 73.1% 87.5% 34.4% 5.7 85.8% 85.9% 15.4 93.2% 11.9 87.9%
3 12.0% 79.3% 337.3% 11.5% 2.5 57.0% 74.2% 59.2 37.4% 3.4 142.4%
4 5.1% 96.9% 3.8% 3.2% 31.9 158.1% 101.8% 61.6 97.2% 37.7 85.1%
5 13.7% 79.2% 26.9% 12.7% 10.2 98.5% 106.5% 59.5 78.7% 3.0 95.6%
6 15.2% 79.8% 28.5% 16.1% 2.0 218.2% 102.0% 28.3 46.0% 0.3 37.2%
7 16.2% 70.0% 290.8% 16.3% 1.2 82.1% 84.7% 222.1 81.2% 1.0 107.1%
8 5.6% 243.6% 40.5% 5.7% 24.6 106.1% 127.2% - - - -
9 73.9% 124.8% 112.9% 69.3% 1.3 52.4% 66.4% 35.8 239.3% 2.3 51.7%
10 31.6% 81.8% 77.6% 23.6% 2.7 110.2% 111.7% - - - -
11 82.6% 70.9% 97.4% 81.0% 3.0 122.8% 118.9% 19.7 87.8% 10.6 96.8%
12 11.3% 90.2% 76.6% 9.3% 11.1 122.6% 110.5% - - - -
13 22.5% 101.8% 282.7% 18.7% 9.2 159.3% 109.1% 21.6 133.0% 19.6 113.5%
14 18.5% 147.0% 98.5% 18.4% 3.9 83.4% 100.2% - - - -
15 13.8% 66.5% 112.6% 10.3% 1.5 82.8% 54.1% - - - -
16 444.8% 114.7% 80.8% 513.7% 5.6 76.9% 68.3% 10.0 111.2% 6.371.8%
17 11.1% 103.6% 101.4% 8.4% 4.2 - - - - - -
18 76.5% 71.6% 126.0% 77.8% 12.2 94.9% 95.6% 10.5 76.3% 29.3 89.0%
19 1860.6% 112.5% 163.9% 2154.0% 3.8 91.9% 98.9% 13.6 - 0.1 -
20 27.9% 62.7% 150.4% 27.4% 5.0 - - - - - -
Mean 147.0% 103.2% 123.6% 162.2% 7.2 103.4% 93.2% 43.6 98.2% 10.285.3%
St. Dev 414.9% 45.9% 89.8% 482.1% 8.0 41.6% 21.0% 57.1 51.3% 11.9 30.2%  
 
 
The majority of stocks have market capitalisations f less than one-fifth the market 
average. This provides some support for the argument that smaller companies are 
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more vulnerable to manipulative short squeezes. However, a small number of large-
cap stocks increase the portfolio mean market capitalisa ion, so that it is above the 
market average. There is some support for the notio that the volatility of returns of 
stocks is elevated ahead of a manipulative short squeeze – stock volatility as 
measured at day 0 during an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’ is slightly above 
its annual average (at 103.2% of annual average) but this result is not statistically 
significant. The mean trading volume is elevated prior to an ‘apparent manipulative 
short squeeze’ compared to its 3 month average, at 123.6% of its 3 month average, 
but again this result is not statistically significant. The majority of stocks have a free 
float value of shares less than one-fifth the market average. This supports the view 
that less liquid stocks are more vulnerable to manipulation. As an alternative measure 
of liquidity, I examine the number of days of normal tr ding volume that it takes 
investors to cover their short positions (The Days to Cover Ratio, or DCR). The 
portfolio mean DCR at day 0 is 103.4% of its three month average, but this result is 
not statistically significant. The percentage of shares on loan is not elevated for 
stocks subject to ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’. In conclusion, there is weak 
support for the notion that manipulative short squeezes are associated with stocks 
with smaller market capitalization and free float, elevated trading volume and 
reduced liquidity.  
 
Using the above observations, I analyse all firms in the dataset to identify stocks that 
display similar qualities to those found in the setof ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeezes’. Specifically, I identify instances where the market cap and free float value 
of a company are below the market average and where t  stock’s DCR and turnover 
are above their 60 day average. If a stock has more than one day when it satisfies 
these conditions, I treat every such occurrence as a separate event. I find 12,909 firm 
days satisfying the conditions described above. However, there is on average no 
price response around these occurrences. This suggets that it is difficult to predict a 
manipulative short squeeze based strictly on these size, trading volume and liquidity 




Jacobs and Levy (2007) argue that if a security does b come subject to a short 
squeeze then a reduction in the supply of loanable stock is usually signalled by a 
decline in the rebate rate offered by prime brokers or by warnings from the prime 
brokers, so the position can be scaled back or covered in advance of any demand that 
borrowed stock be returned. According to this argument, short squeezes are rare and 
can largely be predicted. As such, they pose little thr at to short-sellers. I test this 
argument on my sample of ‘apparent manipulative short squeezes’ by studying stock 
loan utilization rates (a measure of the proportion of available stock to borrow that is 
indeed borrowed) and stock loan fees (i.e. cash return – stock loan rebate rate) 
around the time of the apparent short squeezes. Thee data are shown in the final four 
columns of Table 7.6. I find no evidence that utilizat on rates and stock lending fees 
rise around the time of the apparent manipulative short squeezes. This is not 
consistent with the argument put forward by Jacobs and Levy (2007). I attribute this 
to the fact that my dataset considers the larger UK stocks (market capitalisations of 
£25 million and above) where the availability of stock to borrow is relatively high. 
For smaller stocks, loan availability is more likely to be problematic. My findings 
indicate that it is difficult to predict a manipulative short squeeze using publicly 
available information. It is perhaps this characteris ic - that these are unpredictable 
events that can have economic impact - that has led to the fear of manipulative short 
squeezes amongst practitioners. 
 
 
7.4 Case Study 
 
“This is probably the biggest short squeeze in history”  
The above quote is from Max Warburton, analyst at Snford Bernstein, and is 
reported by Richard Milne of the London Financial Times (see Financial Times, 28th 
October, 2008). Mr Warburton was describing the events surrounding trading in the 
shares of Volkswagen AG during September and October f that year. Volkswagen 
was a large-cap company (one of Germany’s largest companies by market 
capitalization) but had a limited free float. By September, 2008, rival car 
manufacturer Porsche AG had publicly declared a stake of 42.6% of the ordinary 
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shares in Volkswagen AG. A further 20.2% of the ordinary shares were owned by 
the Lower Saxony Land Government – a long-term stock-holder. Thus, the free float 
in Volkswagen ordinary shares was only 37.2% of the firm’s market capitalisation. 
Over a period of time, the relationship between the price of the Volkswagen’s 
ordinary shares and its preference shares had started to diverge from its long-term 
average, and risk-arbitrageurs had increased their sho t positions in the ordinary 
shares of the company. By 24th September 2008, 16.39% of Volkswagen stock was 
on loan. Unbeknownst to the risk-arbitrageurs, Porsche AG had purchased a cash-
settled option position over a further 31.5% of the company. Porsche was not 
required to disclose its ownership of this option position under German financial 
regulations. If this cash-settled option could be converted into Volkswagen stock by 
agreement with the counterparties to the transaction, then Porsche would have 
effective control over 74.1% of the company. Thus, the effective free-float in 
Volkswagen shares was not 37.2% but instead 5.7% of market capitalization - less 
than the short-sellers’ aggregate position. Short-sellers had effectively become 
‘cornered’ - but were unaware of this! As Porsche released news of its option 
position to the market, short-sellers realised thatey were vulnerable to recall risk 
and margin calls. The price of Volkswagen shares rose sharply (by approximately 
400% in a matter of days). The exact cause(s) of this price rise have yet to be fully 
understood. Some possible reasons include pre-emptive short-covering, forced short-
covering after stock loan recall and dynamic hedging by the counter-parties to 
Porsche’s cash-settled options. Volkswagen briefly became the world’s most 
valuable company by market capitalisation, despite deteriorating fundamentals for 
car manufacturers at the time. Figure 7.5 below show  the stock price, trading 










Figure 7.5  Market Data for Volkswagen AG Shares in autumn 2008 
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Porsche later announced that it would sell shares in Volkswagen to facilitate an 
orderly covering of short positions. By November, Porsche revealed that it had made 
a profit of EUR 6.8 billion through its trading of ptions in Volkswagen stock. A 
series of short-sellers announced large losses and the general suspicion arose that the 
short-sellers’ had become the victims of stock manipulation. As a result of these 
suspicions, the German financial regulator initiated an investigation into trading in 
Volkswagen shares and options – this investigation remains ongoing at the time of 
writing. 
 
Figure 7.6 below shows the percentage of shares on loan, the stock loan utilisation 
rate and the average stock loan fee for Volkswagen AG ordinary shares around the 
‘event day’, day 0, defined as the first day on which shares on loan falls after an 
exceptional three day share price rise (25th September, 2008 in this case; well before 






By examining stock lending data around the time of the alleged manipulation, I 
observe that the ordinary shares experienced an exceptional price increase, followed 
by a reduction in shares on loan, and finally a gradual price reversal. This is 
consistent with the pattern of ‘pump, squeeze and dump’ that I use to define an 
‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. In terms of t ck characteristics, Volkswagen 
had a large market–capitalization, limited free float and a high ‘days to cover ratio’. 
Trading volume was elevated and stock return volatility increased sharply in the days 
before the event day. As such, the stock’s characteristics match those from my 
sample of ‘apparent manipulative shot squeezes’ in all but one respect – namely, that 
Volkswagen was a large-cap stock. The stock loan utilisation rate was high at 
49.02% on the event day and rose in the days afterwards (to 55.96% by the fifth day 
after the event day). The stock loan fee also rose, from 0.68% on the event day to 
0.76% by the fifth day afterwards and to 1.40% by the enth day. Thus, the pattern 
observed is consistent with the pattern tested in Section 7.3 using four dummy 
variables as a robustness check. 
 
In summary, the pattern of market data and stock lending data in Volkswagen 
ordinary shares is consistent with my definition of an ‘apparent manipulative short 
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squeeze’. There is the added complication of trading in options as well as ordinary 
shares, and this makes the case study richer than the manipulation that I describe. 
The behaviour of Porsche AG would only be deemed to be manipulation if the firm’s 
intention was to manipulate the ordinary shares of Volkswagen AG. This may never 






By developing a definition for an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’, it becomes 
possible to identify patterns consistent with manipulative short squeezes and to 
investigate the abnormal returns around these events and the characteristics of the 
stocks subject to these events. My findings show that manipulative short squeezes are 
rare events. Out of a sample constituting nearly haf a million firm days, I am able to 
identify only 20 events that satisfy my definition f an ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeeze’. However, where squeezes do occur, short-sellers lose money. I find 
statistically significant abnormal returns around these events that are also 
economically significant with an average cumulative stock return of 3.45% in the 
‘pump’ phase and 2.26% during the ‘squeeze’ phase. Th se are followed by a price 
reversal, but short-sellers who have covered their positions do not benefit from this 
effect. There is some (weak) support for the notion that trading volume and the 
volatility of stock returns is elevated before an ‘apparent manipulative short 
squeeze’. Liquidity is poorer: it takes more days to cover a short position just before 
the squeeze than on average during the previous three months. However, it is 
difficult to forecast short squeezes from this data alone. 
 
A short-seller who fears manipulative short squeezes can take practical steps to 
mitigate this risk. Dechow et al. (2001) explain that short-sellers can pay additional 
fees to borrow on a ‘term basis’ (i.e. for a fixed period of time) rather than on a call 
basis (i.e. with repayment of the loan on demand). However, term loans are not 
common, despite their ability to reduce the risk of a ‘short squeeze’. Another means 
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of managing the risk of a short squeeze is the possibility of borrowing more shares 
than required for short-selling. Excess borrowing results in greater stock lending 
costs, but creates a ‘buffer’: if only a portion of the borrowed shares is recalled, the 
excess shares are delivered first to the lender, so that immediate short covering is not 
required. Both of these techniques incur a cost but reduce the risk of becoming the 
victim of a manipulative short squeeze.  
 
An advantage of the dataset used for this study is that it involves daily data on stock 
lending, providing a level of granularity that is appropriate for studying manipulative 
short squeezes. A limitation of the dataset used is that it includes only the larger 
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange. By showing that manipulative short 
squeezes are rare for larger, more liquid stocks, my results provide support for the 
Jacobs and Levy (2007) assertion that short squeezes generally only affect smaller, 
less liquid stocks. The Volkswagen case provides a rare, but economically 
significant, exception to this pattern. Volkswagen AG was a large-cap stock but with 
a limited free float. This suggests that where liquidity is constrained, even large 
stocks can exhibit patterns consistent with manipulative short squeezes. Whereas my 
interviews show that the fear of manipulative short squeezes acts as a constraint to 
short-selling, I show that this fear is largely unjustified for stocks that tend to be 
shorted by institutional investors (i.e. larger stocks with good liquidity). The 
contribution of this research is that my results should assist in replacing the f ar of 


















There is no upper limit to the price at which a stock can trade. Consequently, there is 
no limit, in theory, to the amount of money that a short-seller can lose. This contrasts 
with the experience of long-only investors, where losses are limited to the amount of 
capital invested. Exposure to unlimited liability can have catastrophic consequences, 
including personal bankruptcy, and is thus an important consideration in risk 
management. My interviews with practicing (and prosective) short-sellers reveal 
that they fear this risk and regard it as an indirect constraint on short-selling. 
Furthermore, they claim to mitigate this risk through the use of ‘stop-losses’, a 
mechanism whereby a trader attempts to close out a position once the loss rises 
above some pre-set threshold. In this chapter, I use the dataset described in Chapter 5 
to examine the response of short-sellers to accounting losses. I find significant 
evidence that short-sellers cover their positions as accounting losses grow. This is 
consistent with short-sellers’ use of stop losses as a risk control mechanism. I relate 
my findings to the literature on loss realization aversion and the ‘disposition effect’, 
an observed regularity in many studies of investor behavior. Evidence that short-
sellers are not averse to realizing losses has important implications for asset pricing 
and market efficiency.  
 
The literature on behavioral finance describes a number of investor biases, or 
apparent divergences from rational behavior. Amongst these is the tendency for 
investors to hold on to their losing stocks too long and sell their winners too early. 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) call this the ‘dispositin effect’. They seek to explain it 
by combining ‘prospect theory’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) with the notion of 
‘mental accounting’ (Thaler, 1985). Prospect theory modifies expected utility theory 
                                                
* This chapter forms the basis of a University of Edinburgh Working Paper entitled “Short-Sellers, 
Losses and Short-Covering” by James Clunie, Peter Moles and Tatiana Pyatigorskaya. The paper was 
presented at the Midwest Finance Association confere ce in Chicago in March, 2009. 
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in two ways, leading to predictions consistent with investors being averse to realizing 
losses. First, individuals assess outcomes through the change they bring to their 
current situation (or other reference state) and not through their effect on overall 
wealth. Second, prospect theory assumes that utility functions are concave for gains 
and convex for losses (but steeper to attain overall risk aversion). Thus, losses (from 
a reference state) are perceived by individuals as larger than positive changes of the 
same magnitude.  Mental accounting provides a framework for the way investors set 
reference points for the accounts that determine gains and losses. Where an investor 
creates separate ‘mental accounts’ for profits in each stock position and applies 
prospect theory to each account (ignoring interaction effects), a disposition effect 
would be observed. Whereas prospect theory suggests a pure preference-based 
explanation for the disposition effect, Shefrin and Statman (1985) suggest that 
psychological explanations also contribute to this phenomenon. An aversion to 
realizing losses is believed to have its roots in people’s desire to avoid feelings of 
shame, regret and blame from others. 
 
Early empirical studies into the disposition effect and loss aversion involved 
experiments on students. Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1984) and Bonner and 
Pennington (1991) argue that student samples are not representative of the whole 
population and the majority of the later experimental studies were performed using 
different groups of market practitioners, including off-floor futures traders (Heisler, 
1994), mutual fund managers (Brown et al, 1996), sellers in the housing market 
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and participants in the automobile market (Johnson et
al., 2006). Odean (1998) tests the ‘disposition effect’ using customer account data 
from a discount brokerage house. He finds that the propensity to sell a stock declines 
as losses increase, consistent with ‘prospect theory’. He also observes selling of 
losing stocks in December by investors who presumably use the end of the tax year 
as a self-control mechanism.  
 
Burns (1985) and Holt and Villamil (1986) argue that due to training, regulation and 
other factors, the behavior of financial professionals is expected to differ from that of 
‘ordinary individuals’. Locke and Mann (2000) find evidence to support the 
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existence of a disposition effect amongst professional floor futures traders: traders 
hold losing traders longer then winning trades and the average position size for 
losing trades is larger than that for winning trades. However, they also find that 
relative aversion to realizing losses is negatively r lated to contemporaneous and 
future relative trading success. Coval and Shumway (2001) find evidence of 
additional intra-day risk taking as a response to morning losses amongst professional 
market makers at the Chicago Board of Trade. Garvey and Murphy (2004) examine 
data on a US proprietary stock-trading team and finevidence that the traders hold 
on to losing positions too long and sell their winners too soon. Shapira and Venezia 
(2000) find that the disposition effect is pervasive amongst their sample of clients of 
an Israeli brokerage firm. However, it is less preval nt amongst professional 
investors than amongst amateurs. Brown et al. (2002) examine daily Australian 
Stock Exchange share data and find that the disposition effect is pervasive across 
investor classes but that it is less pronounced amongst traders instigating larger 
investments. This observation is “consistent with the notion that professional training 
and expertise reduces judgmental bias”. Frino et al. (2004) compare the behavior of 
floor traders to that of off-floor traders and identify greater loss aversion amongst the 
former. Cici (2005) study 517 actively managed funds in the USA and find that 37% 
of the sample funds are affected by the ‘disposition effect’. Furthermore, the 
‘disposition effect’ has an economically and statisically significant negative effect 
on fund performance. Dhar and Zhu (2008) examine the trading records of a 
brokerage firm to identify individual differences in the disposition bias. They find 
empirical evidence that wealthier investors, and those in professional occupations, 
exhibit the disposition effect to a lesser extent. Furthermore, approximately one fifth 
of investors in their sample exhibit behavior opposite to the disposition effect. 
Although Shefrin (2002) argues that “Get-evenitis [i.e. aversion to realizing losses] 
afflicts both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors”, there is evidence in the 
literature that the disposition effect can be moderated amongst larger, more 
experienced investors.    
   
Widespread aversion to realizing losses can have important implications for asset 
pricing. Locke and Mann (2000) suggest that behavior l biases could affect asset 
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pricing through market microstructure. Accordingly, “evidence that professional 
traders also exhibit alternative behavioral tendencies would provide increased 
support for research on the systemic effects of behavioral financial models”. Barberis 
et al. (2001) integrate ‘loss aversion’ into an asset pricing model and show that their 
enhanced model has superior predictive power to alterna ive models. Rabin and 
Thaler (2001) use ‘loss aversion’ to help explain some of the anomalies in expected 
utility theory. Grinblatt and Han (2004) develop a model of equilibrium asset prices 
driven by mental accounting and prospect theory, so a  to generate outcomes 
consistent with the empirical evidence on the disposition effect. In the model, the 
differences between a stock’s market price and its aggregate cost basis is positively 
related to the stock’s expected future return. This creates a spread between a stock’s 
fundamental value and its equilibrium price, and an under-reaction to information. 
They argue that fully rational arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the impact of the 
disposition effect on equilibrium prices for a variety of reasons, including noise 
trader risk and capital constraints. Thus, a pervasive disposition effect amongst 
investors can influence the pricing of assets.  
 
Da Silva Rosa et al. (2005) state that: “the disposition effect…challenges precepts of 
rationality underpinning neo-classical theories of financial markets.” However, a 
defence against such a challenge would emerge if itcan be shown that the 
‘disposition effect’ reflects only the behaviour of unsophisticated investors who are 
price followers rather than price setters. Accordingly, an examination into the 
behaviour of short-sellers with respect to loss realization is important. Short-sellers 
are widely regarded in the literature as sophisticated and ‘well-informed’ market 
participants (see, for example, Senchack and Starks, 1993; Dechow et al., 2001; 
Ackert and Athanassakos, 2005; and Boehmer et al., 2008). Short-selling is an 
integral component of arbitrage, a process that in neo-classical finance involves 
traders exploiting asset pricing anomalies and in so doing, helping to set asset prices 
and keep markets efficient. It is important to identify if short-sellers suffer from the 
disposition effect, as evidence of a systematic bias amongst short-sellers could have 
important implications for asset pricing and market efficiency. This study explores 




Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) examine the behavior of short-sellers after 
changes in stock prices. Making use of monthly data (157 months) on short interest 
obtained from NASDAQ, the authors find that short-sellers cover their positions after 
stock prices rise (i.e. after negative returns for short-sellers). Gamboa-Cavazos and 
Savor use subsequent returns as a proxy for expected re urns and argue that such 
short-covering cannot be explained by expected returns. The authors interpret their 
results as evidence that short-sellers cannot or will not maintain short positions after 
suffering losses, thus “making arbitrage less effectiv  than envisioned by the 
efficient market hypothesis.” They put forward two suggestions to explain their 
results: capital constraints (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and ‘myopic loss 
aversion’ (see Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis and Huang, 2001; and Haigh and 
List, 2005). This study builds on the work of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) by 
introducing higher frequency data and a methodology that examines short-covering 
as a response to accounting losses as well as to stock price increases. I incorporate a 
technique for estimating the volume weighted averag price at which short positions 
are initiated and employ panel data regression analysis on daily data with cross-
sectional dummies and clustered by time period standard errors. I find significant 
evidence that short-sellers cover their positions as accounting losses grow and not 
simply in response to rising stock prices. This is consistent with my interview 
findings that short-sellers employ stop-losses as a ri k-control mechanism. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 describes the 
methodology used. Section 8.3 contains results. Section 8.4 contains discussion and 
analysis. Section 8.5 concludes.   
 
 
8.2   Methodology 
 
A number of well-regarded papers use publicly available, monthly US data on short-
interest (e.g., Figlewski and Webb, 1993; Dechow et al., 2001; Gamboa-Cavazos and 
Savor, 2007). However, short-sellers are renowned for their short time horizons (see, 
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for example, Boehmer et al., 2008) and monthly data fails to capture intra-month 
trading. I use the daily data described in Chapter 5. This provides greater granularity 
than monthly data, and so assists in better understanding the activities of short-
sellers.  
 
At its foundation, this research employs a method of regression analysis in the spirit 
of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007). However, this sudy differs in a number of 
ways. Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) use the following regression specification: 
their main independent variable is ‘returns’ (in different forms throughout the study) 
and their dependent variable is the change in short interest. They also include a set of 
control variables intended to act as a proxy for short-sale constraints in the market. 
This specification, therefore, shows the impact on the change in short interest as 
returns change, i.e. the coefficient for returns tells us about change in the change in 
short interest. Although of interest, this does not directly tell us the direction of the 
change in short interest. I include the Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor specification in 
this study but I first aim to establish the link betw en returns and short interest. To do 
this, I use the Percentage of Market Capitalization on Loan as the dependent variable 
- the coefficient for returns in this specification tells us about the magnitude and 
direction of the change in short interest. If the coefficient is negative and the 
difference from zero is statistically significant, this allows me to reject a null 
hypothesis that short-sellers do not close their positions in response to price changes. 
To mitigate the problem of positive skewness in thedistribution of the market 
capitalization on loan series (see Section 5.4), I also run regressions using the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization on loan as the dependent variable. 
 
I also note that using stock returns as an independent variable can result in confusion 
- in Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) an increase in returns essentially stands for 
the loss that short sellers face. Greater clarity is achieved by using stock price as the 
independent variable - it acts as a proxy for ‘loss’ in the same way as returns do (as 
they move in the same direction) and it is sufficient to establish the link between the 
loss-proxy and the short sellers’ response. A more important reason for using price 
instead of returns as the independent variable in the first stage of the analysis, 
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however, is that it makes an easier link with the second stage of the analysis, where I 
introduce a superior proxy for loss that reveals whether short-sellers react solely to 
price changes or whether they are driven in their actions by accounting losses. To 
create this superior proxy for loss, I require an estimate of the cost basis for short-
sellers’ positions in each stock.  
 
Estimating the cost-basis for short-sellers’ positions 
 
A limitation of the Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor paper is that the authors do not 
account for the price at which a short position is in tiated (henceforth I refer to this as 
the ‘cost basis’ of a short position). The cost basis of a position is important because 
it is the difference between this and the market price of a security that determines if a 
position is at an accounting profit or loss. I build on the Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor 
study by incorporating a method for estimating the av rage cost basis of short-sellers 
into the regression analysis. I estimate the average cost basis of short-sellers using a 
procedure similar to the volume weighted average purchase price technique used by 
Brown et al. (2002) for long-only investors. I take stock prices and the number of 
shares on loan for the first company in the dataset nd identify the first occasion in 
the series when the number of shares on loan increases. I assume that this increase in 
shares on loan represents shares borrowed for the purpose of short-selling and 
estimate the price at which this was done as the average of the opening and closing 
prices for the stock on that date. This becomes my initial estimate of the cost basis of 
all short positions for this stock. This estimate is updated on the next occasion when 
shares on loan increases (I ignore days when ‘share on loan’ is unchanged or 
decreases, as there are no net new short positions established on these days). With 
each additional estimate of the price at which shares re shorted for a particular day, 
I refine my previous estimate of the cost basis of all short sellers. To do this, I 
calculate the weighted average cost basis at which t e positions were established, 
weighted by the number of shares shorted on each ocasion. This approach allows 
me to gradually build my estimate, based on published data. As the estimate is 
updated each day on which there is a rise in shares on loan, the estimate is expected 
to improve over time. Cohen et al. (2007) find that almost half of securities lending 
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contracts are closed out within two weeks and the median contract length is 11 days. 
Accordingly, the formation period for each stock in the sample should cover at least 
several weeks. As early estimates are likely to be poor, I choose a formation period 
of one year. The whole procedure is repeated for the next stock and so on. 
Regression analysis is undertaken using the period after the one-year formation 
period. However, the ‘estimated cost basis’ for each stock is updated every day 
beyond the formation period. The ‘estimated cost basis’ is incorporated into the 
regression analysis in the following manner. The difference between the ‘estimated 
cost basis’ and the share price is found for each occasion that a company’s share 
price rises above the ‘estimated cost basis’ - thisrepresents the short sellers’ 
accounting loss. For ease of interpretation the absolute values of this series is taken. 
In the second stage of analysis this loss series enters the regressions along with the 
price variable. This is done to see whether short-sellers react to the price change or 
instead to the accounting loss, as price might have its own effect on the ‘percentage 
of market capitalization on loan’ series, independent of the accounting loss.      
 
Throughout the study, I incorporate control variables into the regressions, in a similar 
fashion to Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007). These control variables are market 
capitalization, market-to-book ratio and free float number of shares, where the latter 
is used as an alternative to institutional ownership as employed by Gamboa-Cavazos 
and Savor. I consider both institutional ownership and free float number of shares to 
be proxies for the same factor – availability of stock loans. Because Gamboa-
Cavazos and Savor use monthly data, their control variables (and right hand-side 
variables in general) enter the regressions in lagged form (i.e., the last month’s 
observations are control variables for this month). In contrast, as this study benefits 
from a daily dataset, the right-hand side variables are not in lagged form. To 
summarize, this study runs the following set of regressions. For the first stage of the 
analysis: 
 
Market Capitalization on Loan (%)t =               
α + β(lnPricet) + γ(Market Capitalizationt) + δ(Market-to-Book ratiot) + λ(Free Float number of 






ln(Market Capitalization on Loan)t =  
α + β(lnPricet) + γ(Market Capitalizationt) + δ(Market-to-Book ratiot) + λ(Free Float number of 
Sharest) + ut         (8.2)  
 
For the second stage: 
 
Market Capitalization on Loan (%)t =  
α + θ(lnLosst) + β(lnPricet) + γ(Market Capitalizationt) + δ(Market-to-Book ratiot) + λ(Free Float 




ln(Market Capitalization on Loan)t =  
α + θ(lnLosst) + β(lnPricet) + γ(Market Capitalizationt) + δ(Market-to-Book ratiot) + λ(Free Float 
number of Sharest) + ut        (8.4) 
 
For the third stage, I introduce lagged forms of the loss series into the regressions to 
see if their effect diminishes with time. I also investigate the regression based solely 
on the top quintile of the loss series.  
 
In the fourth stage of the analysis, I consider the c ange in short interest (i.e. change 
in the percentage of market capitalization on loan) as the dependent variable, similar 
to the work by Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor: 
 
∆(Market Capitalization on Loan) =  
α + θ(lnLosst) + β(lnPricet) + γ(Market Capitalizationt) + ς(Market Capitalization on Loant) + 
δ(Market-to-Book ratiot) + λ(Free Float number of Sharest) + ut   (8.5) 
 
where the series ‘market capitalization on loan’ on the right-hand side acts as an 




For each regression, I take care of the firm effect parametrically by including firm 
dummies and use clustered by time period standard errors to eliminate the non-fixed 
time effect. This contrasts with Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007), who employ the 
Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure for their regression analysis. This latter procedure 
is designed to eliminate the time effect in panel data. However, panel data can also 
have a firm effect and if the Fama-MacBeth method is used in such a context, it 
would produce biased estimates. Gamboa-Cavazos and S vor do not correct the 
standard errors for potential autocorrelations of the cross-sectional regression 
estimates, arguing that their standard errors will be at most overstated by a factor of 
1.2. Even where the Fama-MacBeth method is adjusted to take account of the firm 
effect, Petersen (2009) shows that it would still produce biased results. Petersen 
recommends starting with an analysis of the dataset to find out whether there is a 
time effect, firm effect, or both, and whether those effects are permanent or 
temporary. In the spirit of Petersen, I investigate th  dataset to determine the most 
appropriate procedure. As a starting point, it is reasonable to assume that the dataset 
has some firm effect, i.e. the residuals for a particular company are correlated along 
the time period, and this is corroborated by an inspection of the correlograms. In 
other words, there are factors that are not explicitly included in our regressions that 
influence the dependent variable (percentage of market capitalization on loan) that 
are either constant or changing over time, but thatdiffer from firm to firm. Such 
factors could, for example, be a firm’s management capabilities or its competitive 
advantage. It is difficult to evaluate whether this factor stays constant over the entire 
sample period or, say, decays over time. Mauboussin and Johnson (1997) show that a 
firm’s competitive advantage period generally varies b tween two and twenty years. 
This suggests that any qualitative judgment would be highly subjective.  
 
Secondly, I consider that the dataset might have some time effect (this assumption is 
also corroborated by the findings of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor). In other words, 
any market shock would affect all firms in the market to some extent. This is 
particularly relevant for my sample, where all the stocks are traded on one exchange. 
The question, however, remains as to whether or not all firms would be affected to 
the same extent by such a shock. It is reasonable to hypothesize that some firm 
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effects and time effects are present. Any effects will include a fixed part, because 
temporary effects can always be adjusted so as to incorporate a fixed component. On 
this basis, I include firm and time dummies in the regression to take care of the fixed 
components of the firm effects and time effects. I next employ quantitative analysis 
to check whether there is a temporary component of the irm and time effects. This is 
done by comparing (for each regression) the standard errors clustered by time period 
and the standard errors clustered by firm to the benchmark of the White standard 
errors. Because each type of standard error is already adjusted for the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, the difference between standard er ors would be the result of 
temporary effects. As each regression also includes firm dummies and time dummies 
to take care of any fixed effects, if the standard errors clustered by firm, for example, 
are very different from White standard errors, then there is a firm effect in the data 
that has not been eliminated by the firm dummies. In other words, because firm 
dummies eliminate fixed firm effects, there must also be a temporary firm effect in 
the data.  
 
For each of the six main types of regression equations (Equations 8.1 to 8.5 above 
plus the regression for the top quintile of the loss series), the regression analysis was 
run three times, each time with different types of standard error: White, clustered by 
firm and clustered by time period. Table 8.1 presents these three types of standard 














Table 8.1 Comparison of Standard Errors 
For each of the six main types of regression equation, the regression analysis was run three times, 
each time with different types of standard errors: White, clustered by firm and clustered by time 




For each of the six panels in Table 8.1 above, it can be seen that the first two types of 
standard errors (White and clustered by firm) are very similar, while the third one is 
quite different. This suggests that my data has fixed firm effects and temporary time 
effects. In such a situation, Petersen recommends taking care of the firm effect 
parametrically (by including firm dummies) and using clustered by time period 
standard errors to eliminate the non-fixed time effct. Time dummies are also kept in 
the regressions for the reasons discussed above. The results of these regressions are 
reported in section 8.3 below. 
 
Finally, if evidence emerges that short-sellers cover their positions in response to 
losses, it is natural to question if this short-covering has a cost to short-sellers, in the 
sense that stocks under-perform subsequent to short-covering. Having covered their 
positions, short-sellers would fail to benefit from any such under-performance and 
this would represent an opportunity cost. For each stock, I identify each occasion that 
the stock price rises above the estimated weighted-av rage cost basis for short-
sellers, and where the number of shares on loan falls on that day and also on the 
following day, indicating short-covering. For each of these occasions, I calculate the 
cumulative abnormal stock return for 5, 10 and 30 days after the day on which the 
stock price rises above the short-sellers’ cost basis. I form a portfolio of such stocks 
and test the hypotheses of zero cumulative abnormal returns for the 5, 10 and 30 day 
periods. The portfolio of stocks is equally-weighted, in order to prevent a small 
number of large-capitalization stocks from defining the results for the whole sample.  
 
     
8.3 Results 
 
Table 8.2 below presents the results of the regression analysis using ‘percentage of 






Table 8.2 Regression Output with Percentage of Market Cap on Loan as Dependent 
Variable 
Panel A considers the link between share price as a proxy for loss and the short sellers’ response using 
the specification given in Equation 8.1. The accounting loss variable is introduced in Panel B, first 
using the specification given in Equation 8.3 and then making use of a lagged loss variable in the 
second and third regression specifications. Panel C uses a regression specification with only log of 
loss as an independent variable. Panel D uses the regr ssion specification in Equation 8.5, where 





Panel A in Table 8.2 shows that the coefficient for the price variable is negative and 
statistically significant (at the 5% significance lvel), providing evidence that as 
share price rises, short-sellers close their positions. Specifically, it implies that a 1% 
increase in share price results in approximately a 1.06% decrease in market 
capitalization on loan. Note that the coefficient for the ‘market to book ratio’ control 
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level, 
suggesting short-sellers’ preference for ‘value’ stocks. This appears surprising at first 
sight. A possible explanation for this lies in the specific characteristics of the sample. 
In particular, micro-capitalization stocks are not present in the database (the smallest 
stock has a market capitalization of around £25million, or USD 40 million), and 
amongst ‘glamour’ (i.e. not-value) stocks, it is micro-capitalization stocks that short-
sellers might be expected to target, subject to stock l an availability (see Fama and 
French, 1993). The percentage of free float shares variable, a control variable for 
short sale constraints, is not significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test. A 
plausible explanation for this is that the majority of firms in the sample have a large 
free float, as noted in the descriptive statistics section. In fact, only 32 (out of 681) 
stocks have a mean percentage of free float shares below 40%. Thus, short sale 
constraints do not appear to significantly influenc this sample of stocks. 
 
In Panel B, the accounting loss variable is introduced to the analysis. The price 
variable is retained as it could have its own effect on the market capitalization on 
loan besides being a proxy for the loss. Results from the first regression in Panel B 
show that the coefficient for the accounting loss variable is negative and weakly 
significant (at the 10% significance level). The coefficient for the price variable is no 
longer statistically significant. This suggests that short sellers cover their positions in 
response to accounting losses and not simply in response to rising share prices. With 
regard to the control variables, a similar explanation applies as for the stage above. 
Benefiting from the daily dataset, I am also able to xamine the relationship between 
short-interest and lagged accounting losses. In the second and third specifications of 
Panel B, the loss variable is replaced with a lagged loss variable (a one day and two 
day lag, respectively). The coefficient on the loss variable that is lagged by one day, 
although statistically significant, is smaller than the coefficient on the non-lagged 
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loss variable and the coefficient on the loss variable lagged by two days is smaller 
than the coefficient on the loss variable lagged by one day. This highlights the 
advantages of using daily data in understanding the actions of short-sellers. Indeed, 
these results suggest that many short sellers (but not all) react to a loss quickly 
(within one day). However, as short-sellers are not a homogenous group, some might 
react to losses only when, for example, accumulated losses lead to margin calls or 
amount to a certain percentage of capital. Furthermore, individual short-sellers will 
each have different cost bases. 
 
It can also be noted that the explanatory power of the regression described above is 
high – the adjusted R2 being 66%. I run a regression with only the loss variable on 
the right-hand side of the regression equation and present this in Panel C. The 
adjusted R2 of this regression is around 65% - almost the same s the explanatory 
power of the previous regression.  
 
Panel D presents the results of a regression where t  dependent variable is the 
change in the market capitalization on loan (similar to the approach undertaken by 
Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor). The coefficients of the variables are much smaller than 
the coefficients of the previous regression specifications, although most are 
statistically highly significant. The explanatory power of this regression (R2 is 
around 2% and adjusted R2 is around 1%) is also far smaller than the explanatory 
powers of the previous regressions. This is, however, not surprising as coefficients 
here represent change in the change of the market capitalization on loan. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the coefficients and of the explanatory power is in 
line with those found by Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor. It is also important to mention 
the interpretation of these coefficients. The coefficient on the loss variable (positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% significance level) tells us that the greater the 
loss, the greater the change in the market capitaliza ion on loan. In other words, large 
losses trigger a stronger reaction among short-seller . This result has an intuitive 




To mitigate the problem of positive skewness in thedistribution of the market 
capitalization on loan series (see Section 5.4), I also run regressions using the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization on loan as the dependent variable. Results are 
shown in Table 8.3 below: 
 
Table 8.3 Results using Log of Market Cap on Loan as Dependent Variable 
Panel A considers the link between share price as a proxy for loss and the short sellers’ response using 
the specification given in Equation 8.2. The accounting loss variable is introduced in Panel B, first 
using the specification given in Equation 8.4 and then making use of a lagged loss variable in the 
second and third regression specifications. Panel C uses a regression specification with only log of 




Although broadly similar, I observe a number of differences between the results in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3. Specifically, in Panel A, the log of price variable is no longer 
statistically significant. In Panel B of Table 8.3, the coefficient on the accounting 
loss variable is negative and now statistically signif cant at the 1% level. At the same 
time, the coefficient on the price variable remains ignificant. This provides 
statistically significant evidence that short-sellers cover their positions in response to 
accounting losses, rather than simply to price increases. This is a key finding and a 
distinction from the findings of Gamboa-Cavazos andSavor.  
 
I test the robustness of the main regression specification using a restricted sample of 
the top quintile of the loss series. This subset represents the ‘large loss’ series. 
Regression results are shown in Panel D of Table 8.3. The coefficient of the loss 
variable is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% significance level) with the 
stock price and free float number of shares variables eing statistically insignificant. 
The explanatory power of this regression is also large, with the adjusted R2 being 
around 77%. The coefficient of the loss variable from this regression is of greater 
magnitude than the equivalent coefficient from the regression on the non-restricted 
sample presented in the Panel B. This suggests that shor -covering as a response to 
accounting losses is greater for larger losses.       
 
Next, I test for short covering at different levels from simply the average cost basis 
of short-sellers. In particular, I examine when stock prices reach 2.5% and 5% above 
the cost basis. This is inspired by the belief (gained from interviews with short-
sellers) that some short-sellers force themselves to sell positions once losses exceed a 
pre-defined threshold. Such mechanisms are generally known as ‘stop-losses’. The 
methodology of this section is similar to that in the rest of the paper. The difference, 
however, lies in the fact that in order to examine short covering at 2.5% and 5% 
above the cost basis, the loss series is presented i  relative or percentage terms 
(relative to price) and then only those data points that were above 2.5% (5%) were 
recorded (the loss series here is in absolute values). Then the logarithm of this series 
was taken before it entered the regression. The form of the regression is similar to 
that in the rest of the study. Table 8.4 shows that t e coefficient on the loss variable 
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becomes more economically and statistically significant at higher levels above the 




Loss Price Mkt Cap Mkt-to-book Free Float
-0.0822 0.1643 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0041 3.6794
(0.0851) (0.8224) (0.0028) (0.0000) (0.5362) (0.3807)
-0.2226 0.4469 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0044 2.2407
(0.0209) (0.5666) (0.0027) (0.0000) 0.5285) (0.6176)
-0.3476 0.7109 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0055 1.0842
(0.009) (0.4004) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.4638) (0.8239)








It is natural to consider if there is a cost, in terms of investment performance, to 
short-sellers who make use of stop losses. Table 8.5 below presents the cumulative 
abnormal returns for stocks that have risen above the corresponding estimated 
weighted-average cost basis for short-sellers, and where short-covering has taken 
place.  
 
5 days 10 days 30 days
Mean 0.00106 0.00226 0.00844
Standard Deviation 0.0294 0.0427 0.0704
Degrees of Freedom 15760 15613 15069
t-stat 4.511 6.621 14.727
Probability (2-tails) 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000
The Table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated on an
equal-weighted basis for all stocks from days on which two conditions are
met: the stock rises above the estimated weighted-average cost basis for
short-sellers of that stock; and the number of shares on loan falls that
same day and the following day. CARs are calculated for 5,10 and 30 days
after each day on which the two conditions are met. 
Table 8.5 Cumulative Abnormal Returns after Short-Covering
 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns for 5, 10 and 30 days after the day on which the stock 
rises above the estimated short-sellers’ cost basis are all positive and statistically 
significant. There is, however, an endogeneity problem associated with such 
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situations: the act of short covering could have market impact, leading in and of itself 
to stock price increases. It is thus difficult to interpret the above as evidence that 
short-covering in response to losses prevents further losses to a short-seller. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is no evidence of an investment performance 
cost (other than transaction costs) to short-sellers from immediate short covering 
upon loss. From the perspective of a risk manager proposing the use of stop losses, 
this is an important finding.   
 
 
8.4   Discussion and Analysis 
 
I find significant evidence that short-sellers cover their positions in response to 
accounting losses. This finding is inconsistent with the notion that short-sellers are 
averse to realizing losses. This has important implications for asset pricing. Aversion 
to realizing losses is a bias observed in empirical studies of many types of market 
participants, including some professional investors. However, I show that this bias is 
not present amongst short-sellers, a sub-set of market participants that is particularly 
associated with arbitrage and price setting. 
 
A possible interpretation is that short-sellers are naturally less prone to loss 
realization aversion than other investors. Alternatively, those short-sellers that are 
free from this bias could prove more successful and gain a greater share of capital, 
such that short-sellers in aggregate appear not to suffer from loss realization 
aversion. Locke and Mann (2000) show that “there is ev dence that trading success is 
negatively related to the degree of loss realization aversion.” Short-sellers aware of 
such evidence might respond by adapting their behavior so as to remove this bias. 
The literature provides examples of the use of trading rules to control against 
behavioral errors. Taffler (2001) notes that some market traders retreat from 
positions once losses exceed some pre-specified threshold (e.g. 10% of position 
size). In fact, Taffler, among others, recommends such rules to conquer 
psychological biases: “…we can overcome the operation of loss aversion to some 
extent by the use of rules to enforce self-control…” Shefrin (2002) describes the end 
238 
 
of December as an end of tax-year threshold that induces US investors to close their 
positions and to accept losses.   
 
A further plausible explanation, however, is that short-sellers employ risk control 
mechanisms that have the effect of mitigating loss realization aversion. Although 
neither legal nor contractual constraints force short-sellers to close their positions at 
any particular level of loss, there are practical reasons to cover short positions in 
response to accounting losses. A key reason is that short-sellers face theoretically 
unlimited losses. By systematically crystallizing small losses through the use of stop 
losses, short-sellers are able to contain this risk. Moreover, popular risk control 
mechanisms such as dynamic hedging and the imposition of position limits are 
consistent with realizing losses in short positions. I  my interviews, a number of 
short-sellers claim to use risk control mechanisms such as ‘stop losses’, whereby 
they would close any position that had either fallen to an accounting loss, fallen to a 
percentage loss greater than some pre-defined level, or made a negative contribution 
to portfolio returns that exceed some pre-defined threshold (e.g. a -0.5% contribution 
to portfolio returns). That is, short-sellers in practice employ stop-losses as a risk 
control mechanism and this has the side-effect of disciplining them against loss 
realization aversion. 
 
The literature on stock price momentum effects alsooffers an explanation for short-
sellers covering positions in response to losses. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) 
show that momentum strategies (‘buying winners and selling losers’) based on prior 
performance can generate significantly positive returns for holding periods of 3 to 12 
months. Short-sellers might believe that short positions that fall to a loss shall 
continue to experience losses in the future. Although subject to an endogeneity 
problem, Table 8.5 shows that there is a statistically significant (albeit economically 
modest) momentum effect for such stocks on a 5, 10 and 30 day horizon.  
 
The desire to maintain portfolio diversification provides a further alternative 
explanation for short-covering. For long-investors, winning positions grow in size 
relative to losing positions. Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) argue that long- investors 
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could sell winners to restore portfolio diversification. However, short-sellers 
experience the opposite effect (see Section 4.6). As losing positions grow, it is 
credible to reduce or eliminate such positions to maintain portfolio diversification. 
Thus, the observed realization of losses amongst short- ellers is consistent with a 
desire to maintain portfolio diversification. 
 
For taxable investors, there could be tax advantages associated with crystallizing 
losses. However, it is widely believed that short-selling is concentrated amongst 
funds that generally operate in tax-free, ‘offshore’ environments. Accordingly, tax 
reasons are a less likely explanation of the observed esults. 
 
Constrained capital provides another plausible explanation for the tendency of short-
sellers to cover in response to accounting losses.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
that arbitrageurs in practice are generally agents working for owners of capital. 
Arbitrageurs face the risk that poorly-informed, disillusioned investors will withdraw 
their capital in response to accounting losses at the portfolio level, even though the 
underlying positions might be attractive. This gives arbitrageurs a strong incentive to 
avoid losses at the portfolio level. By systematically ccepting small losses in 
individual stocks, this reduces the risk of large losses in individual stocks that might 
cause the overall portfolio to fall into loss. An additional consideration is that short 
positions that fall to an accounting loss could require the provision of further margin 
or collateral (to protect the stock lender or counter-party to a synthetic short 
position). This could lead to additional strain on the limited capital available to short-
sellers. Such strain is mitigated by covering short positions that fall to a loss. 
Constrained capital is one of two suggestions put forward by Gamboa-Cavazos and 
Savor (2007) to explain their results.  
 
Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) also suggest ‘myopic l ss aversion’ as an 
explanation for their observation that short-sellers cover their positions after stock 
prices fall. They argue that short-sellers could be loss averse, with the degree of loss 
aversion depending on prior gains and losses. After experiencing losses, short-sellers 
would become more loss averse and so would cover thei positions. Fellner and 
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Sutter (2008) conduct a series of experiments in a long-only environment to identify 
the causes of ‘myopic loss aversion’ and find that in ppropriately short investment 
horizons and high feedback frequency contribute almost equally to this phenomenon. 
My interviews in Chapter 4 show that short-sellers are often characterized as ‘traders 
and not investors’ and so are likely to be associated with short investment horizons 
and high feedback frequency. However, under an effici nt markets framework, a 
short position in a risky security has a negative expected return. Only with a 
mispricing story will the risky security have a positive expected return, and even 
then, only in the short-term because of the negative beta problem (Dyl, 1975). 
Myopic loss aversion - which manifests itself in a tendency to shun attractive long-
term investments because of an aversion to short-term losses – should not apply to 
situations involving negative long-term expected returns. Indeed, given that a 
mispricing story is required to make un-hedged short-selling worthwhile, accepting 
losses appears rational for two reasons: first, if a short-seller believes that the market 
has mispriced a stock, but finds his short position falling to a loss, this suggests that 
his original mispricing thesis could be mistaken. Accepting the mistake (covering the 
short position) is rational in light of the negative expected long-term return. Second, 
it should be clear to the short-seller that as a position falls to a loss, synchronization 
risk (concerned with uncertainty about the market timing decisions of other rational 
arbitrageurs and thus the timing of the price correction) is heightened. Abreu and 
Brunermeier (2002) suggest ‘delayed arbitrage’ as aresponse to synchronization risk. 
This would entail short covering and returning to short the stock when other 
arbitrageurs have learned of the over-valuation. 
 
My findings contribute to the literature on loss realization aversion and the 
‘disposition effect’. I show that a sophisticated group of traders, strongly associated 
with price setting, is not averse to realizing losses. In related work, Brown et al. 
(2002) examine the behavior of investors in Australian stocks across different levels 
of investor sophistication. They find that the dispo ition effect is observed for all 
categories of investor but that “traders instigating larger investments tend to be less, 
if not entirely unaffected by the disposition bias.” Da Silva Rosa et al. (2005) 
observe that (long-only) UK managed funds do not exhibit the behavioral bias 
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associated with the disposition effect, once size (a proxy for liquidity) and market-to-
book (a proxy for value) are taken into account. Thus, empirical evidence is 
emerging to show that larger and more sophisticated investors, who are most likely 
to set prices in markets, do not appear to suffer from the disposition effect. 
 
There is, however, a potential problem for short-sellers arising from their response to 
accounting losses. The systematic crystallization of losses represents a form of 
predictable behavior. By knowing (or being able to estimate) the capital strength and 
cost basis of short-sellers, predators should be able to anticipate short-covering and 
so position themselves to benefit from the market impact of such trades. This is 
similar to the pattern described by Chen et al. (2006), whereby predators anticipate 
rebalancing by index funds and take advantage of the market impact of index fund 
investors. Furthermore, it could be possible for one r more manipulators to induce 
short-covering by placing buy orders when a stock price is close to the cost basis of 
short-sellers. Where the market impact of such trades pushes the stock price above 
the cost basis of short-sellers, short-covering ensu s, placing further upwards 
pressure on the stock price when liquidity is constrained. The manipulator closes his 






This study fills an important gap in the literature on loss-aversion with respect to a 
sophisticated sub-set of investors. It improves upon existing research in a number of 
ways. First, it benefits from the use of daily data, which is better suited than monthly 
data for studying short-selling activity. Secondly, it builds upon the extant 
methodology for this type of study by incorporating i to the analysis an estimate of 
the average price at which short positions are initiated. This permits a study of short-




I find that short-sellers close their positions in response to accounting losses and not 
simply in response to rising share prices. This is a key finding and a distinction from 
the findings of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007). Short-sellers do not exhibit an 
aversion to realizing accounting losses, but instead accept their losses or ‘mistakes’ 
systematically. Stocks subject to short-covering in this manner do not subsequently 
under-perform the market, and so there is no evidence of an investment performance 
cost (other than transaction costs) associated withimmediately covering short 
positions that fall to an accounting loss. These findings should be of interest to 
researchers in behavioral finance and to market practitioners involved in short-selling 
and risk management. They not only shows that some biases can be controlled, but 
also that some of the techniques that assist in overc ming them are already in place 























 9. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
9.1 Main Findings 
 
I use interviews with senior market practitioners to investigate the short-sale 
reluctance puzzle. I identify and categorize five direct constraints and twenty-eight 
indirect constraints. These latter can be grouped into f ve broad, inter-related themes: 
‘risk’, ‘distribution of returns’, ‘institutional constraints’, ‘social constraints’ and 
‘personal constraints’. I find that market practitioners with different functional roles 
believe that different factors account for the short-sale reluctance puzzle. Indirect 
constraints are sometimes more important than direct constraints in explaining why 
some firms that invest or advise on investment are reluctant to practice short-selling. 
 
Diether et al. (2008) suggest that it could be considered ‘un-American’ to short-sell. 
If this is a reference to patriotism, I find that it cannot be generalized globally as 
patriotic reasons are firmly rejected by all intervi wees. In so far as it suggests that it 
is ‘anti-capitalist’ to short-sell, there is only limited evidence to back up this notion. 
There is also limited evidence at best to support D’Avolio’s (2002) notion that ‘fear 
of tracking error’ is a key constraint to short-selling. Arguably, it is the setting of 
tracking error limits by risk managers or clients that has been a barrier to short-
selling, rather than investment managers’ fear of tacking error. The results from my 
interviews could be ‘location specific’ or ‘group secific’. However, they do reveal 
that some suggestions made in the literature cannot be generalized globally – an 
important finding in itself. 
 
I identify two new social indirect constraints on short-selling: the ‘trading not 
investing’ constraint and the ‘lack of stakeholder acceptance’ constraint. Several 
interviewees argue that the latter is diminishing ad believe that this helps to explain 
the growth of short-selling in recent years. The distinction between investing and 
trading is an important finding from this research. There are two facets to this 
argument. First, there is a legal distinction betwen the two activities: investing 
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confers ownership and voting rights and responsibilities; short-selling does neither. 
The second distinction concerns time horizon – investors are generally perceived to 
have longer time horizons than speculators. Social constraints such as ‘lack of 
acceptance’ and ‘trading not investing’ are, in a sense, the collective wisdom of 
market participants built up over many years. This collective wisdom serves to guide 
or warn responsible members of society on how to behav  (or how not to behave) in 
investment matters. In any legal dispute over, say,prudent behaviour, the trustee who 
has observed social constraints is on safer ground. By contrast, some personal 
constraints, such as ‘lack of knowledge’, lack such rationality. Academics have a role 
to play in reducing the constraints around short-selling. I find that the works of 
Clarke et al. (2002, 2004, 2008) have had a profound impact on interest in short-
selling, by addressing the ‘negative expected return problem’ and ‘benchmarking 
constraints’. This suggests that there are rewards for those able to design portfolio 
structures that overcome specific indirect short-sale constraints. Furthermore, such 
work assists in the gradual convergence of market practice towards the theoretical 
assumption of a stock market with many arbitrageurs, constantly trading in such a 
manner as to drive stock prices towards fair value. 
 
To build on the findings from the interviews, I obtain a comprehensive, commercial 
set of daily data on UK stock lending, from its inception on September 3rd, 2003 
through to May 31st, 2007. As stock lending can serve as a proxy for sh rt-selling, 
this data set allows for a quantitative analysis of indirect constraints on short-selling.  
I use the dataset to study crowded exits, manipulative short squeezes and the 
behaviour of short-sellers in response to accounting losses.  
 
Crowded exits are a liquidity problem unique to short-sellers. They have yet to be 
examined in the literature, and this study fills this gap. I find that crowded exists are 
associated with losses to short-sellers that are economically and statistically 
significant. As such, the risk of a crowded exit represents an indirect constraint on 
short-selling. I show that stocks with higher short interest, smaller sizes and poorer 
liquidity are more likely to have crowded exits. Short-sellers can manage risk by 
limiting exposure to such stocks. Furthermore, given the prolonged nature of 
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crowded exits, short-sellers should cover their short p sitions immediately upon 
observing exceptional levels of covering by other shorts-sellers in crowded positions. 
However, such short-covering will in itself exacerbate the crowded exit effect. A 
further difficulty in this process is that data on stock lending and short-selling is 
often publicly available only with a time delay. Under such circumstances, private 
data on short-covering can become valuable.  
 
It is rational for investors to take account of published evidence on stock market 
anomalies. A substantial body of literature shows that heavily shorted stocks (and 
stocks with increasing shorting demand) perform poorly. These studies suggest a 
potential trading strategy for short-sellers: identify heavily shorted stocks (or stocks 
with increasing shorting demand) and build short positions in those stocks. However, 
such imitation changes the market dynamics and can lead to unexpected 
consequences. Short-positions become more crowded with imitation, and the risk of 
‘crowded exits’ increases. This could lead to examples of ‘counter-performativity’, 
as described by MacKenzie (2006), whereby the widespread and plentiful practice of 
short-selling, as assumed in economic models such as Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 
leads not necessarily to a more efficient market, bu  to an increasing number of 
occasions on which stock prices move temporarily away from fair value. Given the 
importance of the path of stock returns to investors employing leverage (who are 
liable to margin calls or subject to loan covenants) or to investment agents using 
open-ended fund structures (who are subject to the risk of redemption by clients), 
even temporary market imbalances can have important implications. Crowded exits 
can thus create path dependency problems for short-ellers. 
 
By developing a definition for an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’, it becomes 
possible to identify and examine patterns consistent with manipulative short 
squeezes. I investigate the abnormal returns around these events and the 
characteristics of the stocks subject to these events. My findings show that 
manipulative short squeezes are rare events. Out of a sample constituting nearly half 
a million firm days, I am able to identify only 20 events that satisfy my definition of 
an ‘apparent manipulative short squeeze’. However, where such squeezes do occur, 
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short-sellers lose money. I find statistically significant abnormal returns around these 
events that are also economically significant with an average cumulative stock return 
of 3.45% in the ‘pump’ phase and 2.26% during the ‘squeeze’ phase. These are 
followed by a price reversal, but short-sellers who have covered their positions do 
not benefit from this effect. There is some (weak) support for the notion that trading 
volume and the volatility of stock returns is elevated before an ‘apparent 
manipulative short squeeze’. Liquidity is poorer: it takes more days to cover a short 
position just before the squeeze than on average during the previous three months. 
However, it is difficult to forecast manipulative short squeezes from knowledge of 
this pattern. The risk of becoming a victim of a manipulative short squeeze can be 
mitigated through the use of ‘term’ stock loans and excess borrowing to create a 
‘buffer’ against loan recall; and by restricting shorting to the larger, more liquid 
stocks amongst which manipulative short squeezes are rare. However, each of these 
techniques incurs either a cost or an opportunity cost.  
 
By showing that manipulative short squeezes are rare for larger, more liquid stocks, 
my results provide support for the Jacobs and Levy (2007) assertion that short 
squeezes generally only affect smaller, less liquid stocks. The Volkswagen case 
provides a rare, but economically significant, exception to this pattern. This case 
shows that where liquidity is constrained (e.g. by a limited free float), even large 
stocks can exhibit patterns consistent with manipulative short squeezes. The 
contribution of this research is that my results should assist in replacing the fear of 
manipulative short squeezes with a more evidence-bas d perspective. 
 
Finally, I build upon the work of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007) and investigate 
the response of short-sellers to losses. I improve upon existing research in two ways. 
First, I use daily data, which is better suited than monthly data for examining short-
selling activity. Secondly, I incorporate into the analysis an estimate of the weighted-
average price at which short positions are initiated. This permits a study of short-




I find that short-sellers close their positions in response to accounting losses and not 
simply in response to rising share prices. This is a key observation and a distinction 
from the findings of Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor (2007). Short-sellers do not exhibit 
an aversion to realizing accounting losses, but insead accept their losses or 
‘mistakes’ systematically. Stocks subject to short-c vering in this manner do not 
subsequently under-perform the market, and so thereis no evidence of an investment 
performance cost (other than transaction costs) associated with immediately covering 
short positions that fall to an accounting loss. This behavior is consistent with short-
sellers’ use of risk management tools that are design d to crystallize small losses. 
These serve to limit the risk of potentially unlimited losses and to reduce short 
exposure to stocks at times of heightened synchronization risk. My findings 
contribute to the literature on loss realization aversion and the ‘disposition effect’. I 
show that a sophisticated group of traders, strongly associated with price setting, are 
not averse to realizing losses. This has important implications for asset pricing.  
 
A problem for short-sellers is that the predictable us  of risk management tools such 
as stop losses can itself lead to a new risk – predation risk (see Brunnermeier and 
Pederson, 2005). To mitigate this second-order risk, short-sellers should be cautious 
about disseminating information on their capital strength and short sale positions. 
They might also consider making use of stop-losses based on a stock’s impact on 
fund performance, rather than on accounting loss thresholds; alternatively, they could 
incorporate some degree of randomness into their behaviour. 
 
Taken together, the qualitative and quantitative findings from this thesis should 
further our understanding of indirect constraints on short-selling. My hope is that this 








An important issue with the qualitative part of this thesis is the transferability, or 
‘generalizability’, of the results from my interviews within the Scottish investment 
community. The results I obtain could be unique to this community, or biased by 
specific ‘Scottish’ factors. In fact, one interviewe argues that “Edinburgh is an 
investing city” (as opposed to a ‘trading’ city) suggesting at least one ‘local’ factor of 
importance to this study. However, by studying one i vestment community, I am 
able to test whether or not a series of constraints suggested in the literature can be 
generalized ‘globally’. I find two examples of constraints, put forward in the 
literature, that are refuted by this community. 
   
In Chapters 6 and 7, I study crowded exits and manipulative short squeezes. These 
two concepts have been described in the literature and are understood by many 
practitioners, but have yet to be formally defined. Where definitions have been 
attempted in the literature, they tend to be in the form of general descriptions or 
explanations that do not lend themselves to clear, formulaic definitions. It thus 
becomes difficult to undertake rigorous academic study of the concepts and their 
implications for investors. To tackle this problem, I establish clear, formulaic 
definitions and proceed to study the distribution of returns that follow from these 
definitions. I undertake robustness tests around the definitions, to better understand 
the implications of changing definitions. Although setting definitions allows study 
into areas that have been under-researched, it also serves as a limitation of this 
research, in that one can object to the subjectivity nvolved in setting the definitions. 
Nevertheless, this is something that must (and has been) done in many areas of social 
science research, from research into poverty (where a threshold must be set to define 
poverty) to research into emerging markets (where definitions must be created to 
establish the boundary between developed and emerging markets). 
 
A further limitation of the dataset used is that it includes only the larger stocks listed 
on the London Stock Exchange. The lowest market capitalization of stocks in my 
dataset is around £25 million. This would be considere  ‘small-cap’ but not ‘micro-
cap’ in the context of the London Stock Exchange. However, I am able to provide 
support for the assertion that manipulative short squeezes, to the extent they take 
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place at all, largely only affect smaller, less liquid stocks by showing that they are 
rare for larger, more liquid stocks. By observing the differences in returns between 
equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, Asquith et al. (2005) demonstrate 
that the level of short-selling is more informative as a negative sentiment indicator 
for smaller capitalization stocks than for larger stocks. However, Au et al. (2007) 
suggest that a study based on larger capitalization st cks will produce more 
conservative estimates for the relationship between short-selling and stock returns 
compared to a study that includes smaller, less liquid stocks, thus suggesting a degree 
of conservatism in my findings.    
 
Another limitation of this research is that it uses stock lending data as a proxy for 
short-selling. Direct data on short-selling is not publicly available in the UK. Instead, 
stock lending data is available, on a daily basis. The process of short-selling 
generally requires stock to be borrowed to facilitate settlement of the trade, and so 
stock lending data acts as a proxy for short-selling data. However, securities lending 
can take place for a variety of reasons (see Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4), and so stock 
lending does not solely reflect short-selling. There are other problems associated 
with using stock lending data as a proxy for short-selling. First, ‘naked’ short-selling 
and intra-day shorting do not require the delivery of stock for settlement at the end of 
the day, and so would not be revealed by daily stock lending data. The extent to 
which market practitioners fulfil their obligations to report stock lending to the 
market authorities is a further limitation on the use of stock lending data as a proxy 
for short-selling. Discussions with practitioners involved in stock lending suggest 
that this problem is rare, but unavoidable. Finally, derivatives can be used to effect 
transactions that are economically equivalent to short-selling (see, for example, Ofek 
et al., 2004). These trades are referred to as “synthetic short-sales”. The extent to 
which the use of derivatives to facilitate short-selling is transmitted into the stock 
lending market influences the usefulness of stock lending data as a proxy for short-
selling. Discussions with stock-lending practitioners suggest that the majority, but 
not all, synthetic short-sales are ultimately hedged by the counter-parties to those 




To examine the reaction of short-sellers to accounting losses, I incorporate a 
technique for estimating the cost basis of short positions. Specifically, for each stock, 
I observe the average stock price for days on which short positions are increased. I 
then build up over time an estimate of the short-sellers’ cost basis in each stock using 
the volume weighted average price at which stock are sold short. Nevertheless, 
having an actual cost basis would enhance the research. Even if data on actual cost 
bases should remain unavailable, a longer series of data would allow for an increase 
in the formation period for the estimation of the cost bases, thus making such 
estimation more accurate.  
 
A number of studies into short-selling make use of m nthly data (e.g. Senchack and 
Starks, 1993 and Dechow et al., 2001, Gamboa-Cavazos and Savor, 2007). However, 
Christophe et al. (2007) criticise the use of monthly short-selling data, as it 
“represents only a snap-shot of total shorted share on one day during the month.” 
Cohen et al. (2007) find that almost half the securities lending contracts they study 
are closed out within two weeks, while the median co tract length is 11 days. This 
suggests that monthly data could be inadequate for understanding the trading 
practices of short-sellers. The dataset used for this study incorporates daily data on 
shares borrowed (a proxy for shares shorted). This higher frequency data allows for 
an appropriate degree of granularity for the study of manipulative short squeezes, 
crowded exits and the use of stop losses. Neverthelss, a limitation of the dataset is 
that it is unable to capture the activities of intra-day traders – those who open and 
close short-positions within one day.  
 
Some studies obtain trade-by-trade (or ‘flow’) data on stock lending or short-selling. 
These same studies tend to investigate shorter time periods. There is a balance to be 
had, though: although flow data provides the highest d gree of granularity, it would 
be arduous to study flow data for long periods of time. However, studies over longer 
periods could reveal trends and cycles not found in shorter periods. Christophe et al. 
(2007) take flow data for a ten month period and aggre ate it into daily data. 
Similarly, Diether et al. (2008) obtain tick by tick short-sale data for over 3,800 
stocks during 2005 and aggregate it for each stock t  the daily level. This study uses 
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daily data over a 45 month period. It provides greater granularity than studies based 
on monthly data, but investigates a shorter time period than a number of these 
studies. However, I investigate a longer time period than most studies that use trade-
by-trade data. This shows the nature of the compromise between granularity and time 
period studied.   
 
 
9.3 Future Research 
 
The interview-based qualitative analysis undertaken for this thesis was conducted in 
the United Kingdom. As institutional frameworks vary by country or region, further 
study outside of the United Kingdom would be helpful in testing whether or not the 
results can be generalized globally. 
 
For the three empirical studies, I make use of a time period from the start of the UK 
stock lending database in September 2003, through until May 31st 2007. As with any 
empirical study, there are benefits to be derived from the study of a longer time 
period that encompasses different market conditions. For example, while in the 
writing-up phase of this thesis in July 2008, UK and US stock markets experienced a 
series of ‘crowded exits’, as heavily shorted financi l and cyclical stocks recovered 
sharply and short-sellers suffered losses. 
 
Whereas many studies of short-selling activity make us  of monthly data on short-
interest, this study uses daily data. This greater granularity allows me to capture the 
activities of short-sellers better, given their short-term trading horizons. 
Nevertheless, even daily data is unable to capture the activities of intra-day traders – 
those who open and close short-positions within one day. Thus, there is a case to be 
made for yet greater granularity and the use of intra-day or flow data in future 
studies.  
 
The behaviour of stock market participants can change i  response to new studies 
and empirical evidence. In particular, knowledge of the risks involved in crowded 
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exits could lead short-sellers to become more aware of crowded positions, or to react 
faster to any drop in short-interest in heavily shorted stocks. A study of changes in 
behavior over time with respect to ‘crowded exit risk’ would be of interest in 
understanding how a ‘sophisticated’ subset of practitioners reacts to new empirical 
evidence.       
 
Another potential line of investigation relates to the predictable behavior of short-
sellers in response to accounting losses. A logical step is to examine whether such 
predictable behavior can be exploited by other trade s. For example, one or more 
large predatory traders, who know the cost basis of a short-seller, would be able to 
buy stock and exert upwards price pressure on the stock price. Where the stock price 
rises above the costs basis of the short-seller, this would prompt the short-seller to 
cover his position, in accordance with his stop loss process. The empirical literature 
on predatory trading would benefit greatly from such a study, as it would reveal 
whether or not short-sellers can become the victims of predatory trading. If so, then 
the use of stop losses - an apparently sensible risk-control mechanism designed to 
deal with the potential for unlimited losses - could in practice expose short-sellers to 
a new risk – ‘predation risk’. Such a study could seek to measure the abnormal 
returns around such events, and to understand the risks involved for both predator 
and prey. Related to this would be an investigation into ‘optimal strategies’ for short-
sellers in light of the need to balance the mitigation of unlimited loss potential 
(leading to the use of stop losses) with the minimization of predatory trading risk 
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Short-selling generally represents a small proportion of market activity. Why do you 
believe that short-selling is so uncommon?  
 
What is your, and your firm’s, attitude towards short-selling?  
 
What factors influence your view on short-selling? 
 
How much of an influence on your attitude to short selling is attributable to: 
• the costs of short selling (e.g. borrowing ‘specials’)  
• constraints (legal, regulatory, institutional)  
• risks of short-selling (e.g. unlimited loss potential; size of short position 
grows as price rises; ‘blow-up’ risk to reputation a d brand, plus the management 
effort required to solve any such problem; synchronicity risk)  
•  the impact of short-selling on expected portfolio returns influence your 
decision not to be involved in short-selling? (If yes to the above, would you consider 
using index futures to counteract this effect?) 
• a desire not to produce tracking error against a benchmark. 




What are your clients’ opinions on short selling? 
 
Do you believe that short sellers have special skils relative to long-only managers? 
 
Do you believe that hedge fund managers justify their fe s in aggregate? 
 
What proportion of your business do you envisage will involve short-selling in the 
long-term?  
 






What is your firm’s attitude towards lending securities?  
 
What factors influence your decision on securities lending? 
 







Are you ever aware of the presence of short-sellers in companies whose shares you 
hold long? 
 
Does knowledge about the presence of short-sellers ver influence your behaviour? 
 
------------ 
